been long diverging from the very simplest practices into the most discordant doctrines. Our so-called right to seize every person and all the goods of every person of the hostile nation. has, in war on land, ceased in Europe since the Norman invasion, and has been abandoned by all Europeans even in their wars with savages, for many generations. We have retained, and we do still retain, the pretension to seize the person and the property of subjects of the enemy at sea, though engaged in the peaceful operations of commerce with ourselves or our friends. We maintain at sea the practice which has been abandoned on land for 800 years. We have still the laws of War of the Normans and Danes operative on the sea; and the doctrines and principles which it is necessary to maintain to justify our maritime practice would equally justify in war by land the capture of every peaceful labourer of the invaded country, the dispossession of every proprietor, and the conversion into prize of every penny and every article of property of the whole population of the territory we occupy. The ancient simple practice was intelligible and consistent. War involved the dispossession of a whole population of its lands, its goods, the reduction to slavery of all who could be seized, and the investment of the invader with all that the invaded lost. War was then in fact, and not by implication, the war of every man of the one community with every man of the other who came within his reach; and it did as a fact, and not as a fiction, put the vanquished, in person and property, at the disposal of the victor. In such a contest, every one was not merely politically an enemy-he had to defend his own life, liberty, kindred, and goods by his own effort, and was a traitor to himself, his kindred, and his country if he did in person not do his best to destroy or disable every enemy who came within his reach. In such a state of things every man was a soldier, and subject in all his person and property to the burdens of service in war, and the casualties of success or failure. But what was fact then is only now a figment of the publicists. Government and war are both carried on representatively and vicariously. Our paid civil servant does the work which five hundred subjects formerly did in person; our paid soldier does the work and incurs most of the dangers of war, and leaves a hundred men to their peaceful business. The business of war is no longer the business of the subjects, except in maintaining it by contributions, and for political purposes. The stake is now these contributions and these political objects; and not the whole body and goods of every man. Defeat involves perhaps a greater contribution, and the greater or lesser failure of these political objects. Even conquest does not displace one proprietor and replace him by another, it only displaces one government and replaces it by another. Practically, then, the game of war, as it can be contemplated by civilised countries, is no longer a cast for life, liberty, the hearth, the altar, wife and child, and worldly goods: it is now only a contest for political ends, involving only political consequences. Being thus narrowed as to its purpose and its ultimate effects — being thus for the most part prosecuted by special and appropriate political and military agencies, it is to invest a humane practice with a frightful doctrine to represent war as being essentially and as a matter of principle, such a relation of nations and men as it once was in fact, but as it has for the most part ceased to be. Granting that it might by possibility be again carried out to all the frightful extent that it once was, it is dangerous to make an extreme phenomenon the exemplar on which you found your definition, and from which you deduce your consequences theoretical or practical; and an example will be seen of this danger in the comparatively barbarous state of our practice in maritime war fully justified by the publicists' definitions and general doctrines of war, but wholly repudiated in the practice of civilised war on land, and now all but abandoned, even as a pretension, by the enlightened men whose unfortunate lot it has been to see the beginning of another war, but who have done more even in beginning a war than could commonly be done by statesmen in a prosperous peace. For they have removed, as we believe for ever, the most fruitful cause of dispute of recent times; they have made it possible hereafter for all maritime nations to pursue their commerce without resort ing to open war of self-defence, or the scarcely less mischievous state of armed neutrality, which was happily described as war in disguise; and they have, to all appearance, secured to us, and to all the nations of Europe, and of the world, during the prosecution of war, more of the benefits of commerce and communication than existed under the restrictions of the Navigation Laws, even in the state of the most profound and cordial peace. What remains is, that our expositors of the rules of maritime warfare, and our Judges, who will have to apply those rules to practice, may deal as boldly with the fictitious and adventitious doctrines prevalent under the name of the laws of war, as our statesmen have with the prescriptive but mischievous policy which had a twin birth and a conjoined development with them. CHANCERY. -- 1. Charity Election of Clergyman - Cæteris Paribus Construction ofInjunction to restrain Clergyman improperly elected taking Possession of Living. 2. Domicil—by Birth-New, how acquired—Anglo-Indian-Where Persons have Residences in different Countries. 3. Election Power of Appointment. 4. Husband and Wife Separation Deed Injunction to restrain Husband from violating Provisions of. 5. Husband and WifeMortgage of Wife's Leaseholds by Husband-Equity to a Settlement. 6. Husband and Wife-Separation Deed. 7. Misrepresentations-When Proceedings in consequence of, should be taken at Law When in Equity. 8. Mortgagor First and Mortgagee - Puisne Mortgagee offering to pay off first Mortgagee Mortgagee restrained froin selling under Power. 9. Nun- On Profession does not become civiliter mortua. 10. Nun Assignment by, to Convent Bill to enforce, dismissed with Costs-Issue to dry whether Deed duly executed It 1 A few of the most interesting points decided in the Irish Courts of Chancery during this last six or seven years have been noticed in this selection. is intended hereafter to continue doing so regularly. having been declined. Equitable 11. Power to appoint by writing under Seal-Appointment by will not valid 1 Vict. c. 26. 12. Receiver Manager Mines Disputes between Joint-owners and Partners. 13. Vendor's Lien Mortgage by Deposit of Title Deeds-Priorities. 14. Voluntary Assignment Choses in Action. 15. Ward of Court-Enlistment of — Jurisdiction. 16. Will Construction - Next of Kin - Period of Distribution. 17. Witness-Expenses of, when summoned to attend Master under the Winding-up Act. 1. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL V. THE EARL OF Powis. Charity- Election of Clergyman—Cæteris paribus — Construction of— Injunction to restrain Clergyman improperly elected taking possession of Living. By an Act of Parliament (38 Geo. 3. c. 68.), entitled "An Act for the better Government and Regulation of Shrewsbury School," it was, amongst other things, declared, that the right of nomination to the church of St. Mary's was in the mayor, aldermen, and assistants of Shrewsbury, and their successors. And it was enacted that they should appoint "a fit and proper person, duly qualified according to law;" provided that, in such appointment, such a person should be preferred, cæteris paribus, who should have been brought up at the school, and should be a graduate, and also a son of a burgess of Shrewsbury; and if there were no burgess's son, then a preference was to be given, in like manner, to such person of the above description, born in the parish of Chirbury, except that it should be lawful to bestow the living upon either of the masters of the said school, after he should have resigned his mastership, notwithstanding any such claim or preference as last aforesaid, and that such master should be capable of holding the living equally the same as if he had been of the description herein before mentioned." The Trustees elected a clergyman, who, although he had been educated at Shrewsbury School, was not the son of a burgess; and they rejected several candidates who answered all the conditions of being sons of burgesses, of having been brought up at the school at least two years immediately preceding their going to one of the universities, of being graduates of one of the universities, and of being fit and proper persons duly qualified by law. Upon an information filed against the trustees, Wood, V. C. issued an injunction restraining the clergyman elected by the majority of the trustees from taking possession of the church, he being of opinion that the words, "cæteris paribus," in the statute, had reference to the previous qualification of being "a fit and proper person, duly qualified by law," and not to the general qualifications of a clergyman. |