ducted in all cases with reasonable despatch (as it certainly now is in all cases as far as the Judges are concerned), but we should be able to ascertain what are the ordinary expenses of suits of different kinds. The expense of each suit might be ascertained by requiring the bills of costs to be filed like the other proceedings, and that returns should be annually made by proper officers.

If filing each bill of costs would be too expensive, or should be otherwise objectionable, there is no reason why the amount of each bill properly verified should not be filed.

To ascertain the average expenses of suits in Chancery would be most important with reference to a question which has not been sufficiently considered, viz. whether, in many cases, the good which results from the centralization of business is not, especially where the subject-matter of litigation is small and the parties interested in it are numerous, and residing at a distance from the central Court, more than overbalanced by the great expenses and delays which might be avoided in a local Court. In all cases where it should be found that the expenses of conducting a suit in Chancery bore so great a proportion to the value of the subject-matter of litigation, as in reality to subject the unsuccessful party to a penal fine in the shape of costs, if those expenses cannot be reduced to a fair amount under the present system of centralization, jurisdiction ought to be given to local Judges, as, for instance, the Judges of the County Courts. There appears to be no reason why the property of a person on his death should not be administered in the most convenient place, viz. the place of his domicil.

Take the case of administering the property of a tradesman or small landed proprietor dying in Cornwall or Cumberland, in the Court of Chancery, might not a County Court Judge be trusted to do what in general an executor in most cases ought to do, viz. to distribute the assets among the creditors according to their priorities? The expenses occasioned by proceedings for that purpose in the Court of Chancery, even under the improved system, are greater than it is believed are necessary. Suppose, for instance (and if we knew the whole truth, it is not unfrequently the case), a person dies leaving

property, real and personal, worth 50007., and debts either 1000, more or less than that amount, if the consequence of a creditors' suit is a bill of costs to the amount of 1000l., and the distribution could have been made in a local Court for 1007., in the first instance creditors of the deceased, in the second his relatives, have been mulcted in the sum of 9007. for the benefit of metropolitan practitioners.

Many take objection to the transfer of jurisdiction to local Courts, and seem to imagine it is impossible that the business which now occupies so much of the time of the Court of Chancery, can be efficiently performed in a provincial forum; in fact, that justice cannot be well administered save within the sound of Bow Bells. As far as the Common Law is concerned, the County Courts have dispelled that illusion; and any person who will examine carefully the bulk of the business which comes before the Court of Chancery, must confess that a very considerable portion of it might be well disposed of by a local Judge, especially if difficulties arising either from a faulty and complicated practice or from conflicting cases, were removed by an efficient mode of procedure,

When difficulties arise in cases where the property in the hands of trustees is very small, where it would be unsafe to make any payment, and at the same time the solution of the difficulty by the obtaining of the opinion of the Court would only result in the absorption of the whole of the property, it might be advisable to give such trustees power to take the opinion of certain official counsel; and on their acting upon such opinion, they should be indemnified in the same manner as under the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853 the Trustees of Charities who obtain and act upon the advice of the Commissioners (16 & 17 Vict., c. 137, s. 16.),

With regard to the question of the Fusion of Law and Equity we seem to be proceeding upon a safe and efficient plan, viz. that of making each Court, whether of Law or Equity, able to do complete justice within itself, without rendering it necessary for the suitor to resort to another Court. Thus, as we have already seen, the Courts of Equity have full power to determine all legal questions. It might possibly be advisable to give them power in certain cases to

call to their assistance, if it should be deemed necessary, a jury, in order to enable them to determine more satisfactorily matters of fact.

With regard to the Courts of Common Law, the same process is going on; by the Common Law Procedure Bill 1854, it will be unnecessary for suitors in a Court of Law to resort, as heretofore, to a Court of Equity. By that Bill it is proposed to give power to the Courts of Common Law to order the production of documents for the purpose of discovery (sect. 50.), and the delivery of written interrogatories for the examination of the opposite party (sect. 51.), to order the specific delivering up of chattels (sect. 77.). It is proposed, moreover, that a defendant may plead an equitable defence (sect. 83.), and even set up such defence after judgment (sect. 84.). Power is also given to the Judges of the Courts of Common Law, upon summary application, to stay proceedings on equitable grounds (sect. 85.), and to restrain a defendant from setting up a defence which he would be restrained from setting up by a Court of Equity (sect. 86.); and power is given to the plaintiff to reply, in answer to any plea of the defendant, facts which absolutely avoid such plea on equitable grounds (sect. 87.).

Another important reform which stills remains to be carried out with reference to the Court of Chancery, is a complete revisal, simplification, and codification of its practice, so as to form it into one harmonious and well arranged system of procedure, where litigants and their advisers could find laid down, in clear and intelligible language, in what mode suits are to be conducted, and what steps are necessary to be taken in different stages of the cause. Our present Chancery practice is derived from various sources-decisions of the Court, traditions of its officers, Acts of Parliament not always clearly expressed or logically arranged, and Orders of the Court, some drawn without reference to others, some fallen into desuetude partial or entire, some partially or entirely over-ruled by an inconsistent series of decisions.

The practice, as derived from these various sources, is, as might be expected, in a most confused state. In Ireland, Lord St. Leonards, when Lord Chancellor, consolidated all the Orders-a work, no doubt (though but one step towards

a perfect Code), of considerable utility; it seems, however, difficult to imagine why we should not have one systematic Code, instead of three without system, arrangement, or unity of purpose or design, viz. that of the statutes, that of the Orders, and that of the decisions, often jarring and conflicting with each other. A minister of justice, by whatever name he might be called, properly understanding and endeavouring to fulfil the duties of his station with honour to himself and advantage to his country, would soon find the means of attaining so desirable an end, without being urged on by the voice of the public, or leaning on the back of a Commission.

ART. VII. REPORT OF THE SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING THE AMENDMENT OF THE LAW.

Report of the Committee on Tribunals of Commerce.

AT the Conference on the assimilation of the Mercantile Laws of the three United Kingdoms, the subject of Tribunals of Commerce was brought forward by the deputies from the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, and at an adjourned meeting of the Conference the following resolution was adopted :

"That the important subject of Local Courts, with compulsory powers and full legal jurisdiction over mercantile causes, is well worthy of the consideration of the Law Amendment Society."

In pursuance of this resolution the subject was referred to a Committee, who have presented the following Report.

The expediency of introducing into this country an exceptional Court to adjudicate in commercial disputes has at various periods engaged the attention of the mercantile classes, it being essential to the welfare of commerce that means should be provided for their speedy, equitable, and cheap settlement.

As early as the reign of Elizabeth', when commerce began to display considerable activity, and maritime assurances became common, the Legislature, with a view to encourage the amicable adjustment of controversies between assurers and assured, established a special Court for determining causes arising out of insurances in the City of London; and to this end empowered the Lord Chancellor to issue year by year a Commission consisting of the Judge of the Admiralty, the Recorder of London, two Doctors of Civil Law, two Common Law Barristers, and eight merchants, to be a Court for the determination of such causes, subject to appeal to the Court of Chancery. The number of Commissioners appointed as a quorum, which was at first fixed at five, was found to be too large, and was subsequently reduced to three2, with a proviso that a Doctor of Civil Law or a Barrister at Law of five years' standing be always one. But owing to the anomalous position in which this Court stood towards the superior Courts of Common Law, and to its jurisdiction being restricted to the City of London, it soon fell into disuse. Objections had been raised relative to the authority of the new Court; first, that it did not extend to an insurance of the life of a person going to sea3, or to suits by the underwriters against the insured; but that which wholly paralyzed the new Court was a decision that a suit pending in it was no bar to a suit at Common Law. From the date of that decision no commission was issued, and all causes were again brought into the Common Law Courts.

The immense increase of commerce of late years, and the increased facility for intercourse with other countries, whether by sea or land, have produced a great change in mercantile transactions, and it cannot be doubted that more efficient means than now exist are required for the prompt administration of commercial law, especially in the large shipping ports. A number of cases might be stated in illustration but it may be sufficient to quote the following general remarks from the valuable Report of the Liverpool Chamber

1 43 Eliz. c. 12.

3 Bender v. Oyle, Style, 166.

13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 23.

;