notice I turned to the Septuagint version, and having considered its language, was led to the conclusion that, if the passage were rightly translated into our tongue, it would exhibit such a different application of some parts of it, from what they would appear to have had given to them in our authorized version, as entirely to do away with all ground for making the above-mentioned inference.

The passage, as it is given in the Septuagint, is as follows:Γυναῖκα ἐπ ̓ ἀδελφῇ αὐτῆς οὐ λήψῃν ἀτίζηλον ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην αυτῆς ἐπ ̓ αὐτῇ, ἔτι ζώσης αὐτῆς. And in our authorized version it is thus rendered:-"Neither shalt thou take a wife to her sister, to vex her, to uncover her nakedness beside the other, in her lifetime."

Now, assuming that the Septuagint gives a correct version ofthe original, it appears to me demonstrable, on the principles of Greek grammar, that the clause, Er wons avrne, instead of being intended by Moses to refer to the sister already married, or the person alluded to in the preceding uvrn, was meant, on the contrary, to refer to the unmarried sister, or the person signified by the preceding avrns. For, if it were not so, I conceive that, according to the use of the Greek tongue, this part of the sentence would naturally have been written in one, or the other, of these two ways-Éπ' avτy étɩ Swoŋ, or iz' avτņ, ETI Swons Taúrns. For, in making use of either of these forms of expression, the writer would have felt that there was no possibility of his meaning being mistaken. In the former case this is evident at once; and as it regards the latter, the use of the demonstrative raúrns would have made it certain that the person who was the last mentioned of the two, was the person referred to; whilst, if the intention had been to refer to this person, the use of avrñs would have been felt to make that intention, to say the least, appear doubtful; whereas, on the other hand, the use of the present form was proper and natural, if the intention were to refer to the person alluded to in the preceding avτns; nor am I aware that any alteration in it could be proposed, in order to make its reference to that person more determinate. If this be so, surely the fact of the Septuagint translators having adopted the present form, and not either of the other two above noted, when there was a necessity for precision of language, in order to guard against the possibility of mistake, may fairly claim to be considered as conclusive ground that they certainly intended to refer, in the last clause, to the person alluded to in the preceding airns, or the unmarried sister. Nor can anything be urged against this on the score of the signification of the phrase; for it may legitimately be taken to be equivalent to the form ἔφ' ὅσον χρόνον αὕτη ζῇ.

If this, then, be taken to be the right view of the grammatical construction of this part of the sentence, the meaning of it in the whole will indisputably be the same as though it had been thus differently expressed: Τὴν ἀδελφὴν τῆς σῆς γυναικὸς ἐπ ̓ αὐτῇ οὐ λήψῃ ἀντίζηλον ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην αὐτῆς ἐπ ̓ αὐτῇ, ἐφ ̓ ὅσον χρόνον αὕτη (τ. ε. dèeλon tñs ons yuvaikдe) : and could be correctly rendered in English, as follows:-"Neither shalt thou marry the sister of thy wife besides her, as long as she (the sister of thy wife) lives;" leaving out of notice for the present the reference which the phrase dvríšnλov

should be understood to have, which will by and by be shewn to be capable of such a construction as makes it perfectly consistent with the conclusion come to above.

The right application of the phrase, eri wons avτñs, having been, as I presume to think, thus ascertained, it would seem just to remark upon it, that the intention of Moses thereby was to make it expressly understood that the prohibition of marriage with a wife's sister applied to the very contingency in which it is contended that, by means of this same clause, he meant to signify the divine permission of it; that is to say, in the event of the wife's decease. For whereas he had already, in vv. 6. 16, implicitly forbidden this union, without any limitation of the restraint being implied, it is only reasonable to conclude, that when he further proceeded to make an express prohibition of it, he must have done so with some particular object in view. And that his object was not, as the advocates of the lawfulness of the marriage in question have imagined, to limit the prohibition so as to remove it in case of the wife's decease, but rather to do what is the very reverse, to fix the prohibition on it in that very case, in express terms, would seem to be indicated beyond all doubt by the addition of this very clause, provided its legitimate application be what has been above claimed for it, which the principles of Greek grammar would seem to require.

But, independently of this inference, from the very introduction of this clause, there is also this antecedent probability that such was the object Moses had in view in introducing it, that, whereas he might have foreseen that there would be persons who, in their desire to marry their wife's sister after her decease, would be disposed to restrict the merely implied prohibition to the lifetime of the wife; he may therefore have seen it to be expedient, by adding this clause with the intention of making it refer to the lifetime of the wife's sister, to take away all po-sibility of misconceiving, or misinterpreting the prohibition, and to signify expressly that it applied as well to the case of marrying a wife's sister after the wife's decease, as during her lifetime. And it may be added, that the circumstance of Jacob's having had two wives who were sisters, may have appeared to the Divine wisdom to give the more occasion for this anticipation, and was probably that which made it appear expedient, that the intended prohibition of this union should. not be left to be collected by mere inference, from any of the preceding declarations of his will, in relation to the same matter; but that he should direct his servant Moses to deliver this express prohibition of it, and in such a way as to make it clearly understood, that it had respect not merely to the lifetime of the wife, but to the lifetime of the wife's sister also. This consideration, therefore, I conceive, affords another probable ground for inferring, as before, that the design of Moses in v. 18, was to make an express prohibition of the marriage in question, with a particular reference to the contingency before mentioned.

These conjectural ideas, savouring, as I humbly conceive they do, of considerable probability, and the reasonings founded upon them, have been adduced for the purpose of obviating an objection which

the advocates on the other side might be apt to start against the view I have advanced, that, if the marriage in question had been already implicitly prohibited in vv. 6, 16, as there could then be no other reason save that of intending to limit the general prohibition, and to restrict it to the lifetime of the wife, which could have induced Moses to make this particular reference to it, it was therefore fair to infer that he meant the clause, étı Gúons avrñs, to refer to the person signi. fied by the preceding avrñ ; i. e., the married sister or wife. It has been shewn above, on the contrary, that there might be other reasons which could have induced him to do so, and that they are not only probable ones, but such also as would require that the clause in question should be understood to refer to the person signified in the preceding aurñs ; i. e., the unmarried sister. The objection, therefore, would not appear to have any sufficient ground to stand upon to entitle it to be considered of any weight. And hereupon I seem warranted, in the course of my argument, to lay down now the following position :- That, unless the advocates on the other side will undertake to shew, and to express their belief, that propriety of speech would require that Moses should have used the present form of expression, as it is given in the Septuagint, and not either of those other two which I have said he would naturally have used instead, when it is supposed that his intention in the last clause was to refer to the married sister, they ought to feel compelled to disavow their belief that this was his intention, and to acquiesce in that view of his meaning in the passage which has been above propounded.

With respect now, in the last place, to the force of the phrase avisnov, to which, in accordance with the bearing that has been given to it in our English version, these persons would doubtless be disposed to attach the notion, that it shews the reason of the prohibition to have had respect only to the lifetime of the first married sister, some explanation concerning it would seem to be requisite; for certainly, if such a view of it must necessarily be taken, it could not then be denied that this would give some colour of probability both to the notion they entertain respecting the clause, čri swons airñs, that it is rightly to be applied to the same sister, and also to the inference they deduce therefrom, that Moses was here only prohibiting the marriage of the second sister during the lifetime of the first married one.

I conceive then there is no necessity that this phrase should be so understood, as that it can only imply a reason for the prohibition which has respect to the lifetime of the first married sister, as is the case with the meaning assigned to it in our English version. For what should hinder its being urged with at least equal probability, that the phrase was rather meant to suggest a secondary reason for the prohibition, derived from the consideration of what was likely to be the consequence of the marriage, even though it should take place only after the decease of the first married sister; namely, that it would cause the second married sister to act towards the children of the first from feelings of envy and jealousy ? For it is obvious, that the second sister might act from such feelings towards the children of the first, as well in the case of being married after her decease, as during her

lifetime. And in corroboration of the probable correctness of this rendering of the phrase, I would beg it might be observed, that St. Basil would seem to have regarded it in this light; for, in the conclusion of his epistle to Diodorus, he makes the following exclamation in reference to the effect that would be likely to attend upon such an union, in the case of the marriage taking place after the decease of the first married sister, to which alone he is speaking :-“Make not, Oman, the aunt to be the stepmother of infants ! Do not arm with uprelenting jealousies one whose duty it is to cherish in the place of a mother.”

After these remarks, and having now concluded my argument, I would humbly appeal to every one who desires to ascertain the truth, that he may embrace and maintain it, whether right reason would not seem to require that we should recognise in the following paraphrase, the just sense of what Moses ought to be cousidered to have intended to deliver in this perplexed passage : “ Neither shalt thou marry thy wife's sister at any time as long as she (the sister) lives, to cause her to entertain and practice jealousies either towards her sister, or her sister's children.”

Hoping that in this investigation I have proceeded on sure grounds to the result just stated, and that, in that case, it will be deemed a satisfactory and seasonable elucidation of the truth in this matter.

I remain, Mr. Editor, your obedient servant, OMICRON.

ON ARCHDEACON HARE'S SERMONS.

MR. EDITOR-I was somewhat surprised, and, I confess, disappointed, in taking up a volume of sermons, lately published by Mr. Archdeacon Hare, and turning to his Visitation Sermon. Amidst many evils enumerated,—which we must all deplore in common, and for pointing out which, as well as for his honesty and fearlessness in putting them in bold relief, Mr. H. deserves, and will receive, the thanks of his readers and his brethren,,I was grieved to find much matter which I could not but condemn, and which must startle his readers.

There is, if I mistake not, something strange in his origin and foun. dation of the church. It is separated from the apostles, and contra. distinguished from them, as though it were not built on them, as though they were not its very basis and pedestal, (resting, of course, as we must never forget they did, on their Lord and head,) (Eph. ii. p. 20,) as though they did not exclusively gather in the Peculium and Segullah, which they were commissioned to do by our Great High Priest and Apostle.

I am at a loss also to make out his theory of church government and discipline. It seems to me vague and indefinite, and to admit of all the shades and varieties of civil government, ranging from absolute monarchy to downright democracy. It may be anything to suit the taste and prejudices of the religious body, and yet in every variation be equally divine, and equally useful in the several circumstances and phases, because God has expressed his will and preference respecting none.

As regards the apostolic succession, that is described “ as a strengthless prop,” “reared indeed by amiable and pious men, but in fact nothing but the brain-sick whim of an invalid,” “a fascinating delusion," "the mere dregs and earthly part of a heavenly system, the “ mere dust of a ruined temple, to which a lofty and gentle-minded spirit clings,” from a love of antiquity, “a solitary cave in the wilderness,” « a form, which romantic minds maintain as the only one, not because it is founded in truth, but because it is their own,” because “ they have not examined the foundations of other churches with patience, with candour, and with righteous self-distrust." In short, “the arguments of the Romanists in favour of the inalienable primacy of St. Peter are far niore specious and plausible than those in favour of this scheme of amiable and pious men, derived from the same source.”

Is then every form of civil government as much divine as that form of ecclesiastical polity which we maintain as our own, not merely because it is our own, but because, as we firmly believe, it was handed down to us by the apostles 2 Without asking how far the arguments in favour of the observance of the Lord's day, infant baptism, public churches, public prayers in the church, texts to be handled in sermons, the canon of Scripture, receiving women to the eucharist, and many similar things, are specious or not, may we not ask, in reading St. Paul's epistles, is there nothing to be found in them on the subject of the form of church government but what is only as specious and plausible as a Romanist error ? In weighing the climax in Rom. x. 14, 15, compared with the epistles to Tim. and Titus, (especially such texts as 1 Tim. i. 3, v. 1-19; Tit. i. 5,) may we not ask if every one may not send his brother to preach, who may ? If presbyters may, how comes Titus to have the charge of ordaining presbyters in every city in Crete ? How has Timothy the charge of rebuking presbyters? How had he power over them, if he were but their equal ? or, if he was not their equal (as clearly he was not), why are these things left on record, but for our learning ? Why should Crete and Ephesus be made examples to us, but for our imitation? Why should Timothy and Titus (confessedly superior to presbyters) be left as patterns for us? Why should the same powers be given to them both ? Why (with reverence be it asked) should the Holy Spirit give directions in these matters to Crete and Ephesus alone? Why should not that which was imperative in the government of the Christian churches in Crete and Ephesus, be also imperative always and everywhere? Why should this form be peculiar to the apostolic age or the apostolic converts ? Why should what was fixed then be arbitrary now? Is all this only as specious as the Romanist's argument for the papal supremacy ?

But Mr. H. says, “I cannot discover a shadow of a word in the gospels to countenance the interpretation referred to.” Surely he would not be understood to say that the epistles of St. Paul are less the inspired word of God than the works of the four evangelists? If not, surely we have found something of a shadow of a word. If by