 If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...  The Relations of Mind and Brain - Sayfa 225Henry Calderwood tarafından - 1879 - 455 sayfaTam görünüm - Bu kitap hakkında
 | Henry Allon - 1884 - 548 sayfa
...complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing...accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi H but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. If we may trust the passage quoted... | |
 | Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool - 1897 - 346 sayfa
...Mill, with his usual candour, states the case thus — " We are reduced (by the phenomena of memory) to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego...them, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series" * There is always a... | |
 | John Stuart Mill - 1865 - 578 sayfa
...speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their meaning. ing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from...of accepting the paradox, that something which ex /iypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. I have stated the difficulties... | |
 | David Masson - 1865 - 432 sayfa
...the statement by calling it a series " of feelings which is aware of itself as past and " future ; and we are reduced to the alternative " of believing that the mind, or Ego, is some" thing different from any series of feelings or " possibilities of them, or of accepting the para"... | |
 | 1865 - 540 sayfa
...complete the statement by calling it a sej-iea of reelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or JSjo is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting th«... | |
 | 1866 - 622 sayfa
...conclude the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing...of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothcsi, is but n scries of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.' Mr. Mill allows this difficulty... | |
 | 1866 - 826 sayfa
...complete the statement by calling it a scries of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing...of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex fiypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself at a series."— P. 211. It would be... | |
 | Lucy F March Phillipps - 1866 - 106 sayfa
...however adheres to his name. His words are these : " If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ey liypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, we are... | |
 | James McCosh - 1866 - 424 sayfa
...complete the state" ment by calling it a series of feelings which is aware " of itself as past and future: and we are reduced to " the alternative of believing...something different from any series of feelings or pos" sibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that " something which ex hypothesi is but a... | |
 | David Masson - 1866 - 334 sayfa
...definition of mind as " a series of feelings" must be abandoned, and the mind must be thought of as " something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them," or the paradox must be maintained that "that which, ex hypothesi^ is but a series of feelings can be aware... | |
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