tures.

Scripture expressly asserts the doctrine of the Two NaLike that of the Trinity, it is a mere inference from the premises laid down by Trinitarians. I know of no allusion in the Bible to the doctrine of the Two Natures, either with or without modification.

But an objection of a graver character lies against the doctrine of the Two Natures. It implicates the moral character of the Holy Jesus; it impeaches his veracity; and exposes him to the charge of equivocation, duplicity, and falsehood. These are weighty charges; and we cannot endure, for a moment, a hypothesis which throws suspicion of dishonesty upon our blessed Saviour.

Jesus said, "I can of mine own self do nothing." The Trinitarian says, Jesus can of himself do every thing that God can do. Jesus said, "My Father is greater than I." The Trinitarian says, Jesus is as great as the Father. To one unacquainted with the use that is made of the doctrine of the Two Natures, these assertions appear to be palpable contradictions. He cannot perceive how the assertions of Jesus, and those of Trinitarians, can both be true.

But

here comes in the doctrine of the Two Natures to reconcile the apparent contradictions.

66

"Jesus is both God and

man," says the Trinitarian. And though as man, he can do nothing of himself, yet as God, he can do every thing. Though as man, he is not his Father's equal, yet as God, he is equal with the Father in substance, and power, and glory." But if he is God, can he say in truth, that he can do nothing of himself? What, can God do nothing of himself! If he is God, can he say in truth, My Father is greater than I? What, is the Father greater than God! For a man to assert that he cannot do what he is conscious that he can do, is to say what is not true. For what a man can do, in any way, or by any means, he can certainly do. Suppose a man should be required to

subscribe his name to a written instrument; and that he should refuse to do it, saying, "I cannot write, I cannot wield the pen. I never learned to write." Suppose it should be known that this man could write; that an explanation should be demanded; and that he should say, he only meant that he could not write with his left hand, though he could use the pen with his right hand as well as any man. Would not such a man subject himself to the charge of equivocation, duplicity, and falsehood?

The disciples came to Jesus with these questions: “Tell us, when shall these things be? and what shall be the sign when all these things shall be fulfilled?" After some explanation and caution, Jesus answered thus: "But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the SON, but the FATHER only." The Trinitarian says, the Son knew perfectly both the day and the hour. Here the doctrine of the Two Natures is again employed to solve the difficulty. "Jesus being God as well as man," says the Trinitarian," he must have known the day and hour as God, though he did not know it as man. When he said he did not know the day and hour, he spoke of his human nature only." But is this satisfactory? The disciples came to Jesus not to inquire into any distinctions in his nature, but to obtain information of a different kind. Now if Jesus had two.natures, the one omniscient, and the other "of imperfect knowledge," would he not consider the questions addressed to the nature that knew, rather than the nature that did not know, the subject about which the disciples came to inquire? Most certainly. Yet Jesus not only said that the Son did not know, but that the Father only knew. All other persons, besides the Father, whether they be persons in the Trinity or out of it, are excluded from the knowledge of the day and hour.

Let us suppose that å murder is committed in the city of Boston, at noon, by some person or persons unknownthat suspicion fastens upon an innocent man, who, at the time of the murder, was in New-York-and that he is charged with the crime, apprehended, and brought to trial. The prisoner summons in his defence a witness, who saw hiin in New-York, about noon, the same day the murder was committed in Boston. This witness, being under oath, is asked, "Did you see the prisoner in New-York on that day?" The witness answers, "I did not." This being the only witness for the defendant, he is convicted, and hanged. After the execution, this witness confesses that he did see the man that was hanged, in New-York, on the day and hour specified at the trial. Being required to answer for himself, he says, under oath, that his left eye was defective; only his right eye was sound. And when he testified in court that he did not see the prisoner, he meant that he did not see him with his defective eye; but he saw him distinctly with his sound eye. Now, I ask, would not all honest men consider such a witness perjured? The only difference I can see, between the conduct of such a witness, and that which the doctrine of the Two Natures imputes to Jesus, is, that what Jesus said was not said under the solemnity of an oath. Knowledge is the eye of the mind. Jesus is said to have two capacities of knowledge-his divine and his human nature. The one is strong and piercing, knowing all things. The other is weak and defective, being ignorant of many things. As such an one, he says, in regard to the time of a certain event, he does not know the day nor the hour. He makes no exception of one of his capacities of knowledge; but says, absolutely, he does not know the time. No one knows but the Father. Yet the doctrine of the Two Natures supposes that Jesus did know the day and hour; and that

when he said he did not know, he spoke only of his capacity of knowledge which is weak and defective.

Another objection to the doctrine of the Two Natures is, that it renders it impossible to understand or believe any thing that Jesus says of himself. The terms I, me, myself, mine own self, always denote one person, an individual; they include the whole person, all that constitutes him a -person. In this sense they were unquestionably used by Christ. When he said, I, me, myself, he could not have meant a part of himself. He could not have meant that part of himself which is infinitely less than another part of himself. If it be admitted that Jesus did not mean himself, his whole self, all that constituted his proper personality, there is no assertion he ever made but what may be contradicted. One has only to say, This he did as man, it is not true of him as God, therefore it is not true; and this he did as God, it is not true of him as man, therefore it is not true." In this way, every assertion he ever made of himself, may be contradicted. In this way, we may deny his birth, his crucifixion, his death, and his resurrection, because these were true of him only as man, not as God. If, instead of saying, "My Father is greater than I," he had said, I am not so great as my Father, I am not equal with the Father, I am not God, I am not equal with God," we have only to say, " This he spoke as man, hence it is not true," in order to set his testimony, concerning himself, aside. Now can a doctrine be admitted, which renders his plainest sayings unintelligible, and makes it absolutely impossible for him to deny that he is God, if he had a mind to do so?

That Trinitarians see and condemn this kind of sophistry, when employed about other matters, may be seen by the following quotation. "See Dr. Stillingfleet's Sermon on Matt. x. 16, speaking of the equivocations of Popish Priests,

There

whose common answer, when examined about what they know by confession, is, that they know it not; which they think to vindicate from the charge of lying by saying, that in confession, the Priest knows matters as God, not as man, and therefore he denies to know them, meaning as a man. But, says the Doctor, this is absurd; because to say he does not know, is as much as to say he doth not any way know. Now if this be good against the Papists, as no doubt it is, then sure it is so in the present case. fore when Christ says he knows not the day of judgment, it is as much as to say he does not any way know it, and consequently, it is a vain shift to say, it was as man only. We must beware lest we bring the Holy Jesus under such a reproach for equivocation, as the Romish Priests lie under; and make the Jesuits themselves think they have a good title to that name, by imitating herein his example, according to this interpretation."

The doctrine of the Two Natures throws obscurity over the sacred pages, and renders passages which are sufficiently plain, quite unintelligible. Take, for example, Heb. i. 1, 2: "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed heir of all things, by whom also he made the worlds." Admitting that this passage relates to the creation of the natural world, what does the word Son denote according to the doctrine of the Two Natures? Does it denote the divine, or the human nature? Or does it comprehend both natures? Son cannot mean the divine nature, because God cannot be appointed heir of all things, inasmuch as he is the original proprietor and independent owner of all things. Son cannot mean the human nature, because the worlds were created thousands of years before the human nature existed. Son cannot denote both natures,