An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: With Thoughts on the Conduct of Understanding ; Collated with Desmaizeaux's Ed. To which is Prefixed the Life of the Author

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Mundell & Son, 1801 - 308 sayfa
 

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İçindekiler

Other Helps ſhould be fought
7
We reaſon about Particulars
8
Firſt Reaſon fails us for want of Ideas
9
Secondly Becauſe of obſcure and imperfect Ideas
10
Secondly Received Hypothefes
11
Secondly Modes not falfe
17
Thirdly Ideas of Subſtances when falſe
18
Truth or Falſehood always ſuppoſes Affirmation or Negation
19
Ideas in themſelves never true nor falſe
20
But are falſe Firft When judged agreeable to ano ther Mans Idea without being
21
Secondly When judged to agree to real Exiſtence when they do
22
Thirdly When judged adequate without being
23
Fourthly When judged to repreſent the real Elence
24
Ideas when falſe
25
More properly to be called right or wrong
26
Conclufion
27
Suppoſition that Species are diſtinguiſhed by their
37
Difference of Mens Diſcoveries depends upon the dif
66
All our Ideas are of the one or the other of theſe
74
On this Hypotheſis the Soul muſt have Ideas not
81
CHAP II
87
CHAP VII
97
Memory
123
Attention Repetition Pleaſure and Pain fix Ideas 4 5 Ideas fade in the Memory 6 Conſtantly repeated Idea can ſcarce be loft 7 lie remembering the Mi...
124
Brutes heve Memory CHAP XI
127
The difference of W and Judgment 3 Clearneſs alone hinders confuſion 4 Comparing 5 Brutes compare but imperfeciy
129
Compounding 7 Brutes compound but little
130
Naming
131
Brutes abſtract
132
Idiots and Madmen
133
Method
134
Theſe are the Beginnings of Human Knowledge 16 Appeal to Experience 17 Dark Room
135
CHAP XII
136
SECT
242
Sect
275
CH A P II
confuſed
CHA P XXXIII
Made by the Mind out of ſimple ones
1
Made voluntarily
2
Are either Modes Subſtances or relations 4 Modes
3
Diftint and confuſed what
4
Objeion
5
Confuſion of Ideas is in reference to their Names
6
7 Defaults which make Confuſion Firſt complex Ideas made up of too few ſimple ones
7
Secondly Or its limple ones jumbled diſorderly
8
Simple Ideas the Materials of all our Knowledge
9
Confufion without reference to Names hardly con ceivable
10
Confuſion conceros always two Ideas
11
Cauſes of Confufion
12
Complex Ideas may be diftin in one part and
13
fuſed in another
91
This if not heeded cauſes Confufion in our Arguings 15 Instances in Eternity
92
real Effences uſeleſs
102
CHAP I
129
CH A P III
136
Abſtract Ideas are the Efrences of the Genera
142
Real and nominal Eſſence the ſame in fimple Ideas
147
Simple Ideas why undefinable farther explained
153
Divifibility of Matter
203
CHAP IX
210
of Perception
260
Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes
1
Simple Ideas all real
2
Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations
3
Sect
4
none innate
5
SECT
Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas
1
Firſt Of Identity or Diverſity
4
Secondly Relation
5
Thirdly Of Coexiſtence
6
Which Ideas firſt are not evident
7
Demonſtrative
8
Depends on Proofs 4 But not ſo caſy
9
Not without precedent Doubt
10
Not ſo clear 7 Each Step muſt have intuitive Evidence Ś Hence the Miſtake ex precognitis et preconceis 9 Demonſtration not limited to Quanity
12
Each diſtinct abſtract Idea is a diſtinct Effence
14
Perception the Inlet of Knowledge
15
Firſt Ad Verecundiam
19
Secondly Ad Ignorantiam
20
Thirdly Ad Hominem
21
Fourthly Ad Judicium
22
Judgment may reach farther but that is not know
73
What Uſe theſe general Maxims have
89
Little Uſe of thefe Maxims in Proofs where we have
96
6
102
And
105
So Ideas of Subſtances are real when they agree with the Exiftence of things
108
The eternal Being must be most powerful
111
Not material Firſt Becauſe every Particle of Matter
117
Firſt Becauſe we cannot have them but by the Inlet
124
The Exiſtence of Spirits not knowable
130
The true Method of advancing Knowledge is by con
137
This may procure us Convenience not Science
139
CHAP XIII
145
Above contrary and according to Reafou 24 Reaſon and Faith not oppoſite
187
CHAP XVIII
188
Faith and Reaſon what as contradiſtinguiſhed
189
Traditional Revelation may make us know Propofi tions incwable alſo by Reaſon but not with the ſame Certainty that Reaſon dotha
191
OF THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING
227

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Popüler pasajlar

Sayfa 64 - I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding.
Sayfa 97 - ... some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brain or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them.
Sayfa 192 - ... a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately; which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does muchwhat the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope.
Sayfa 10 - From all which it is evident, that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas.
Sayfa 64 - ... got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning...
Sayfa 80 - When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas.
Sayfa 239 - ... harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided ; and, where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or person 'that makes use of them.
Sayfa 179 - I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind ; which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies ; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker...

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