9 East, 44., that in the construction of this statute, the 119th section, which is nearly in totidem verbis with the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 128., is not affected by the 120th section, which is substantially the same with the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61., whereby the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. s. 128. is repealed, and the Court held, therefore, that where a plaintiff in the superior court recovers less than 201. in an action on contract, or less than 57. in an action on tort, which might have been brought in the City Court, he loses his costs without any suggestion; and if he recovers 207., and not more than 50%. in an action on contract (except in certain specified actions), he is not entitled to costs if the defendant enters a suggestion.

If," said the Lord Chief Justice, "we were at liberty to speculate as to what would be most conducive to the benefit of the public, and as to the reasons which induced the Legislature to enact as they have done, instead of endeavouring to put a construction upon the words, we find much might be said in favour of the view which has been presented by Mr. Pulling, because one cannot well see why a different rule should prevail in the city of London from that which applies to all other parts of the kingdom. When one sees that this statute was consequent upon those which were passed for the general improvement in the administration of the law, one would not have expected that those who had charge of the bill in its progress through the Houses of Parliament, would have committed so palpable a fraud upon the Legislature. But so it is; and this Act differs in a very important particular from the general County Court Acts. If the two provisions in question had been found in two separate Acts of Parliament, applying what Mr. Justice Burton calls the golden rule of construction-to give all the words of an Act of Parliament their plain and ordinary meaning, upless such a construction leads to absurdity or injustice -we might possibly have so altered the words as to avoid the absurdity and incongruity we find here. But, seeing that there are two sections in the same Act of Parliament, immediately following each other, which, though apparently conflicting, received the Royal Assent at the same moment, we are bound, if it be possible, to give effect to both."

14. FISHER v. RONALDS. 12 Common Bench, 762.

Witness-Privilege from answering Questions tending to Criminate.

This was an action of assumpsit upon a bill of exchange for 2451., drawn by one Chappell upon and accepted by the defendant, and

indorsed by Chappell to the plaintiff. The cause was tried before Cresswell, J., at the Second Sittings in London in Michaelmas Term, 1852, when it appeared that the defendant was an officer of the 77th Regiment, stationed at Plymouth; that, during the Plymouth races in August, 1851, certain persons, calling themselves "The Bath and Bristol Club," of whom Chappell was one, went down to Plymouth; that a room was hired for them there at the house of one John Hix, a livery-stable keeper, where roulette was played, and Ronalds, the defendant, was a considerable loser. The defence was, that the bill in question was given by defendant for part of the money so lost by him to Chappell. To prove this, Hix was called, who stated, among other things, that he was in the room on the night on which the defendant was there; but that he saw no gaming. He was then asked, "Was there a roulette-table in the room?" Upon the suggestion of the plaintiff's counsel, the learned Judge, after looking at the Gaming and Wager Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109. ss. 1, 2.), told the witness that he was not bound to answer the question, inasmuch as he might thereby involve himself in the danger of being indicted as the keeper of a common gambling-house, or as a conspirator to defraud. Upon motion for a new trial, on the ground that the Judge ought not to have told the witness that he might decline answering the question, the Court of Common Pleas held, that a witness is not bound to answer a question where his answer might have a tendency to involve him in a criminal charge, and that the Judge may caution a witness without waiting for him to claim his privilege. "The tendency of the question," said Lord Chief Justice Jervis, "is plain; and the learned Judge saw that the witness really believed that his answer might tend to criminate him. In Phillips on Evidence, 10th edit., vol. ii. p. 487., it is said that a witness is privileged from answering not only what will criminate him directly, but also whatever has a tendency to criminate him: and the reason given for this decisively disposes of this case;"-" because, otherwise, question might be put after question; and, though no single question may be asked which directly criminates, yet enough might be got from him by successive questions whereon to found against him a criminal charge." "We must, therefore, allow the witness to judge for himself, or he would be made to criminate himself entirely."

POSTSCRIPT.

IRISH MEMBERS' CORRUPTION COMMITTEE.

OUR readers will readily perceive that we do not broach the subject of this strange inquiry lately undertaken by the House of Commons, with any reference to the merits of the case, but only from its connection with the rules of Evidence and Procedure. Indeed, the result of the Committee's protracted labours was to prove that the whole of the charges brought, and the whole assertions made, some vaguely, others more specifically, but all hardily and even audaciously, were without the shadow of any thing that could be called proof, and, for the most part, probably without the shadow of foundation. But the manner in which the inquiry was conducted, demands some notice from those who regard the incalculable importance of the principles whereon the rules of evidence are grounded-rules which should guide the proceedings of all courts, and which ought never to be neglected by any body entrusted with the investigation of truth.

As it might be supposed that we disapprove of the course taken in the Committee, on account of the violence to these rules done at each step, we must premise that there are two kinds of inquiry,-one for ascertaining what judicial resolution shall be come to, the other only for the purpose of ascertaining whether there shall be a judicial proceeding or not. Thus suppose an offence is alleged to have been committed, and some one is charged as the offender, that allegation and that charge must be investigated by the strict rules of evidence, of which the most inflexible, as the most important is, the absolute exclusion of hearsay evidence, the permitting no one to state any the least matter not within his own knowledge. But if the inquiry is rather a Police than a Judicial one, the inquiry not only whether or not the offence has been committed, and whether or not the person charged is

the offender, but also who is the offender, if the accused be not he, or who is the offender, if no one be accused, then a much greater latitude is allowed, and every thing is receivable, which can put the inquirer upon the traces to discover the offender. We have no manner of doubt that the chairman of the Irish Committee was aware of this distinction. A person who has been engaged in administering criminal justice, could not be ignorant of the most received and known rules of evidence; and we may add that no one is more entitled to respect from all friends to the Amendment of the Law than Mr. Henley, whose invaluable services to that cause, when he and Sir James Graham were the able and most useful lay members of the Chancery Commission under Sir John Romilly, must be held in grateful and lasting remembrance. It is, therefore, under a conviction that he regarded the investigation over which he presided in the light just described, that we proceed to note the course of the proceedings, with any view rather than that of censuring it, but certainly with the design of suggesting to the wisdom of Parliament, the necessity of making one very material change in its modes of procedure.

We shall first give a sample of the evidence; and we may take it almost at random; but we prefer selecting a part by no means the most remarkable for sinning against all rules, supposing this was a judicial and not what we have termed a police inquiry.

Dr. J. Gray, proprietor and editor of an Irish newspaper, had, both in his paper and in speeches, brought general charges of corruption against Irish Members, and when called as a witness, he could give nothing but vague rumour and hearsay as the ground of those charges. Among others, the following was shifted by him upon another newspaper editor, who is also a Member of Parliament, and who we perceive is about to receive a testimonial from his friends of the Roman Catholic Church, for his great services to their cause. Probably such services as are here recorded, may not be among that number. Dr. Gray's second examination was March 1. 1854.

"Question. Can you mention the name of any Member

of either the past or the present Parliament whom you have heard charged with selling places, or obtaining a pecuniary advantage by disposing of them ?"-Answer. "There are

two Members of the present Parliament named by Mr. Lucas in the conversation which I heard.

"Q. Who were they?—A. Mr. Roche and young Mr. O'Connell."

Again, in answer to another question, he says, " Mr. Lucas stated to me that he had heard of cases; the parties who mentioned them he did not name, but the parties who were alleged to have had these transactions were Mr. Roche and Mr. O'Connell."

He afterwards says, when asked if he had heard any other Members of Parliament named, "I have heard it stated that there was a case before a Bankrupt Court, in which the name of a Member was mentioned in the proceedings there. I do not exactly recollect that case. The statement made to me was to the effect, that it came out before a Bankrupt or Insolvency Court, upon a man explaining the condition of his affairs, that he had been a long time expecting a situation through the influence of a Member, and that a bill due by that Member was to be wiped out on his getting the situation." Being asked to name the Member, he answers " Mr. Morgan John O'Connell." The one before named was another of the family.

He

Mr. Lucas is then called, and admits that he had given the two names to Dr. Gray, but asserts that he never intended they should be communicated to the Committee, but the contrary; and being asked, why, if so, he being a Member attending the Committee, and Dr. Grey a witness before it, he (Mr. Lucas) went out of the room and mentioned the names of two Members, and accused them of this offence? answers, "Because it was in my mind, and I spoke indiscreetly." (p. 50). He repeatedly says it was an indiscretion; but when called on some days after to name the parties from whom he heard the story, he peremptorily refuses to name them, and adds, that on further reflection he does not consider the mention of the names of the accused Members was an indiscretion (p. 80). Being by the Committee told