or other, wherein these sins may be pardoned, and the true worshippers of God be made happy. This I need not bring many arguments to prove: for all believe so much of their own religion, be it what it will, that they shall be made happy by it; which they cannot, unless their sins be first pardoned. And certainly all could not have so concurred in expecting happiness from the Deity they worship, unless there was some such thing as happiness to be enjoyed. (5.) Fifthly, my reason tells me, that no sin can be pardoned without violation of divine justice, unless full satisfaction be first made for it. For herein consisteth the very nature of justice, even in giving to sin its due punishments, as well as to virtue its just rewards. And therefore if God be just, as he must be if God, there is never a sin can go unpunished by him; unless there be some satisfaction made to him equivalent to the punishment that is due from him. (6.) Sixthly, my reason tells me, no creature, no finite being can make such satisfaction to infinite justice: for all creatures depend continually upon God, and therefore whatsoever they can possibly do, is but of duty, and so cannot merit any thing from God, much less make satisfaction for demerits. (7.) Seventhly, my reason tells me, that the person himself, who is thus offended, cannot make that satisfaction to himself: for then the same person would be the person satisfying and the person satisfied too; which reason cannot but look upon as a great absurdity, yea, an impossibility: and therefore, (8.) Eighthly, my reason tells me, there must be some person in the world equal unto that person, whom we apprehend as offended by our sins, and yet not the same person with him; which he cannot be unless he be God as well as the other, and no ways distinct in essence, but only in subsistence from the other. And thus we see, the foregoing conclusions being granted, every one of which is demonstrable from reason, we must of necessity acknowledge, that there are two persons, each of which is God. Which being acknowledged, I build upon it these following propositions. [i] First, my reason tells me, that though this person forenamed be in himself able to satisfy the justice of God, and so to make the foregoing conclusions true; yet he could not satisfy for the sins of man, unless himself became man; because justice still requires, that the same nature that offends should be punished for those offences: as also, because, as God, he was not capable of bearing the punishments that were due to man, not being capable of any suffering or passion whatsoever: and therefore, unless he became man as well as God, he could not make satisfaction to God for man. [ii.] Secondly, my reason tells me, he could not become man, but only by having his divine nature united to the human, and so to have the two natures joined together in one and the same person; for otherwise whatsoever he had done could have been no ways available to the purpose we are speaking of; he not being so man, as to be both God and man too. [iii.] Thirdly, my reason tells me, no creature, no finite power can make this union, because one of the natures to be united is infinite, and therefore out of the reach of all finite powers. [iv.] Fourthly, my reason tells me, that the person to whom we suppose this satisfaction is to be made could not do it, upon the same ground that he himself could not make satisfaction to himself; the uniting of the two natures being the ground of all the satisfaction that could be made to himself; and therefore, had he joined the two natures together, he himself would have laid the foundation of all satisfaction to himself: which my reason will not suffer me to assert, upon the same account upon which it appeared before he could not make satisfaction to himself. [v.] Fifthly, my reason tells me, the person himself, who was thus to become man, could not do it; for in every union there is a bringing two things so together as to make one out of them both: and therefore there is of necessity required a third to bring them thus together; and not only to bring them together, but to tie them to one another, yea, and make one out of both together: so that I cannot apprehend in reason, how that person, who was thus to become man, could himself unite himself to the human nature: and therefore, [vi.] Sixthly, my reason tells me there must be a third person of equal power with the other two, who might thus unite one of the other divine persons to the human nature; and that so he might satisfy the other person for the offences committed against him, that justice being satisfied, the offenders themselves might be pardoned. Which things being put together and thoroughly considered, will force us into an acknowledgment of three distinct persons, every one of which is of infinite power, and so God. For seeing there is one person, who is God; seeing also that this God is infinitely just; seeing all men have sinned against him; seeing some notwithstanding go unpunished, which he could not in justice suffer them to do without satisfaction made to him some other way; and seeing no creature could make that satisfaction, nor the person himself it is to be made to; it necessarily follows, that there is some person, who is not a creature, but God, besides the person acknowledged at the first. And seeing this person could not make this satisfaction unless he became man; seeing he could not become man, but he must be united to the human nature; seeing no creature could unite him, nor the other person who is God, nor he himself; it necessarily follows, that there is a third person who is God too: and therefore there be three persons, every one of which is God. And that they are all but one and the same God, is plain from the arguments I brought to prove there can be no more than one God; there can be no more than one divine substance, though there be many divine subsistences in it. To explicate these things fully would take up a volume by itself, and therefore I shall not expatiate upon them. Though I believe it is very easy to demonstrate from natural principles the truth of all the premises in each sorites, from whence the conclusion so clearly flows, that though there be but one God, yet there be three persons or subsistences in that one God, every one of which is as much God as all three. But now, to show from reason, that one of these persons begat the others, and that from the two first proceeded the third, I think it altogether impossible. Neither do I propound these as unanswerable arguments; or though they should be so, I cannot certainly conclude that one that never read the Scriptures could ever have produced them; or if myself had never had the little light of my reason helped with the glorious light of Scripture, I cannot say I should have ever thought of them but howsoever, seeing the denying it would bring one into so many irrational absurdities, I cannot but hence conclude, as well as from Scripture, that there be three persons in the Godhead, every one of which is God, and yet all three but one and the same God. 6 3. Confirmation from the FATHERS. And this was the ancient doctrine of the church of Christ: Justin Martyrd saith expressly, Truly there is one God over this whole universe, who is made known or acknowledged in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. For, seeing the Father of his own substance begot the Son, and issued forth the Spirit, there is all the reason in the world that they that have one and the same essence, should be acknowledged to have one and the same Divinity.' And again: It is fit therefore, that we should confess one God, made known to us in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, acknowledging the several subsistences of one Deity; but as God understanding the communion of those subsistences in the same essence: for unity is understood in the trinity, and trinity is acknowledged in that unity.' And elsewhere, There is one God in the coexistency of three divine persons or subsistences; which are differenced from one another, not in their essence, but in the manner of existence. But the difference of the manners of existence makes no division or difference in the unity of essence.' And so Gregory Nyssen ", 'In his essence d Εἷς οὖν ταῖς αληθείαις ἔστιν ὁ τῶν ἁπάντων Θεὸς, ἐν Πατρὶ, καὶ Υἱῷ, καὶ ̔Αγίῳ Πνεύματι γνωριζόμενος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας οὐσίας ὁ Πατὴρ Υἱὸν ἀπεγέννησεν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς τὸ Πνεῦμα προήγαγεν, εἰκότως ἂν τὰ τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ μιᾶς οὐσίας μετέχοντα, Tñs avτñs μiãs deótntos ǹžíwvrai, — Just. Par. 1636. Expos. Fidei de Rect. Confes. p. 373. A. e"Ένα τοίνυν Θεὸν προσῆκεν ὁμολογεῖν ἐν Πατρὶ, καὶ Υἱῷ, καὶ ̔Αγίω Πνεύματι γνωριζόμενον ᾗ μὲν Πατὴς, καὶ Υἱὸς, καὶ Πνεῦμα ̔́Αγιον τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος τὰς ὑποστασεις γνωρίζοντας· ᾗ δὲ Θεὸς τὸ κατ ̓ οὐσίαν τῶν κοινὸν ὑποστάσεων νοοῦντας· μονὰς γὰρ ἐν τριάδι νοεῖται, καὶ τριὰς ἐν μονάδι γνωρίζεται. Ibid. p. 379. A. Γ Εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς τῇ συνυπάρξει τῶν τριῶν θείων ὑποστάσεων, τῶν διαφερουσῶν ἀλλήλων, οὐ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλά τοῖς τῆς ὑπάρξεως τρόποις. ἡ διάφορὰ δὲ τῶν τῆς ὑπάρξεως rgówwv où dinigeï rò ïv tỷ ovcía.—Id. Resp. Quæst. 139. ad Orthod. p. 488. A. 5 Τῷ μὲν γὰς λόγω τῆς οὐσίας ἓν ἐστι, διὸ καὶ εἰς ἕν ὄνομα βλέπειν ὁ Δεσπότης he is but one; and therefore God commanded, that they should look but upon one name: but by the known properties of the persons, or subsistences, it is distinguished into the faith of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.' And so Liberius, in his epistle to Athanasius", For neither the Son, nor the Spirit, is divided from the essence of the Father, which filleth heaven and earth. There is, therefore, as I said before, a trinity in one substance undivided, but one in essence, one in deity, one in power, one in dominion, one in glory, one in likeness, one in Spirit, for the Spirit is not divided.' And Athanasius sends him word back again: And therefore is our faith in one God, the Father Almighty, and in his Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Holy Ghost. For these are of one unity, one power, one substance, one essence, one glory, one dominion, one kingdom, one in the image of the Trinity, consubstantial: by whom all things were made.' And there are amongst others three questions, which Athanasius answers, that make much to clear this mystery, as well as to show the judgment of this father upon it. First, What k ἐνομοθέτησε, τοῖς δὲ γνωριστικοῖς τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἰδιώμασιν, εἰς Πατρός τε καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύματος ̔Αγίου πίστιν διῇρηται. — Gr. Nyssen. Orat. I. contra Eunom. tom. ii, p. 3. C. Par. 1615. * Οὐ γὰς μερίζεται ὁ Υἱος ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως, οὐδὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ̔́Αγιον, τῆς πληρούσης τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γὴν· ἔστιν οὖν, καθῶς προεῖπον, ἡ τριάς ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει μὴ μεριζομένη, καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἕν· καὶ τῇ Θεότητι ἕν· καὶ τῇ δυνάμεὶ ἕν· καὶ τῇ βασιλεία ἕν. καὶ τῇ δοξολογίᾳ ἕν. καὶ τῇ εἰκόνι ἕν· καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι ἕν· Πνεῦμα γὰρ οὐ μερίζεται. Liberii Epist. ad Athanas. inter Athanas. Opera, tomn. ii. p. 664. Β. Ed. Ben. Par. 1698. 1 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν ἐστιν, εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν Πατέρα παντοκράτορα, καὶ εἰς τὸν Υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, καὶ εἰς τὸ ̔́Αγιον Πνεῦμα· ταῦτα δὲ ἐξ ἑνότητος μιᾶς, δυνάμεως μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως μιᾶς, οὐσίας μιᾶς, δοξολογίας μιᾶς, κυριότητος μιᾶς, βασιλείας μιᾶς· εἰκόνος τῆς τριάδος ὁμοούσιν· δι ̓ οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο. — Athanas. Rescript. ad Liber. p. 665: C. ibid. --- * ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ έ. Τί τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος; ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ. Κοινὸν ἡ οὐσία· κοινὸν τὸ ἄναρχον· κοινὸν ἡ δύναμις, ἡ ἀγαθότης, ἡ σοφία, ἡ δικαιοσύνη πάντα γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἔχει ὁ Πατὴρ, καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς, καὶ τὸ ̔́Αγιον Πνεῦμα, πλὴν τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῶν· ἴδιον γὰς τοῦ μὲν Πατρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον· τοῦ δὲ Υἱοῦ, τὸ γεννητὸν· τοῦ δὲ “Αγίου Πνεύματος, τὸ ἐκπορεύτὸν. ΕΡΩ. ς'. Επὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ πόσας οὐσίας ὁμολογεῖς ; ΑΠΟΚ. Μίαν οὐσίαν λέγω, μίαν φύσιν, μίαν μορφὴν, ἓν γένος, μίαν δόξαν, μίαν ἀξίαν καὶ κυριότητα. ΕΡΩ. ζ'. Υποστάσεις δὲ πόσας ὁμολογεῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ; ΑΠΟΚ. Τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ὁμολογῶ, τρία πρόσωπα, τρία ίδια, τρία άτομα, καί τρεῖς χαρακτῆρας. -- Athanas. Quæst. et Resp. 5, 6, 7. tom. ii. p. 339. ibid. |