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his boundary a considerable part of an adjoining manor belonging to S. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the sessions had no jurisdiction, no notice having been given to the lady of the manor; and the court held that the justices had acted right. The notice of appeal was insufficient. By the general act, the party who appeals is bound to give eight days' notice to the commissioner; by the local act ten days' notice to the commissioner, and also to the parties concerned. The latter, therefore, so far supersedes the provisions of the former; and it would be a great hardship if the parties concerned were bound by a notice to the commissioner alone. "Party concerned” includes parties directly interested in the soil; which in this case the lady of the manor was, and therefore entitled to notice, which she had not received (k).

It seems to follow from Farrer v. Billing (1), that, at least in cases where the provisions of a local inclosure act conform to, and do not contradict or supersede, those of the general inclosure act, the grievance or foundation of appeal arises at that point of time when the allottee has notice of the portion allotted for him on the map by the commissioners, whether he obtains that knowledge from a map, or by staking out, or in any other manner. A local inclosure act gave an appeal to parties grieved by any thing done in pursuance of the act, to "any general quarter sessions holden for the county, within four calendar months next after the cause of complaint shall have arisen." An allotment was made and staked out by the commissioners in March, and the appellant cropped it. It was held, that though the mere staking out the ground might not be a grievance, as it might be done without notice to the party, yet his cropping it showed him too late in lodging his appeal at the October session (m).

In a private inclosure act, power was given to the commissioners to set out land in a certain proportion in lieu of tithes to the vicar, with the following clause of appeal ;-" And if any persons shall think themselves aggrieved by any thing done in pursuance of this act, they may appeal to any general quarter session of the peace for the county, &c. within six calendar months after such cause of complaint shall have arisen." The commissioners made an allotment upon the map, which the vicar inspected in November, 1812, and appointed an agent who

(k) R. v. Lancashire (Justices), 1 B. & Ald. 630.

(1) Farrar v. Billing, 2 B. & Ald. 171.

(m) R. v. Wilts (Justices), 13 East,

353. See R. v. Cumberland (Justices), 1 B. & Cr. 64. The other point held in R. v. Wilts (Justices), was, that as it was too late to lodge it at the October sessions, they could not adjourn it.

attended a subsequent meeting, when an alteration was made which such agent approved, and it was understood at the meeting where such agent so concurred, that all objections were reconciled, and the allotments definitely settled. In November, 1813, the commissioners gave notice that all tithes were to cease from the 29th of September last preceding. The vicar entered an appeal against the allotment at the Epiphany sessions, 1814, being within six calendar months from the date of the notice of the commissioners above-mentioned; which appeal was dismissed as being out of time, the question being from what period the "grievance commenced." But the court held that the notice of the commissioners of the time from which the tithes were to cease, was the commencement of the vicar's grievance, and therefore that the appeal was in time (n).

An act gave, in the first place, a complaint to special sessions, and afterwards an appeal to quarter sessions to any person aggrieved by any act done under the act. A party grieved applied to special sessions, who after hearing the case and evidence, dismissed the complaint on a supposed want of power to grant relief. The quarter sessions dismissed the appeal on the ground of want of jurisdiction to hear it. But the court granted a mandamus, holding the dismissal by the petty sessions to be an act done against which an appeal would lie (o).

A local act vested the management of the parish poor in the churchwardens and others, and gave an appeal to them by any person thinking himself aggrieved by any thing to be done by virtue of the act, and if he should not be satisfied with their determination, then gave an appeal to the quarter sessions. A parishioner applied for relief against a poor-rate to the churchwardens, &c. who, at a meeting, resolved to take no further notice of his application; the court held, that as the churchwardens, &c. had not come to any determination on the subject matter of the complaint, the remedy was by mandamus to them to hear the appeal; and an appeal to the sessions was held mistaken (p). By a local act, certain guardians, &c. of the poor were incorporated and ordered to hold courts at which rate-payers might object to their proceedings; and if the matter could not be then settled, it was to be adjourned to the next court, to be then "finally heard and determined. By another clause, any person aggrieved by any thing done

(n) R. v. Gloucestershire (Justices), 3 M. & S. 127; and see R. v. Nockolds, 1 Ad. & E. 245; Smith v. Shaw, 10 B. & Cr. 277. See as to inclosures in general, 6 & 7 W. IV. c. 115; 3 & 4 V. c. 31.

(0) R. v. Tucker, 3 B. & C. 544. See also Blakemore v. Glamorgan Canal Company, 3 Y. & J. 60.

(p) R. v. Kent (Justices), 9 B. & C.

283.

in pursuance of the act, and for which no further mode of relief was already appointed,' might appeal to the quarter sessions to be holden within four calendar months next after the cause of complaint should have arisen." The directors ordered certain payments to be made for sums due on annuities and interest on loans previously granted and incurred. A rate-payer appealed within four months after the date of their order. Held that the borrowing the money and granting the annuities were not the "cause of complaint," but the being burdened in respect of the payments by the making the order; and the sessions were ordered to hear the appeal (q). The court also held that the act did not confine the party to the remedy before the directors.

Where a local act gave an appeal against a rate, first to a borough sessions, and then against their order to the county sessions, the appellant was confined to the original grounds of appeal urged at the borough sessions, though he might bring forward additional evidence (r).

SECTION III.

OF THE STEPS PRELIMINARY TO THE ENTERING AN APPEAL FOR HEARING; AND HEREIN OF NOTICES OF APPEAL GENERALLY. When Convicting Justices must inform the Party of his Right to Appeal, and when not (s).]—By many statutes it is made a part of a magistrate's duty to acquaint the party whom he convicts of his right of appealing, and also to inform him of the necessary steps to be taken. In convicting on such statutes, if the justice neglect to perform the whole of this duty,-viz. if the statute requires both a recognizance and notice of appeal, and he informs the party convicted of his right to appeal, and receives his recognizance, but is silent as to the notice, the appellant is discharged from the obligation of giving notice, and the session is bound to receive his appeal (t). The necessity for informing the party that he must give notice of appeal may be waived: as, where a party was informed of his right of appeal, and replied, he

(q) R. v. Salop (Justices), 2 B. & Adol.

145.

(r) R. v. Suffolk (Justices), 1 B. & Ald. 640; and see R. v. Tucker, in last page.

(8) R. v. Surrey (Justices), 5 B. & Ald. 539; 1 D. & R. 160, S. C.

(t) R. v. Leeds (Justices), 4 T. R.

583.

thought he had better pay the penalty, but afterwards appealed, his appeal was dismissed for want of notice at the time of his conviction that he intended to appeal.

But per curiam; "All the statute positively requires is, that the justices shall make known to the person convicted his right of appeal; they do so; and if he had thereupon signified his intention to appeal, non liquet that they would not also have proceeded to inform him of the further steps to be taken by him. But why should they do so nugatory an act as to inform him what he must do to appeal and enforce his right, when he had declined to appeal altogether, and had waived his right?" (v)

Entering into Recognizances.]-A statute required that recognizances should be entered into "forthwith " after giving notice of appeal. That means not" immediately" after the act of giving the notice of appeal, but without unreasonable delay; and a nine days' interval, without cause assigned for the delay, was held to take away the right to appeal (w). If a recognizance is made necessary, it may be verbally acknowledged before a justice within the time fixed, and it may be perfected afterwards (x). It is doubted whether a corporation can enter into a recognizance; so that any clause requiring it will be inapplicable as to them, unless expressly named (y); but they may appoint an attorney, or procure sureties to enter into it (z).

Notice of Appeal, in what cases made requisite by Statute.]The statutes which grant an appeal from the order or conviction of justices commonly annex certain conditions precedent to the taking advantage of that privilege, e. g. the giving notice to them, and entering into recognizance to prosecute the appeal. Where this is the case, the directions of the legislature must be strictly complied with before entering the appeal: and no contrary practice of the sessions will avail (a). But unless notice of appeal be thus expressly required by statute, it does not appear absolutely necessary, particularly where the party, by any act of justices, is directed to enter into a recognizance to appear at the next sessions to prosecute his appeal (b).

(v) R. v. York (West Riding, Justices), 3 M. & S. 493; see also 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 29, s. 72; id. c. 30, s. 38. (w) Reg. v. Worcestershire (Justices), 7 D. P. Č. 789, Coleridge, J.

(x) See ante, p. 47.

(y) Cortis v. Kent Waterworks Com

pany, 7 B. & Cr. 331.

(z) Id. 331, 332, 337.

(a) R. v. Lincolnshire (Justices), 3 B. & Cr. 548.

(b) R. v. Essex (Justices), 4 B. & Ald. 276 (on 50 G. III. c. 48, now repealed); R. v. Kent (Justices), 6 M. & S. 258.

T T

For the entry into the recognizance is held equivalent to notice to the informer and the convicting magistrate of this intention to appeal, so that any further notice to him becomes unnecessary, and the sessions are bound to hear the appeal; and this was so decided notwithstanding that, by the practice of the particular sessions, eight days' notice of appeal was requisite in all cases to be given by the appellant to the respondent. The practice of the sessions can only compel eight days' notice to be given in those cases where some notice is prescribed by the statute, without more explicit direction therein (c); for otherwise, by the act sub judice in R. v. Kent, if the conviction was made seven days before the sessions, the party grieved must have appealed to those sessions, and yet could not give the (eight days') notice prescribed by the practice (d). Nor can the practice of the sessions, requiring a notice of appeal against an order or conviction of justices out of sessions to be served on every justice who is a party to it, avail, if the act which gave the appeal does not direct such a notice. For that would be to introduce a new condition of appeal not to be found in the act (e).

As to written or verbal Notices of Appeal; and herein of Time of giving "Reasonable Notice" of Appeal by Practice of Sessions.]-Where an act requires notice of appeal to be given, without providing that the notice must be in writing, a verbal notice will suffice; and this, though the notice prescribed by the statute is "reasonable notice" (f). For the word "reasonable" will be held to refer to the time, and not to the manner of giving the notice (g); and the sessions are to determine what notice is reasonable. This must depend on their usual practice (h). Where notice is made a condition of appealing, without more being required, it is more convenient to give it in writing, as being better capable of proof by an

See R. v. Milnrow (Chapelwardens), 5 M. & S. 248. In R. v. Essex, the eight days' notice of appeal, required by the sessions practice, had been in fact given to the convicting magistrate.

(c) R. v. Kent (Justices), 6 M. & S. 258, decided on 55 G. III. c. 99, s. 20. (local and personal act).

(d) Per Holroyd, J., ibid.

(e) R. v. Staffordshire (Justices), 4 Adol. & E. 842; 6 Nev. & Man. 477, on 53 G. III. c. 127, s. 3. Appeal against order of justices for not paying a church rate; notice was served on the

churchwardens-the court did not expressly hold even that notice necessary under the act.

(f) R. v. Salop (Justices), 4 B. & Ald. 626, decided on bastardy act, 49 G. III. c. 68; R. v. Lincolnshire (Justices), 3 B. & C. 548. See also 4 B. & Adol. 685; R. v. Yorkshire (Justices, W. R.) in re Bower.

(g) R. v. Surrey (Justices), 5 B. & Ald. 539; 1 D. & R. 160, S. C.

(h) Reg. v. Watts, 7 Ad. & E. 470. See post, tit. Appeal against Overseers' Accounts,

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