Pastor" which condemned Molinos; and in many others.* Yet on the other hand, the Church's censures are by no means confined to propositions which directly assail revealed dogmata: but extend much further. Those propositions are said to assail revealed dogmata directly, which either point-blank contradict them, or else contradict them in the way of strictly logical and necessary consequence.† Propositions of the first class are condemned as "heretical"; and it is now the universal opinion of theologians, that it is propositions of the second class which are condemned as "erroneous." See Dr. Murray, d. 17, n. 22. But what a vast number of censures still remains! Not only does the Church brand propositions as "suspected" or "savouring" of the "heretical" and the "erroneous;" she infallibly brands them for no heavier offence, than that of being "temerarious," "ill-sounding," or "scandalous;" again, as "disturbing the peace of the soul," or "derogatory to the Church's rights," or "injurious to holy doctors." In fact, if you look over the list of censures which have been pronounced-some seventy or eighty-you will admit that any proposition falls within the sphere of censure, which on the one hand is reprehensible, and on the other hand is in any possible way injurious to the Faith. So Montagne pronounces (Cursus, vol. i. p. 1113) that any proposition can be condemned which is "fidei aliquo modo nociva"; and F. Perrone indeed considers this the one accepted definition: ("Vulgo definivi consuevit," De Virtutibus Theologicis, part i. n. 500. See again Dr. Murray, d. 17, n. 53.) We have added indeed explicitly, what Montagne and others of course imply, that no proposition is censurable which is not reprehensible;

"Among all the anxieties of our pastoral care

grievously oppresses us, that

this chiefly more the Orthodox and Catholic Faith may remain whole and unspotted." "Inter cunctas." Then follows presently the censure on Wicklyffe and Hus.

"The care of our pastoral duty admonishes us that we watch with all zeal over the task of promoting the salvation of souls throughout the world, and especially of preserving the purity of that Orthodox Faith without which it is impossible to please God." "Pastoralis officii." Then follows the reference to Quesnel's condemned propositions. "The Heavenly Shepherd

rule of Peter

delivered the Catholic Church to the and his successors, in order that they might preserve absolutely entire (sartam tectamque) the doctrine learned from His mouth. it has been always our fixed desire that the Christian people should follow that Faith which was preached by Christ the Lord, through the Apostles," &c. Innocent XI. "Coelestis Pastor." Then follow the various censures of Molinos.

Wherefore

+ The meaning of this expression is more precisely considered a few pages further on.

because it is a contradiction in terms, that any thing can be infallibly censured which does not deserve censure.

2. We are thus led to a question, which has been recently discussed with some emphasis. Can a condemned proposition be possibly true? Of course there are many condemned proposi-. tions, which are most undoubtedly true in a certain sense: the question to be considered is-can they be true in that particular sense in which they have been condemned? Most strangely some writers, who have argued for the affirmative answer to this question, have done so under an idea, that they shall thus lessen the sphere of the Church's infallibility. But it is evident, on a moment's thought, that the opinion of these writers greatly enlarges that sphere. For on their view the Church possesses a power of declaring with absolute infallibility, that a proposition, though understood in some sense in which it is perfectly true, will nevertheless to the end of time be, under all circumstances, "temerarious," "scandalous," or "ill-sounding."* However, we will consider the matter on its own merits, and exclusively of such results. It is a perfectly open question, and one on which theologians differ: we must be understood therefore, as merely expressing with deference the bias of our own opinion.

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Now as to the vast majority of censures, it is most plain that they imply untruth in the censured proposition: no true proposition can be "blasphemous," "impious," "seditious," schismatical," &c., &c. Take one of the very mildest, that of "ill-sounding." When the Church infallibly pronounces this censure, she clearly pronounces two infallible judgments: viz. (1) that the censured proposition has a certain appearance of being intended in a certain sense; and (2) that, if it be understood in that sense, it is an "evil"-i. e., inclusively an "untrue"-proposition. See Dr. Murray, d. 17, n. 40. But taking the matter generally, to us there seems no imaginable ground but one, on which a true proposition can be in itself +

"To the end of time," because (as Catholic theologians are in the habit of pointing out) this qualification is often expressed, and always understood. So the Council of Constance put forth a "perpetuum decretum"; and Clement XI. condemned Quesnel, "hâc nostrâ perpetuò valitura Constitutione."

"In itself reprehensible." Of course there are various other grounds, on which individuals may be reprehensible for holding some true opinion. It may be contrary e. g., to filial piety, that a son shall believe even on sufficient, though not overwhelming, evidence, an accusation against his father which may nevertheless be true; and there are various analogous cases bearing on the interests of religion. But the Church condemns propositions objectively, not subjectively; i. e., she directly censures the proposition itself, and not the individual who holds it.

reprehensible. That one case of exception occurs, when a proposition, though it may happen to be true, yet is contrary to the weight of attainable evidence; including of course "authority" under the head of "evidence." And it seems to us therefore the more probable opinion, that there is but one censure, that of "temerarious," which can with any show of reason be accounted compatible with the truth of what is censured. Now that, under particular circumstances and for a period, a true proposition may be really temerarious, is most evident. Thus, in Galileo's time it was undoubtedly temerarious to hold that the earth moves round the sun; because such an opinion contravened the one obvious and the one traditional sense of Scripture, not on the strength of astronomical proof, but in the weakness and license of astronomical conjecture. But, as we have already pointed out, the Church's censures are of perpetual application; and the Copernican theory therefore could not have been censured by her. In pronouncing then a proposition temerarious, the Church pronounces infallibly that to the end of time it will be contrary to the weight of attainable evidence. And whether such a proposition can or cannot be true, at all events it follows, from the Church's condemnation, that every Catholic will be under an obligation, so long as he remains on earth, of interiorly rejecting and disbelieving it.

But now let this fact be very particularly observed, which seems entirely to have escaped F. Ryder's attention. Several considerable theologians, no doubt, have held that the mere fact of a proposition being condemned as "temerarious,” "scandalous," or the like, does not prove its untruth. But none of them have denied-none of them could possibly have denied that the Church herself may teach in this or that particular case the falsehood of those propositions which she censures. She has done so in several instances. Thus, the recent Syllabus is a Syllabus of "errors": no one therefore, of the propositions therein recited, is true in the sense in which it is condemned. The condemned tenets of Wicklyffe and Hus were (as we have seen) infallibly declared "perverse," and therefore untrue; nor was any Catholic permitted to "believe" them. Leo X., in the "Exurge Domine," repeatedly calls Luther's condemned propositions by the name "errors." Clement XI. speaks no less distinctly on Quesnel's.*

In the "Unigenitus," just before reciting the propositions. "Nihil propterea opportunius aut salubrius præstari à nobis posse arbitrati sumus, quam si fallacem libri doctrinam pluribus singulatim ex eo excerptis propositionibus distinctiùs et apertius explicaremus Ita nimirùm denudatis et quasi in propatulo positis non uno quidem aut altero,

And all this adds considerable probability to the opinion of those theologians-far the more numerous-who maintain that in all cases every condemned proposition is certainly untrue.

It may be added that, though this question is in itself of some importance, yet it has no bearing on any conclusion which we have ourselves at any time been especially desirous of urging. The whole doctrine, e. g., on the infallibility of Encyclicals is absolutely unaffected by it: as any one will see, who cares to follow the argument which we shall pursue in future articles.

3. We now come to a somewhat important matter of terminology. Those irreformable judgments of the Church, which brand a contradictory tenet as "heretical," are called "definitions of faith." But what name shall be given to those other irreformable judgments, which brand a proposition, not with the note of heresy, but with some minor censure? Many theologians call these by the name of "dogmatic judgments." Our own objection to this phrase is, that the word "dogma” is not unfrequently contradistinguished from the word "doctrine" the word "dogma" being confined to the actual Deposit, while the word "doctrine" is applied, not only to the Deposit, but to every truth connected therewith. So Pius IX., in the "Quantâ curâ," uses the phrase "dogmata fidei et morum" to express exclusively the actual truths revealed by God. It seems to us extremely convenient, that this distinction should be preserved between the two words; and we think it better therefore to avoid the term "dogmatic" judgments. We propose then to use the term "doctrinal judgments" as expressing the genus; as expressing all the irreformable judgments of the Church. This we divide into two different species: viz. (1) definitions of faith; and (2) minor doctrinal judgments.

4. Now it is evident that the Church not only expresses doctrinal judgments negatively-viz., by condemning this or that proposition-but affirmatively also. Thus the capitula of Trent, as distinct from the canons, contain a long series of infallible

sed plurimis gravissimisque
omnes veritati cedere compellantur."

In the "Pastoralis officii" he speaks more than once of the " errores per nos damnati" in Quesnel.

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"T.," writing in the Tablet, seems to think it would be a very heavy yoke, if he were required to hold as infallibly certain, that each of the hundred and one propositions is untrue. We cannot ourselves think the obligation a heavy yoke; but at all events there can be no doubt whatever that he is under it.