Thus, if I by my make and constitution be an intelligent and voluntary agent; then ought I to find out the reafon of things, and in all my actions comply with it. That is, I ought to find out the difference of good and evil upon a moral confideration, and comply with that difference; I ought in the use of my liberty and freedom, to determine myself to good only, and avoid and efchew all evil. And this I call neceffary matter, or indifpenfible; there is such a relation between these terms, that these terms are infeparable; for this is that which is proper to mind and understanding, to find out the nature of things; and mind and understanding in man doth as much enable man to diftinguish things in their goodness, as light does enable man to distinguish colours. ther inftance: if I be apprehenfive of God, I ought to reverence him, and to have him in regard; for wherefore are the creatures below us excufed from all acts of reverence and devotion toward God, but from their incapacity? Another inftance: if I am beholden to God, as I am, for his gracious communication and influence, my maintenance in being, and protection from evil; then ought I to be thankful. And these are inftances of the highest order; and a man will be felf-condemned if he do not approve himself in these things. -But in things al

Ano

fo of a lower order. It is juft and right for a child to honour a parent; and this is grounded upon the proportion these terms bear one to another, a child and a parent. The like is between a mafter and a fervant; a fervant is to do his mafter's work, this is juft in itself. Further, where any is compounded of a grofs

grofs body and an immortal foul, the better and more noble part is to have the preeminence, and the other fub-ordination; therefore men ought to make fubfervient to the state of their fouls all bodily conveniences; they ought not to neglect the use of their natural faculties, nor to use their natural faculties for the gratifying of their sensual appetite. These are things right and just in themselves. One instance more; in ufe of all perfons with whom we do converfe, we are to deal with all men as we would be dealt with our felves. These are the things that I instance in, that are right in themselves, where the nature of the things doth determine, and there needs no foreign power nor use of liberty; for no power can give a difpenfation, neither can any man in the use of his liberty depart from them; none in the world can pretend to power or privilege beyond the confines of these. So that, not by opinion, but by the nature of the thing, right is constituted; and it is not to be altered by any power whatsoever. But,

2. Right is determined by pofitive conftitution; and that is in two cafes; by the right of property, and by the right of authority.- -By the right of pro perty, every man may do with his own as he will; he may keep it, or difpofe of it as himself pleafeth. By the right of authority; he that hath power makes laws as he finds caufe, and fo he doth determine right; and a man is wanting to his duty, that doth not observe them for it is to be supposed that the law of the place is not the inftitution of a particular will, but that it is in conjunction with right, and agreeable with univerfal reafon. So, according to law,

in this cafe, is according to right. I might add, that custom and common ufage found right, or if not abfolutely found right, at least it is to be imagined they concur with right, because they have fo long obtained, and that they begun by contract and agreement, and had general consent, (though at this time it doth not appear,) and that depends upon the wisdom of a nation; and the wisdom of a nation is more likely to be right, than the sense of any particular person; and therefore that may be called juft, which is done with reafon according to usage and custom. Likewife prescription is a good argument of right; for right is thought to go along with practice, and title with poffeffion; for if any body had had a demand to the contrary, why did not the world hear of it before? We may also hold tacito confenfu; and there are these titles among us, that is, there is one in poffeffion, but if another would, he might be outed; he comes into poffeffion duly, and he may hold it without trouble of conscience, until he that hath right to difpofe makes a demand; fo that he is not thought to be a wrongful doer, who holds by tacit consent.

And fo much for juft: which though it belongs to the common dictates of reason, of which every one hath a copy writ with the finger of God in his foul, and though it may appear to be rather law than gofpel, yet it is highly neceffary.

And now for equal: and that is determined to be equal, that gives allowance where the cafe doth require, and where abatement is made upon reasonable confideration: but then there is that which is beyond all this; and that is, what we call mercifulness, gra

cioufnefs,

ciousness, compaffion, benignity; when a perfon out of his own good nature, or in a sense of Gods goodnefs unto him, or in the confideration of the fallibility and frailty of human nature, will do more than reasonably can be demanded or expected: there are fuch men in the world, tho' the world hath been bleffed but with few of them; I am fure God deals thus with men, though men with men deal thus but feldom; but that God doth thus, I make it thus appear. We fay that God doth compaffionate every compaffionable cafe; and we may alfo fay, that the cafe of every penitent is a compaffionable case ; for man was never better than finite and fallible, and if a finite and fallible creature fail and do amifs, (as by the nature of his make he is subject to,) if he repent and revoke what he hath unduly done, that alters the cafe, and the cafe is compaffionable. And God himself hath declared, that he doth not do alike in all cafes; for although he hath threatned a finner or finful nation, yet if they repent, he doth not account himself engaged to punish; and if a righteous perfon leave his righteoufnefs, God doth not think himself engaged to perform his promife. It is the notion of Origen; " If a man fin, and superadd im"penitence, and be obftinate and contumacious in "his fin, the goodness of God requires him to con"troul this man; for it is good that a contumacious "finner be taken off by power, and punished; but "God's goodness and righteousness doth engage "him to do good to a finner, if he doth repent and "call for it. God by his goodness doth punish contumacy God by his juftice doth relieve peniten

:

cy."

cy." And this is Origen. For juftice and righteousness in God, doth not carry along with it the neceffity of punishment, if there be repentance; but juftice and righteousness are often exegetical one of another; and the righteousness of God is his benignity, clemency, compaffion, and readiness to forgive; or else it is his fidelity. Wherefore the righteousness of God, or his goodness, being confidered, there is an effectual invitation of finners to repent, and great encouragement to revoke what hath been unduly done. But I have no word of comfort to finners who fuperadd contumacy and impenitency to fin; for the goodness of God doth engage him to controul them; for it is good, not only juft, but good and fit in itself, that an obftinate and contumacious finner be controuled; but the case of every one that repents and leaves off to fin, and returns to duty, and deprecates God's difpleasure, is compaffionable; and it is amplitude, and liberty, and freedom both in God and man, to have it in his power to commiferate, and to be always free to compaffionate every compaffionable cafe and whofoever it is that is bound up either by his own conftitution and temper, or by his own refolution or decree, or by any impofition from abroad from fhewing mercy freely; he is in a ftate of narrowness, shortness, contractedness, imperfection; and therefore it cannot be the cafe of God: for it is the greatest perfection to be able to do the most good, to afford the greatest relief, to allow the largest compaffion; and this as in regard of power, fo alfo in refpect of will; it is goodness of will to have a mind to do it, and greatness of power to be able to do it.

Now