no man could tell what it was, or what defence to "make to it." He then proceeds to state various instances of cruelty and vexation, and concludes with this observation:

"By these, and the like instances that might be given, it appears how arbitrary, and uncertain the "law of treason was BEFORE THE STATUTE of the "25th of Edward the Third, whereby it came to

pass, that almost every offence that was, or "seemed to be, a breach of faith or allegiance, was "by construction, and consequence, and interpreta"tion, raised into the offence of high treason."

To put an end to these evils, therefore, and to give to the harassed subjects of England security and peace, this sacred law was made; but for a season with very little effect, because wicked Judges still broke in upon its protecting letter by arbitrary constructions, insomuch that Lord Hale observes, that although the statute of Edward the Third had expressly directed that nothing should be declared to be treason, but cases within its enacting letter"yet that things were so carried by parties and fac"tions in the succeeding reign of Richard the Second, "that it was little observed; but as this or that party got the better, so the crime of high treason was in a manner arbitrarily imposed and adjudged, which by various vicissitudes and revolutions mischiefed "all parties, first or last, and left a great inquietude and unsettledness in the minds of the people, and was one of the occasions of the unhappiness of

*that King." All these mischiefs, he further observes, arose from breaking the great boundary of treason by a departure from the LETTER of the statute, which was so great a snare to the subject, that after many temporary acts of Parliament passed and repealed, and many vexatious and illegal judgments, clashing with, and contradicting one another, the statute of Queen Mary was at last enacted, which swept them all away, and as Lord Coke observes, in his Commentary upon it, in the Second Institute, not only set up again the very letter of the statute of the 25th of Edward the Third, but repealed all judicial interpretations past, and prohibited all recurrence to them in future.

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I will give it you in his own words: "In this statute of Mary two things are to be observed. First, that the word expressed in the statute of Mary ex*cludes all implications or inferences whatsoever. Secondly, that no former attainder, judgment, precedent, resolution, or opinion of Judges or Justices, of high treason, other than such as are specified and expressed in the statute of Edward the Third, are to be followed or drawn into example. FOR THE WORDS BE PLAIN AND DIRECT— "That from henceforth no act, deed, or offence, "shall be taken, had, deemed, or adjudged to be

high treason, but only such as are declared and "expressed in the said act of the 25th of Edward

the Third, any act of Parliament or statute after the 25th of Edward the Third, or any other de

2

«claration or matter, to the contrary notwithstand ing."

I do therefore maintain, that the statute of King Edward the Third, plain in itself, and rendered still more so by the parliamentary exposition of the act of Queen Mary, is A FEREMPTORY RULE, and that no appeal can be had upon the subject to any writers or decisions, whatever may be the reputation of the one, or the authority of the other.

I find nothing, however, in any writer of character, or in any decision, which deserves the name of authority, to which such an appeal could successfully be made. Lord Hale no where says, that a conspiracy to subvert the Government, of any rébellion, pointed merely at the King's royal authority, is high treason within this branch of the statute. He uniformly considers the crime as a design against the King's NATURAL LIFE; and treats, nothing even as an overt aet of it, that is not so pointed against the King's PERSON, as to be legal evidence of a conspiracy against his EXISTENCE. "If men," says Hale, conspire the DEATH of the King, and "thereupon provide weapons, or send letters in the "execution of it, this is an overt act within this "statute." Undoubtedly it is but mark the principle, and attend to Lord Hale's language, which is plainly this:-If men conspire the DEATH of the King, and do these things in execution of the conspiracy, the things so done are legal evidences of the treason but the treason, which is the intention

of the mind against the King's life, must first exist, before any step could be taken in pursuance of it.

Another passage in Lord Hale, upon which the whole argument against us appears in a manner to be built, is, in my mind, equally clear, and perfectly consistent with the letter of the statute:

"If men conspire to imprison the King BY FORCE "AND A STRONG HAND, until he has yielded to "certain demands, and for that purpose gather

company, or write letters, that is an overt act to

prove the compassing the King's death; for it is "in effect to depose him of his kingly government, "and was so adjudged by all the Judges in Lord "Cobham's case."

Here, you observe, that the conspiracy, even to imprison the King, is not stated as a substantive act of treason, independently of a design against his LIFE, but only as an overt act to prove the compassing of his DEATH; and so far was Hale from considering that constructive attempts upon the King's government or authority, without direct force pointed against his person, could even be offered as evidence to support an Indictment for compassing his death, that he seems anxious to prevent the reader from running to such a conclusion; for he immediately afterwards says, "But then this must be intended "of a conspiracy forcibly to detain and imprison the "King."

Gentlemen, I have only troubled you with these observations, to prevent any thing which has been

offered as evidence upon this trial, from being at all confounded in your minds, as connected with the charge. We have indeed attempted nothing against the King's government; but leaving that still to be the question, there is not a tittle in the whole body of the proof, which has any the remotest relation to any conspiracy to seize the King, or to depose him, which alone could support a charge of compassing the King's death; for the Indictment itself does not point even to any conspiracy to depose the King directly by force against his person, but only constructively, through the medium of a subversion of the go

vernment.

Gentlemen, the charge, therefore, which the Crown seeks to bring home to us, not only as it is to be collected from the Indictment, but as it is explicitly pointed by the argument, is this-that a design was formed to call a convention of the nation, and that the Prisoner at the bar was engaged in it; that he consulted with others for the appointment of committees of co-operation and conference, consisting of the persons now in prison, who were delegated by the two great London Societies at the head of the conspiracy; and that the convention, which was to be assembled as the result of this confederacy, was to destroy, by force, the legal government of the country, and to form itself into a legislature for the nation: thereby superseding, not only the functions of the three branches of Parliament, but the executive authority of the Crown :