recognition in the world of non-Catholic philosophy, by its thoroughness in the application of this method, is the NeoScholastic school of the University of Louvain. We quote, then, the opinion of the eminent Rector of this school as regards the misunderstandings occasioned by this new science.

There is evidently no question of weighing thought, or of calculating the dimensions of the human soul, as certain works and reviews on Christian philosophy have several times seemed to insinuate. The conscious fact is taken, just as it is, in both its material and immaterial complexity. Through its material part, it has connections with the external world, it undergoes the action thereof, and in its turn reacts on it. This fact, thus roughly considered, is accessible to common observation, and our spontaneous conscience suffices to make known to us the primary results of this observation. But, left to itself, our conscience cannot tell us anything about the elements of which is composed the complexus which is apparent, in its undivided state, to our spontaneous introspection. Briefly, then, the programme of this new science is: firstly, to dissociate these elements so as to arrive at the analytical data that are most simple, those which Wundt calls impressions'; secondly, to synthetically reconstitute the concrete complexus of our spontaneous conscience, namely a representation, and then to determine the laws of the association of representations. What is there [concludes Mgr. Mercier] to be afraid of in all this ?9

On the contrary, he says elsewhere, Neo-Thomists must take up their position, thoroughly, in this movement of experi mental psychology of the German school, instead of ignoring it as is so frequently the case. But not only have we nothing to fear from this new school, but we have much to gain. For, as a matter of fact, our system--that of Aristotle and Aquinas -lends itself better than any other, to the interpretation of the facts which form the object of experimental psychology. And Wandt, from a quite different initial standpoint, arrived at the same conclusion, thus proving once and for all the ignorance of those who would persistently maintain that psycho-physiology is either dangerous, or at least useless. At the end of his great work, Elements of Physiological Psychology, Wundt tells us :

The results of my labours do not fit in with either the materialistic hypothesis nor with the dualism of Plato or Des

9 Mercier, Origines de la Psychologie Contemporanic, p. 465.

cartes; alone, Aristotelian Animism, which connects psychology with biology, 10 is the conclusion I arrived at as the surest metaphysical foundation of experimental psychology.11

For if, on the other hand, materialists are right, if the soul, as they maintain, is but a dynamical or physiological mechanism, it follows that psycho-physiology is not a distinct science; it is merely a chapter of mechanics or of physiology. On the other hand, if the soul is such that its whole nature be 'to think,' as Descartes maintained, if it subsists on its own account, isolated from the living body, directly and exclusively observable by conscience, evidently a laboratory of experimental psychology is inconceivable, for it would have the pretention to experiment on the soul directly, and to submit it to apparatus of measure, weight, force, etc.; in other words, all this would presuppose as admitted, ipso facto, the material nature of the soul.12

But, if we admit with Aristotle and the great scholastics, that man is a substance, composed of a body and an immaterial soul; that there is a real dependence of the superior functions of the soul on our material functions; that there is not a single interior activity but has its physical corelative, that there is no idea without an image preceding it, no act of will without a sensible emotion; if all this be admitted, immediately, the concrete phenomenon, which becomes the object of our conscience, presents the character of a complexus at the same time psychological and physiological; it comes under the retrospection of our conscience, and under biological and physiological observation; in a word, the reason for the existence of a psycho-physiological science is clearly indicated.

So well, indeed, is it indicated that in Aristotle's philosophy, psychology and physiology did not constitute two separate sciences, nor again two opposite ones (as is the case in most modern philosophies), but a single unique science.13 We now see the reason for our comment on the saying of Wundt that these two sciences had been for centuries, but not

10 See p. 10 supra.

11 Wundt, vol. ii, ch. xxiii., 3rd part; Mercier, work cited, p. 455 sqq. 12 Prof. Thiéry, Revue Néo-Schol., April, 1895.

13 Mercier, cited work, ch. viii.

always, studied separately. Evidently, the body of data acquired by Aristotle was very small, compared to what is known to-day as the co-relation of our internal states and the external processes that precede them. But, as we have already noted, this was not due to any defective view on the part of Aristotle, but rather to the physical impossibility of acquiring more data, owing to the backward state of physical and physiological science. In the same way, in years to come, our present knowledge on this science, as given us by its masters such as Wundt, Fechner, Weber, etc., will surely be considered as rudimentary next to the knowledge that will then be obtained. Referring to Aristotle again, Dr. Hermann Siebeck, one of the greatest historians of psychology, says: Aristotle was the first to thoroughly understand that we must explain the spiritual acts of man by their connection with the functions of our organism which gave rise to them.'

Having thus explained that this science is distinct from all others, and that it is thoroughly in the spirit of the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, it is easy to conclude the attitude which all Catholic philosophers, and especially those who consider themselves as Neo-Thomists, should adopt as regards it. We should be failing in our duty towards those whom we, as teachers maybe, are preparing to take up their position in the maintaining of Catholic philosophy against the many errors of modern philosophers, were we to leave them in ignorance of the chief principles and results of this important school of experimental psychology. If we belong to the number of those who consider it their special duty to maintain the superiority of Neo-Thomism over all other modern or ancient systems of philosophy, we may well ask ourselves, in the words of Mgr. Mercier :

For whom do we write philosophy if not for the men of our times? and in writing, what object have we if it be not to propose solutions to difficulties they bring on matters that are most important?

We must, therefore, evidently know how to meet these difficulties, and the only way is to thoroughly grasp the domain whence they are taken.

It will be objected that this science is useless. But, even

supposing this to be true-which we are far from admitting -as long as a useless thing can be used against us, we must learn how to master it. But this 'apologetical' reason is far from being the only one to encourage our study of this science which, admittedly, is not an easy one. Does it not interest us to know more about our own activities, since we find it so interesting to study animal and vegetable life? Doubtless, many who would try to ridicule psycho-physiology spend a great deal of their time in their chemical or physiological laboratories, trying to wrest from nature some of her secrets, by studying the same subject from different points of view. If our science is useless, of what use is cytology, or morphology, which study the anatomy and functions of cells, and the forms of living matter in their lower stages, respectively? And yet, how many have made their immortality in the annals of true science, by their studies in general biology, of which the two above-mentioned sciences form a part! Just because we do not see the immediate utility of a certain kind of knowledge, are we to conclude that all these creations of the Almighty are unworthy of our consideration?

Is there nothing praiseworthy in the devoting a life to making more manifest God's infinite science, in the studying of science for itself as a work of God? And when we know that our own kind is the end of all the less perfect living beings, is not the study of ourselves, from a scientific standpoint the most worthy of all?

Will it be said that this science is useless and vain; that it matters little to know whether a colour sensation is simple or complex, or what may the physical and physiological conditions of a representation be, or according to what laws do the whole contents of our conscience ultimately combine? Objections of this kind are irritating. For who is in a position to prophecy as to the importance or the unimportance of a discovery now made in the future?14

We may well add that if those who helped to build up the various sciences as they are now, if the early workers in the dark had stopped and asked themselves: 'Of what use is this

14 Mercier, Orig. de la Psych. Contemp., ch. viii.

labour?' science would not have made the progress which we know it has.

Infinitely harder was their task, with rough instruments for experiments, printing unknown, little means of communication, than that of the modern scientist. In physics, astronomy, medicine, etc., the first workers prepared the way for those who came after them in the line of progress. Their work was a disinterested one, and they knew the dignity of science well enough not to trouble themselves either with the narrow scope of their work, or with the immediate utility of their investigations.

Why not have the same spirit, in the new science of physiological psychology? And, as an example, consider how far his experiments in this science have led Wundt, the founder of the famous laboratory of psycho-physiology at Leipzig 15 Is it impossible that, the knowledge of our conscious sentiments and emotions being developed, we should thus be enabled more thoroughly to enjoy the beauties of harmony and rhythm, whether it be in music, painting, or literature that we may find them?

Like all sciences it is useful, since it develops our most perfect faculty, our intelligence. Moreover, is it difficult to foresee that certain results of this science may have, when better know and appreciated, considerable influence on education? The character that is formed by education depends greatly on the training of the emotions and sentiments. From the very identity of the subject-matter of these two sciences, there must be many questions in the one which the other can enlighten. Many books are written, nowadays, in France especially, on what may be termed 'Experimental Education,' containing errors with far-reaching results, due to imperfect and erroneous observation. In the training of the senses, of the imagination, of our æsthetic sentiments and of our emotions, our new science, when sufficiently developed in years to come, may have the same relation to education that logic has in the training of our reason. And, evidently, before it is developed, it must be well grounded in its principles,

15 Vide supra, p. 18.