him to reach it, at the county charge; or out of bequests, &c. originally made for supplying prisoners with food and clothing (ƒ); a proceeding equally discreet and just; as, if he be not supplied with the means of subsisting till he can regain the place where he is entitled to relief, he will be tempted to supply his wants from the property of others. And by s. 15 of the vagrant act, 5 G. IV. c. 83, the visiting justices of every prison may grant a certificate to enable any person discharged therefrom to have or receive alms or relief on the route to his or her place of settlement. Such certificate to be drawn up in compliance with the gaol acts.

No Fees on Discharge of Prisoners.]-In cases of felony or misdemeanour, no fees are due from prisoners on their discharge, whether the bill is thrown out, or an acquittal or discharge by proclamation for want of prosecution has taken place (g). In the third edition of this work it was stated, that fees are still demanded by some clerks of the peace from the defendants in traverses, on their acquittal: this claim (if indeed it be legal, since 55 G. III. c. 50, s. 4) (h) can scarcely be permitted to disgrace the criminal law much longer. At all events, such fees are only recoverable by action, and no defendant can be detained for them (i).

(f) See post, Chap. XV. tit. Gaols. (g) 14 G. III. c. 20.

See a list of

(h) See ante, p. 138. large demands paid to a clerk of the peace on a traverse, R. v. Thompson, 3 Tyrwhitt's R. 53.

(i) Ibid. Anciently, if the jury acquitted a prisoner, but found that he had fled for it, his chattels were neverthe

less forfeited!!! Wood's Instit. 652. Sheriffs formerly took fees from debtors on their discharges. This oppression was repealed by 55 G. III. c. 50, s. 10; the sheriff's compensation to be fixed by the sessions out of the county, city, or town rate; see R. v. Middlesex (Justices), 3 B. & Ad. 100.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SESSIONS IN PENAL AND CIVIL MATTERS.

I.

SECTIONS.

Of the Original Jurisdiction of the Sessions in Civil Matters generally. II. Of the Jurisdiction of the Sessions in Cases of Apprenticeship. III.-Of Articles of the Peace.

IV.-Of Vagrants.

SECTION I.

OF THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SESSIONS.

WE come now to that part of the business of the sessions, which is entirely submitted to the judgment of the court, without the intervention of a jury; and which, as opposed to the criminal trials, may be termed the civil jurisdiction of the court of quarter sessions.

The far greater part of the civil business of the sessions comes before the justices as a court of appeal deriving authority from various statutes. But the sessions have in some matters an original jurisdiction, which will be shortly considered in this chapter.

In general, the sessions have an original jurisdiction to do whatever may be done by two magistrates; except where the statute, empowering the latter to act, gives an appeal to the sessions (i).

The cases in which the sessions most usually exercise an original jurisdiction are in cases of apprenticeship; in the allowance of articles of the peace; and in the disposal of incorrigible rogues (j) committed to the general or quarter sessions for punishment.

(i) Per Holt, C. J., 1 Ld. Raym. 426; R. v. Boughton (Inh.). Thus they cannot make an original order of removal, R. v. Bond, 2 Show. 503.

(j) Justices in sessions have no ori

ginal jurisdiction over the earlier stages of vagrancy; see post, Sect. 5, or (since 2 & 3 V. c. 89, which passed 26 Aug. 1839) in bastardy. See Index, tit. Bastardy.

SECTION II.

OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE SESSIONS IN CASES OF
APPRENTICESHIP.

Ill-treatment and Misconduct of Apprentices.]-Stat. 5 El. c. 4, s. 35, enacts, “That if any such master (as therein referred to) shall misuse or evil intreat his apprentice, or the said apprentice shall have any just cause to complain, or the apprentice do not his duty to his master, then the said master or apprentice being aggrieved, and having cause to complain, shall repair unto one justice of the peace within the said county, or to the mayor, or other head officer of the city, town corporate, market town, or other place where the said master dwelleth, who shall by his wisdom and discretion make such order and direction between the said master and his apprentice as the equity of the case shall require; and if for want of good conformity in the said master, the said justice of the peace, or the said mayor, or other head officer, cannot compound and agree the matter between him and his apprentice, then the said justice, or the said mayor, or other head officer, shall take bond of the said master to appear at the next sessions then to be holden in the said county, or within the said city, town corporate, or market town, to be before the justices of the said county, or the mayor, or head officer of the said town corporate, or market town, if the said master dwell within any such; and upon his appearance, and hearing of the matter before the said justices, or the said mayor, or other head officer, if it be thought meet unto them to discharge the said apprentice of his apprenticehood, then the said justices, or four of them at the least, whereof one to be of the quorum, or the said mayor, or other head officer, with the assent of three other of his brethren, or men of best reputation within the said city, town corporate, or market town, shall have power by authority hereof, in writing. under their hands and seals, to pronounce and declare, that they have discharged the said apprentice of his apprenticehood; and the cause thereof and the said writing so being made and enrolled by the clerk of the peace and town clerk amongst the records that he keepeth, shall be a sufficient discharge for the said apprentice against his master, his executors, and administrators, the indenture of the said apprenticehood, or any law or custom to the contrary, notwithstanding. And if the default shall be found to be in the apprentice, then the said jus-tices, or the said mayor, or other head officer, with the assistance aforesaid, shall cause such due correction and punishment to be mini

stered unto him as by their wisdom and discretion shall be thought meet."

Construction of the Act.]-In the construction of this act, it was, at one time, doubted whether the sessions could interfere except on appeal; but it is clearly settled that they have jurisdiction to act without any application previously made to a magistrate (k). Their jurisdiction extends not only to apprentices bound to the trades enumerated in the statute, but to apprentices in all other trades (?) : but, as it would seem, is restricted to compulsory bindings, without premium paid (m); and even if the master be a freeman of the city of London, and the indentures are enrolled in London, the sessions for the county of Middlesex have jurisdiction to discharge the apprentice, notwithstanding the saving in section 40 of the act of the privileges of London and Westminster (n).

If the master be bound over or summoned to appear, the sessions may proceed in his absence to hear the case; and may, if they see fit, discharge the apprentice from his indentures (o). It has been lately held that the justices in session have not power to order the return of any part of a premium already paid to the master, or to order that any part remaining unpaid shall not be paid (p). The order made in session must be under the hands and seals of at least four of the justices (q).

The sessions under this act have power, on proof of the misbehaviour of an apprentice, to order him to be corrected by corporal punishment, or by imprisonment and hard labour in the house of correction (r).

SECTION III.

OF ARTICLES OF THE PEACE.

THE Consideration of articles of the peace may either come before the sessions on a complaint originally made in court, or in consequence of the party being previously bound by a magistrate to appear at the sessions.

(k) R. v. Johnson, 1 Salk. 68; R. v. Gill, 1 Stra. 143; R. v. Davies, 2 Stra. 704.

(1) R. v. Collingbourn, 2 Ld. Raym. 1410.

(m) Per Alderson, B., East v. Pell, 4 M. & W. 665.

(n) Id. ibid.

(0) Ditton's case, 2 Salk. 490.

(p) East v. Pell, 4 M. & W. 665; R. v. Vandeleer, 1 Stra. 69. As to power of justices out of session, see 32 G. III. c. 57.

(q) R. v. Gately, Carthew, 198. (r) Hawkesworth v. Hillary, 1 Saund. 313, 314.

Recognizance for Keeping the Peace may be taken by a Single Justice for an indefinite Period.]-It was once contended that a recognizance taken by a single justice to keep the peace, or be of good behaviour, for any certain period, or for life, or without expressing any specific time, and without fixing any certain period for the offender's appearance, was not legal and sufficient (s); but it appears on all hands to have been the ancient practice (t), and is supported by the greatest authorities (u). It is true that it has of late been the more usual, and is considered as the better way, except under very special circumstances, to bind the party against whom the peace is required, to appear at the next session of the peace, and in the mean time to keep the peace to the queen and all her liege people, especially to the party claiming the security; and though the recognizance for keeping the peace should be removed by certiorari, it is no discharge of the obligation to appear (v). If the party refuses to be bound, it seems he may be committed to gaol till he shall comply (w), or till the next session.

This right, however, in an individual magistrate to require securities without restriction as to time, and the other circumstances above referred to, received the most decided confirmation from a decision of the court of king's bench (x), in an action against the defendant, a justice of the peace for the county of Sussex, for falsely imprisoning the plaintiff under a warrant of commitment (on failure of finding sureties) to the house of correction, which directed the gaoler the plaintiff "safely to keep for the space of two years, unless he shall in the mean time find sureties, &c. for keeping the peace towards our lord the king, and all his liege people, and especially towards James Martyn Lloyd (the party demanding sureties), for the space of two years from the date hereof." The only question raised in this case, with which we have any concern in this place, was contained in the words distinguished by italics; and on that subject, Abbott, C.J., with whom the other judges concurred, delivered his opinion to the following effect:

(s) Even Hawkins speaks doubtfully, B. 1, c. 60; R. v. Bowes, 1 T. R. 696. (t) Dalt. c. 119; 2 Hale, c. 136. (u) 4 Bla. Com. 253.

(v) Hawk. B. 2, c. 27. The following is the condition of the recognizance to keep the peace:

"The condition of this recognizance is such, that if the above bounden shall keep the peace towards her majesty

the Queen, and all her liege people, and
especially towards A. B. of
said county, yeoman, and

in the his wife,

for the term of [twelve calendar months] now next ensuing, then the said recognizance shall be void, or else shall remain in full force."

(w) 2 Hawk. c. 16, s. 2.

(a) Willis v. Bridger, 2 B. & Ald. 278; 1 Chit. Rep. 273, S. C.