waste;" and held that a trustee to whom real property was devised in trust for a person for life, could not interfere with the possession of the equitable tenant for life, because he neglected to keep the property in repair; but that if the tenant for life was committing active waste, the trustee might, and probably ought, to interfere, at least if the persons entitled in remainder were under disability. A trustee was, therefore, not liable to the remainderman for the neglect of a tenant for life to repair. "I think," said his Honour, "that it is not possible to obtain a remedy against permissive waste indirectly, through the medium of a trust created in the property. If I were to hold that, it would be most inconvenient. If every trustee is to be considered liable, though merely a trustee under a will which devises the property to and to his use, as in Denton v. Denton (7 Beav. 388.), in cases of permissive waste for want of repairs, the difficulty which is now felt of getting respectable persons to act as trustees would be increased. I can foresee no end to the demands which would be made upon trustees by remaindermen coming into possession of the trust property, who might think it not sufficiently repaired, if they might say to the trustees, 'it was your duty to look after the tenant for life, you had the legal estate, and it was your business to see that he was performing all those trusts; and as you have not done so, we shall fix you with the liability.' I think that such a doctrine cannot possibly be established."

22. CABLE V. CABLE. 16 Beav. 507.

Will-Construction— Next of Kin― Period of Distribution.

In the above-mentioned case, the rule laid down 20 L. R. 192. (see In the Matter of the Trusts of the Will of Daniel Barber, 36.) as to the period for distribution amongst the next of kin has been again acted upon. The facts are as follows:- A testator bequeathed the residue to his wife for life, with remainder to his children living at his death; and if there should be none (which event happened), then he directed, "that immediately after his wife's decease, it should become the property of the person who should then become entitled to take out administration to his effects as his personal representative," according to the Statute of Distributions, and in the proportions thereby pointed out, in case he had died intestate and unmarried. It was held by Sir J. Romilly, M. R., that the next of kin at the death of the testator, and not those at the death of the tenant for life, were entitled.

23. DOUGLAS V. DOUGLAS. 1 Kay, 400.

Wills Act, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26. s. 24.

A question, occasionally arises how far the 24th section of the New Wills Act (7 Will. 4. & 1 Vict. c. 26.), which directs "that every will shall be construed, with reference to the real and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will" is to be considered as applicable to those gifts of personal property, which, before the Act, would have been specific legacies. In the above-mentioned case, Sir W. P. Wood, V C., observed that there was a considerable class of cases in which gifts of personalty were held to be specific; and which, since the new statute, might possibly include portions of the property which would not have passed except by its operation; in particular those cases in which a testator bequeaths the whole of some one genus of his property, as, for instance, all debts due to him on bond or simple contract. After referring to Doe d. York v. Walker (12 M. & W. 591.), Cole v. Scott (1 Mac. & G. 518.), his Honour adds, "I can imagine that, under the new statute, a gift of all my stock' would pass all stock to which the testator was entitled at the time of his death. But suppose the bequest were of 'all my stock which I have purchased,' that would make a considerable difference, and would, I think, be enough on the face of the will to show that the testator was defining the particular portion of the property which he intended to give, as being property then in his possession; so, if the gift were of 'all the debts due to me on judgments' it is possible that judgments obtained after the date of the will would pass ; but if it were all judgments which I have registered,' that would be taking a particular class of judgments out of the general class, and would show that the testator did not intend his will to have the sweeping operation of passing all judgment debts registered by the testator at the time of his death."

II. POINTS DETERMINED IN THE COURTS OF COMMON LAW.

(By ALEXANDER PULLING, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.)

1. Attorney - Obligation to produce Client's Title Deeds in Evidence. 2. Retainer of Attorney at an Annual Salary-Operation of Agreement. 3. Bill of Exchange-Admission of Acceptance- Production of Bills. 4. County Bridge- Action against County Surveyor for Injury caused by want of repair. 5. County Court Appeal from in what cases. 6. Delivery Order - Presentation of- What it means. 7. Feme covert, where Action maintainable by, in her own name. 8. Joint Stock Company-What is a Contract. within the provisions of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110. s. 44. 9. Lex Loci Contractus- Contract made in France in contravention of Statute of Frauds not enforceable here.

10. Libel-Privileged Communication - Evidence of Malice-Right of Jury to look at Libel. 11. Negligence-Master and Servant - Pleading in Action. 12. Railway Co. Carriers Small Parcels Uniform Charges. 13. Statute Construction of- City of London Small Debts Act- Costs. Witness Privilege from answering Questions tending to Criminate.

14.

1. VOLANT v. SOYER and Another. 13 Common Bench, 231.

Attorney Obligation to produce Client's Title-Deeds in Evidence.

This was an action tried before Jervis, C. J., at the Middlesex Sittings after Michaelmas Term, 1852. It appeared upon the trial of the cause that the two defendants had been in partnership in carrying on the Symposium at Gore House, Kensington, where the work for which the action was brought had been done. On the part of the defendant Symons, one Mr. Michael had been subpoenaed to produce a deed of assignment dated the 22nd of November, 1851, by which both defendants were alleged to have assigned all their property at the Symposium to one Hart, in trust for their creditors, and in trust to pay over the surplus, if any, to themselves, and by which deed Hart was alleged to have undertaken to satisfy all existing claims against the defendant's estate

and to pay all necessary expenses. The deed had been prepared in the office of Mr. Michael, who was the attorney for Mr. Hart, and held the deed in that character. Mr. Michael stated that, shortly after the execution of the deed, a document was delivered from his office to the defendants as a copy, but he was unable, from his own knowledge, to prove it to be a copy. Mr. Michael, on being asked to produce the deed, submitted to the Judge that he held it as attorney for Mr. Hart, and was not bound to produce it. He was asked whether the deed was not an assignment to Hart, but the Judge refused to allow the question. The copy of the deed was then tendered as secondary evidence, on the ground that in the delivery as a copy there was a declaration accompanying an act, and that this, along with the other circumstances of the case, made the copy admissible. The Judge also refused this evidence, and directed the Jury to find for the plaintiff. On motion for a rule to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, on the ground of improper rejection of evidence, it was held by the Court of Common Pleas, upon the authority of Newton v. Chaplin (19 L. J., C. P. 374.), and Doe d. Carter v. James (2 Moo. & R. 47.), that an attorney subpoenaed to produce a deed, may, in his discretion, not only refuse to produce it on the ground that it is his client's, but may also refuse to answer a question with respect to its nature; and the Judge ought not to examine it to see whether it is a document which ought to be withheld. It was held, also, that the copy of the deed was not admissible as secondary evidence of its contents.

2. EMMENS V. ELDERTON. 13 Com. B. 495.

Retainer of Attorney at an Annual Salary— Operation of Agreement.

The declaration set out a parol agreement between Elderton and the Church of England Insurance Co., that Elderton should, as the attorney and solicitor of the Company, receive a salary of 1007. per annum in lieu of costs for general business transacted for the company, and should and would for such salary advise and act for the Company on all occasions in all matters connected with the Company, with certain exceptions, and alleged in the usual form mutual promises, and a breach by the Company in dismissing him. It was held by the House of Lords, in accordance with the opinion of eight Judges against one, and in affirmance of the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, whereby that of the Court of Common Pleas was reversed, that the count was good after verdict, for that

it sufficiently alleged an agreement by the Company creating the relation of attorney and client, and a promise to continue that relation for at least a year.

3. CHAPLIN v. LEVY. 9 Exch. 531.

Bill of Exchange— Admission of Acceptance— Production of Bill.

In an action on a bill of exchange against the acceptor, to which the defendant pleaded non acceptavit, the plaintiff gave in evidence the following letter, signed by the defendant's attorney: "I hereby admit that the acceptance to the bill of exchange upon which this action is brought is in the handwriting of the defendant." The Court of Exchequer held that this was evidence to go to the jury of the defendant's acceptance without the production of the bill itself, and that the plaintiff was entitled to retain the verdict found for him for the amount of the bill, without interest.

4. M'KINNON V. PENSON. 9 Exch. 609.

County Bridge-Action against County Surveyor for Injury caused by want of Repair.

In this case it was held in the Exchequer Chamber (affirming the decision of the Court of Exchequer), that an action for a personal and peculiar damage resulting from the want of proper repair to a county bridge will not lie against the county surveyor, either at common law or under the statute 43 Geo. 3. c. 59.

5. DRESSMAN V. HARRIS. 9 Exch. 485.

County Court Appeal from in what Cases.

In this case the Court of Exchequer held that in actions brought in the County Courts in cases where those courts have jurisdiction, an appeal lies where the amount of the claim exceeds 201., although judgment be given for a smaller amount.

6. BARTLETT v. HOLMES. 13 Common Bench, 630.

Delivery Order-Presentation of, what it means.

This was an action on a contract to sell iron specified in a eertain delivery order signed by the iron-masters, and in the