tion of the suggestion of which I am now stating only a very general outline.

Let us suppose that we act upon the principle of this suggestion, and that peace is not restored sooner than the end of the year 1816. We should, by that time, have mortgaged the Sinking Fund to the amount of about six millions. Its whole amount applicable to the reduction of debt, in 1816, would be upwards of 18 millions. It is not over-sanguine to assume, that by the effect of the continuance of such a Sinking Fund, with its annual improvement, for two years after a peace, the interest on the five per cent. stock might be reduced to four per cent. On the other hand, it cannot be denied by those who are acquainted with the nature of our war-taxes, that several of the most productive (independent of the property tax, which, in a more or less proportion, must, I think, be continued, at least for some years, as the foundation of our peace establishment) might without difficulty be maintained for two years after the restoration of peace; say till the close of 1818. The Sinking Fund would then have reached nearly to twenty millions. By deducting the aid of the war-taxes, it would, in the year 1819, be reduced to somewhat above fourteen millions, or fifteen, if the saving by the contemporaneous reduction of the five per cents should be allotted to it. From that period, so long as peace should continue, we should have annually the gratifying task to perform, of remitting to the people more or less of their burdens; and we might look back upon our past difficulties with the cheering recollection, that a firm adherence to the principles laid down by Mr. Pitt in 1792 had enabled us to provide for all the exigencies of this tremendous and protracted contest, without for a moment swerving from that strict good faith which at once raises our character and doubles our resources; at once enables us, by exertions unparalleled in our history, to uphold the glory of our arms in every quarter of the world, and to find in the public credit at home the means by which such exertions are to be sustained.

I will not weary the Committee by going into further details of the alteration which I could wish to see introduced into the plan of my Right Honorable Friend. If the principle of that alteration should once be admitted by him, I am sure that he would be infi

nitely more competent to direct its application than myself. By adopting it, he would remove the only insuperable objection which I feel to its plan; that which arises from its directly breaking in upon the Sinking Fund, and diminishing its effective amount and operation, under circumstances, which, according to my Right Honorable Friend's own words, more than once quoted by me, render such interference neither consistent "with JUSTICE to the Stockholder, nor with SAFETY to the State."

The following is the CORRESPONDENCE with the EDITOR of the TIMES, referred to in our last No. p. 493, relative to the AMERICAN QUES

TION.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

Sir,

LETTER I.

Times, August 12, 1812.

I CONSIDER Mr. Madison's Message of June 1, not as a prelude to war (for that, I hope, will not, to any considerable extent, take place between Great Britain and the United States), but rather as the official exposition of a certain political system, embraced by the leading party in America. As such it deserves serious attention, on both sides of the Atlantic. I shall not at present enter into its general character: but shall first examine its principal topics in detail. Hereafter I may attempt to show how they harmonise, and from what spirit they proceed.

Beginning with that which stands first in the list of grievances, I perceive that, stripped of its rhetorical florishes, it is merely an allegation that British cruisers have been in the continued practice of seizing persons, sailing on the high seas, in American vessels.

First, then, this is no neae provocation for war. If it be any provocation at all, it is one under which Mr. Madison has long been content to be passive; and I must presume, that he did not think such forbearance disgraceful to his country. The evil, whatever it may be, cannot have increased of late years; for the President has taken good care to preserve American ships from all danger but that of rotting

in their own harbours. It is evidently, therefore, set in the "head and front of our offending," for no other reason than to heighten and exasperate party-feelings, and to predispose the popular mind for the reception of charges against us obviously too slight to stand alone.

Secondly, This is not an act of State. It is a practice, which, for aught that appears, may in all its obnoxious features be totally opposite to the wishes and regulations of the British Government. It is impossible for human prudence to devise means of protecting the national and personal rights of both countries, which shall not be liable to some abuse in point of fact. To make such abuses, when formally disavowed, and really discountenanced by the respective Governments, a pretence for war, would be mere clicanery. It is asserted that the United States have remonstrated on this subject in vain. I take upon me to say, that if it be meant to intimate, that the British Government has disregarded official complaints of this kind, relating to individual natives of America, the assertion is totally false. It would be idle to deny, that any native American citizen was ever taken against his will into the British Navy. The similarity of language, names, and appearance-the defective laws and practices of the Americans themselves, and many other obvious causes, must have produced such occurrences; although I am convinced, that they will be found, on accurate investigation, to have been very rare indeed. The British Government has never learnt an instance of such an event, but with regret; nor ever refused to interpose, when it was possible to ascertain the truth of the representation, and to restore the individual to his country. It might, perhaps, have gone farther, and have adopted some general arrangement in coucert with the American Goternment, for the security of their mutual interests. It is to be presumed, that the British were at least as desirous of this as the Americans; for they were full as deeply interested in it. No man, who knows any thing of the subject, will deny, that the British Navy has suffered far more from desertions, encouraged and abetted by the citizens of America, than it can possibly have gained by the impressment of native Americans. I have no doubt, but that each party has "formally assured" the other of its "readiness to enter into arrangements on this subject;" but I am quite certain, that no specific and satisfactory proposal has been made on the part of America, and rejected on that of Great Britain.

Thirdly, I come to consider what is the "crying enormity" of the practice complained of. The British Government disavows any pretence of right to take native American citizens, in any vessel. It dis

claims the exercise of a right (if any such right exist) to take even native British subjects out of the public ships of the United States. Mr. Madison's complaint, therefore, reduces itself to this,-that we take our own native-born subjects out of American merchant vessels, on the high seas, or, as he phrases it, on the great highway of na. tions." Let us try the question by this analogy. I meet a runaway apprentice, or child of my own, on the common highway of the king dom: May I not stop him? Undoubtedly I may. But what, if he is riding in my neighbour's cart, or driving his team? Why, my neighbour has either acted in ignorance of my prior right; or, if he knew it, he has done a very unneighbourly act, in harbouring the fugitive; and either way, my right remains perfectly indisputable.

. However, it is said, a new right has intervened,—an act has been done, which ousts Great Britain of her authority over her own sub. jects. These British deserters have become American citizens. They have been naturalized; and, in the words of Mr. Monroe, "they must be protected." Hear this, ye natives of Massachusets! You are going to war for a principle. You are to hazard your lives and property upon a point in Mr. Jefferson's Code of Rights. At least, then, this point (for which never war before was waged) requires a clear demonstration at least, it must be shown to be consistent with the common sense of mankind in all ages. The British Government certainly claims an authority over its native-born subjects, Mr. Madison (pace tanti viri) absurdly calls this a "municipal prerogative." It is a strict right under the law of nations. It exists equally in peace and war, at home and abroad. Its exercise in alieno solo is controlled, as that of all other rights is, by the local jurisdiction; but, in solo nullius, it remains free to operate without restriction. I am not surprised at Mr. Madison's ignorance of the distinction between international and municipal law; for I remember, that when the Berlin Decree appeared, he called it a municipal regulation: and I also remember, that in a pamphlet commonly attributed to his pen, the author ingenuously confessed, that he had not had an opportunity to read Grotius "in the original Latin." It may be expected, however, that I should oppose to the weight of the President's name, something of higher authority than a mere anonymous dictum. I therefore proceed to trouble you with some references, which, I think, will set the matter at rest.

It is a known axiom, that nemo potest exuere patrium. This is said by Sir Matthew Hale, Sir Michael Foster, and Sir William Blackstone, to be a principle of universal law. Hence, the English lawyers hold with Sir Edward Coke, that all subjects are equally bound to allegiance,