The reason for noticing any distinction here between orders and convictions, is for the purpose of observing, that less technical strictness is necessary respecting the former, than the latter (o). Thus, in an order, it is not always necessary that it should appear on the face of the record that the defendant was summoned (p), which is absolutely necessary in the case of a conviction (q), except when his appearance renders it immaterial. So an order has been holden good in the case of removing goods to avoid distress under 11 G. II. c. 19, when the offence was expressed in the alternative, “removed or concealed goods," &c.; whereas the same allegation in a conviction would be fatal to it (r); for, as was said by Lord Mansfield in one case (s), though in indictments and convictions the court is bound by a long succession of cases to require certainty to the greatest degree of technical precision, in orders more latitude is allowed; and if the record be substantially right, the court will intend that all the necessary formalities have been observed. Again, the result of the evidence is all which need be stated in an order, whereas the evidence itself must be stated in a conviction (t).

As the appeals against particular descriptions of orders will be further considered hereafter, as well as against particular descriptions of convictions, sufficient notice has already been taken of the general differences between them, so far as regards appeals from them respectively and we must proceed to other matters respecting appeals in the abstract, preliminary to any discussion of the individual enactments under which they may be made. On this view of the subject, three considerations offer themselves, viz. the right of appeal itself, the session to which it is to be preferred, and the steps to be taken preliminary to entering it for hearing.

Parties to an Appeal-Appellants-Parties grieved.]—The parties to be made appellants are sometimes specifically pointed out by the act which gives the appeal, and sometimes left at large under the general terms, "parties aggrieved." Before considering the persons who have in various cases been held to fall within the latter words, it must be remarked, that parties may jointly appeal against a poor-rate,

(0) R. v. Morgan, Cald. C. 156; 1 Burr. R. 399; post, Chap. XII. sect. 2. (p) R. v. Oxfordshire (Justices), 1 M. & S. 448.

(q) R. v. Venables, 2 Ld. Raym. 1405; R. v. Hawker, Cald. Ca. 391.

(r) R. v. Sadler, 2 Chit. R. 519; R.

v. North, 6 D. & R. 143. See Cowp. 682; 1 Ld. Raym. 171; 3 T. R. 159; Dougl. 278; R. v. Pain, 7 D. & R. 678. (s) R. v. Middlehurst, 1 Burr. R.

399.

(t) R. v. Cheshire (Justices), 5 B. & Ad. 439; 2 N. & M. 827, S. C.

whether they rely on the same, or separate grounds of appeal (u). Again, where a local act gave an appeal against any rate or assessment, it was held that a party might, in one appeal, question several rates; though if the session should think that injustice would be done by hearing the appeal against the several rates jointly, they were at liberty, though not bound, to determine them separately (x).

Appeal by "Party Grieved," and Notice thereof.]-If the condition of appealing imposed by a statute be, that the appellant is, or thinks himself, injured or aggrieved, the grievance must be immediate to the appellant, and not consequential only, or of a kind not recognized by the law (y). The privilege of appeal is not conferred on strangers, or on every captious person capable of pointing out errors, but on those who have sustained a special and peculiar injury (z). The grievance must, in all cases, appear on the face of the notice of appeal, either in express terms, or as of necessity resulting from such facts, or from so much of the order, conviction, &c. appealed against as is disclosed in the notice (a): for a notice which in no way states such an appellant to be aggrieved (b) is bad on that account. A pauper may himself appeal against the order for his removal as "aggrieved" by it (c). Under the old highway act (13 G. III. c. 78, now repealed), any inhabitant might appeal against a bad appointment of a surveyor of the highways, for every inhabitant must be deemed to be aggrieved by it (d). But if parish officers are em

(u) R. v. Sussex (Justices), 15 East, 206; R. v. White et al. 4 T. R. 771. So their notice of appeal may be joint.

(x) R. v. Suffolk (Justices), B. &

Ald. 640.

(y) See R. v. Middlesex (Justices), 3 B. & Adol. 938. Appeal against the grant of a public house license to a house within a few yards of appellant's licensed public house. Held, that the sessions were not bound to hear the appeal. The refusal of the license to the appellant himself would be different. But if trustees are enabled by a local act to sue or to be sued in the name of one of them, he may appeal under the words "party grieved," though not personally aggrieved; and notice of appeal and recognizance may be by him only, R. v. Surrey (Justices), 5 Ad. & Ell. 701, n.

(z) See the language of the court in

R. v. Essex (Justices), 5 B. & Cr. 433. (Reconsidered and upheld in R. v. Yorkshire, W. R. (Justices), 7 B. & Cr. 678. R. v. Somersetshire (Justices), 7 B. & Cr. 681, n.; R. v. Blackawton (Inh.), 10 B. & Cr. 792. See also R. v. Bond, 6 Ad. & E. 908-910; R. v. Ady, 4 N. & M. 365; 1 H. & Wol. 42, S. C.

(a) R. v. Blackawton (Inh.), 10 B. & Cr. 792, 798; R. v. Yorkshire (Justices) in re Bower, 4 B. & Adol. 685.

(b) R. v. Essex (Justices), 5 B. & Cr. 431; R. v. Yorkshire W. R. (Justices), 7 B. & Cr. 678.

(c) R. v. Hartfield, Carthew, 222; Comb. 478, S. C.; Weston Rivers v. St. Peters, 2 Salk. 492; and per Littledale, J., Reg. v. Colbeck and others, 3 P. & D. 488.

(d) R. v. St. Alban's (Justices), 3 B. & Cr. 698; but see now 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 50, s. 6.

powered to appeal, when they find that the parish is aggrieved, no appeal can be instituted by less than a majority; for they are to exercise a judgment before bringing it (e); and in the exercise of a public or general power a majority is to act for the whole. The "griev ance" to a party convicted by justices, is their judgment, and not the execution of it (ƒ).

Parties to an Appeal-Respondents.]-The parties to whom the statute directs notice of appeal to be given, are the proper respondents; and if those parties are not mentioned, then it seems that the party at whose instance, and for whose interest, the magistrate was called on to act, and in fact acted, as well as the magistrate or magistrates themselves, should be made respondents. But if the magistrate or magistrates acted without the prompting of any interested party, they should be made respondents (g). An inclosure act allowed an appeal on giving the commissioner, and the parties concerned, ten days' notice in writing. It was held that these words meant parties directly interested in the soil, including among others the lady of the manor; and that for want of giving her notice of the appeal, it could not be heard at sessions, or respited on order to a hearing there (h) : so that it seems she should have been one of the respondents.

Where a public general act gave a remedy by appeal to sessions, without limitation as to time of appealing, this power was held to override a clause of appeal in a previous local act, by which a time was limited after which no such appeal could be made (i).

The question of what sessions the appeal must be preferred to, is discussed in the next section.

(e) R. v. Lancashire (Justices), 5 B. & Ald. 755; appeal by overseers on 18 G. III. c. 19, s. 4, against allowing a constable's accounts.

(f) Per Buller, J., Proser v. Hyde, 1 T. R. 417.

(g) See R. v. Hants (Justices), 1 B. & Adol. 654; post, tit. Convictions (Parties to Appeal). If two or more magistrates act together by a joint authority, notice to one will not suffice, Reg.

v. Cheshire (Justices), 3 P. & D. 23 n. (Hil. 1840), overruling R. v. Stafford. shire (Justices), 4 Ad. & E. 844; R. v. Sillifant, id. 354.

(h) R. v. Lancashire (Justices), 1 B. & Ald. 630.

(i) R. v. Bucks (Justices), 7 B. & Cr. 3, appeal against a county rate on 55 G. III. c. 51, s. 14. The local act was 54 G. III. c. 103.

SECTION II.

OF THE SESSIONS TO WHICH AN APPEAL MUST BE PREFERRED.

To what Kind of Session.]-An appeal is not usually given by a statute to the next general sessions, if there be such holden distinct from the quarter sessions; but to the next quarter (or general quarter) sessions, as distinguished from other general sessions, and from special sessions (j).

To what Session in respect of Place.]-The appeal must be to the sessions of the jurisdiction in which the order or the conviction is made, unless it is otherwise specially provided by statute; viz. from the orders and convictions of county magistrates to the county sessions, and from those of magistrates acting within a borough to the sessions for the borough (k). Where a quarter sessions held under one commission of the peace for the whole county is assembled, first in one division of a county or riding, and afterwards by adjournment in another, as in Sussex, &c. an appeal which is by law limited to the "next quarter sessions " may be preferred, either to such next practicable adjourned sessions as may be held for the division in which the order of removal is made, if so allowed by the practice of the sessions (1), or to the next practicable original sessions, though by the practice it might have been entered at the preceding original session, or at the adjournment of it (m); for a statute giving the appeal to the "next quarter session" does not contemplate the continuance of the sessions, but takes the holding of them as the point of time to which it refers the appeal; the sessions being always considered in law as one day, to whatever length they may be extended by accidental causes (n).

(j) R. v. London (Justices), 15 East, 632. Where, in a borough being a county of itself, the only sessions (before 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 96) were general sessions held twice a year, it was held that appeals against orders of removal must be tried at the next of those general sessions, R. v. Carmarthen (Justices), 4 B. & Ald. 291.

(k) South Molton case, Skinner's R. 222; Burr. Sett. C. 592.

(1) R. v. Sussex (Justices), 7 T. R. 107; and see R. v. Coyston, 1 Sid. 149; cited 3 B. & Cr. 549.

(m) R. v. Surrey (Justices), 1 M. &

S. 479.

(n) Id. ibid.

Appeals against orders of removal for relief of the poor, when made by justices of a borough not being a county of itself, were limited by 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30, to be prosecuted at the sessions for the county, division, or riding at large, and not otherwise or elsewhere. This was intended to prevent appeals ab eodem ad eundem. The present state of the question, whether since 5 & 6 W. IV. c. 76, s. 105, such appeals can be tried there, or at the quarter sessions of the borough as now constituted, is canvassed in the first chapter, and is standing for argument on a return to a mandamus (0).

To what Session in point of Time Appeals must be preferred; and herein of the Meaning of the Words "Next Session."]-The period within which an appeal is to be preferred is generally pointed out by the statute which gives it; but when it is not, the rule is, that it must be preferred within such time as shall be decided by the justices to be reasonable (p). Where the statute giving the appeal fixed the time within which it was to be brought, viz. " within three calendar months after the conviction," the appeal was held to be in time, when brought to the sessions occurring next after the expiration of the time so limited; for the act gave that time for the appellant to make up his mind, whether he would appeal or not; besides, as more than three months often intervene between the Epiphany and Easter sessions (q), the appeal could not in that instance be lodged in time on the other construction. But where an appeal was given by statute to "any quarter session, to be holden within six months after the conviction, on condition of the appellant giving ten days' notice of his intention to appeal, and entering into recognizance (r) four days after such notice," and an appeal lodged within the time was dismissed at the hearing for want of proof of the proper recognizance, it was held that the right to appeal was gone, and that the appellant could not lodge a second appeal, though within the six months; the court saying that the first judgment on the formal objection was conclusive, and that the sessions could not take cognizance of a second appeal on the same subject. The appellant might indeed have stopped his first appeal from being heard at all, when he discovered his deficiency of proof,

(0) Reg. v. Shropshire (Justices), in Wem v. St. Julian's, Shrewsbury, pending in Q. B. Hil. 1841.

(p) R. v. Oxfordshire (Justices), 1 M. & S. 448; R. v. Gloucestershire

(Justices), 3 M. & S. 127; R. v. Herts (Justices), id. 459.

(q) R. v. Middlesex (Justices), 6 M. & S. 279.

(r) Ante, p. 47.