Marshal Murat, after the Treaty of the 11th of January, first occupied Tuscany and the Roman states, took Ancona after a siege of eight days, and arrived at last on the Po. The great benefit derived from this was evident from the proclamation of general Bellegarde. The viceroy was obliged to take a defensive position behind the Mincio, and prevented from any thing more than defensive operations. To his army of 45,000 men, stated to be of the most excellent description, and on which such stress was laid in defending the Treaty of Fontainbleau, General Bellegarde had only 30,000 to oppose. If Murat had added his force to that of the viceroy, general Bellegarde would have been compelled to go behind the Tagliamento, and from the easy access to Vienna from that quarter, Austria would no longer have been able to continue her efforts for the cause of the alliance; and plan of combined operations. This was a convention for military co-operation, which, in point of fact, actually took place. It did, in point of fact, confirm the Austrian Treaty, guaranteeing to Murat the full and entire sovereignty of Naples. On the 15th of February the convention of Troyes was entered into, of which the 3d article awarded to the King of Sicily a liberal indemnity in Italy, according to the scale of his losses, and the means at the disposal of the Allied Powers. But this Treaty did not consist only of ostensible and public articles, for there were two secret articles, in which it was stipulated, not only that the Sovereign of Naples should be maintained in possession of his sovereignty, but also that he should receive an accession of ter ritory for his claims on the kingdom of Sicily; and in that article the noble secretary and the Allies then began the new mode of calculation, by which the inha-as it was by the most narrow accident in bitants of a country were numbered like so many cattle-the King of Naples to receive an accession of territory comprehending not less than 400,000 souls. The noble earl then proceeded to notice the confirmation of the Convention in the conferences at Chatillon, and the letter of lord Castlereagh to lord William Bentinck, of the 3d of April, respecting the proceedings of the King of Sicily; and he inferred, from all he had stated, that the engagement amounted to a preliminary treaty of alliance, to the fulfilment of which the King of Naples had a right, if such right was not forfeited by some proceeding of his own.-He now came to the two considerations on which the fulfilment was stated to depend. The first of these was the indemnity to Sicily, and the second a co-operation;-no; not a co-operation, but a cordial co-operation between Murat and the Allies. With respect to the indemnity, it was not to be taken from Murat's dominions, but from the disposable fund possessed by the Allies; and except he endeavoured to defeat or oppose such indemnity, nothing on this point could be laid to his charge. In entering on the subject of the co-operation, he entreated their lordships to be lieve, that he was not disposed to be the apologist of that person; but it was certain, that the military co-operation which was wished for, and which had relieved Austria from the pressure which prevented her from directing her efforts with vigour against France, was actually obtained. the world that it succeeded at last, they owed to the co-operation of Murat that success in all probability. It was too late to come forward now and say, that he did not act with all the cordiality which might have been wished. He wished to defer saying any thing however on this subject, till he should see the reports of general Nugent and lord William Bentinck, and of the latter more especially, knowing, as he did, that he not only possessed the highest degree of truth and honour, but a clear and excellent understanding, and that he was not likely to have an undue bias either on one side or another. He was not the apologist of Murat; but he contended that we had had the benefit of the co-operation of Murat, though not probably to the extent which was expected. We owed to it, however, the success of the campaign, and we ought to be very cautious, therefore, how we set aside an engagement in virtue of which we had derived so many advantages. If the noble earl were to examine accurately into the subject, he would find, perhaps, that without any treachery or bad faith on the part of Murat, his cooperation might not have been so active as they expected. Had those charges of bad faith and treachery been made openly? If not, the circumstances were still more suspicious. They might be. true; but if so, they ought to have been made openly, and followed up by assisting the King of Sicily to recover his ancient dominions. This would have been * sound policy as well as strict justice, for if the character of marshal Murat was such as the noble earl had represented it to be, considering the state of Europe, considering the situation of Italy (declared by every one to be in the greatest danger), having such a case against marshal Murat, it was the height of impolicy to suffer a man who had exhibited such treachery and perfidy, to wait until an opportunity offered to set fire to the magazine of combustibles which had been accumulated. This was prima facie a strong case against his Majesty's ministers. But, in the mean time, what had been done? Their lordships had all seen the letter from the prince of Benevento to lord Castlereagh (and he * Copy of a LETTER from the Prince De Talleyrand to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, dated Vienna, Dec. 15, 1814. "My lord;-You desire me to make known to you in what manner I conceive the affair of Naples ought to be settled in Congress; for as there is a necessity of settling it, it is a point upon which there ought not to be one moment of uncertainty in a mind like yours. It would be for ever a subject of reproach, and I will say, even an eternal subject of shame, if the right of sovereignty over an ancient and fine kingdom, like that of Naples, being contested, Europe united for the first time (and probably for the last) in general congress, should leave undecided a question of this nature, and, sanctioning in some degree usurpation by its silence, should give ground for the opinion, that the only source of right is force. I have not at the same time to convince your excellency of the rights of Ferdinand 4. England has never ceased to recognise them. In the war in which he lost Naples, England was his ally. She has been since, and is so still. Never has she recognised the title that the person who now governs at Naples assumes, nor the right which this title supposes: therefore, in concurring to assure the rights of king Ferdinand, England has only one plain thing to do which is to declare in Congress what she has always recognised, that Ferdinand 4. is the legitimate sovereign of the kingdom of Naples. Perhaps England, heretofore the ally of Ferdinand 4, desires still to be so. Perhaps she may believe her honour demands that she should assist, if need be, with her forces, for his regaining the crown of which he has been recognised was persuaded that most of them had felt the deepest shame on its perusal); a letter which proved, that though we were not disposed to any manly and vigorous operations, we were quite ready to adopt all kinds of secret and underhand proceedings. I repeat, continued lord Grey, that no doubt all your lordships have seen this extraordinary letter, and have seen it with feelings of resentment for the injured honour, for the humiliation and shame of the remaining character of this country, so deeply involved, and so much more so if it were written not merely on the writer's own notion, but as the reply to some preceding communication from the British minister. I trust, my lords, that the sovereign; but this is not an obligation that can flow from a pure and simple acknowledgment of the rights of this prince, because the recognition of a right does not naturally carry with it any other obligation, than that of doing nothing that may be contrary to such right, and of not supporting any pretension that may be set up against it. It does not carry with it the obligation of fighting in his defence. "It may be that I deceive myself, but it appears to me infinitely probable, that a frank and unanimous declaration of the Powers of Europe, and the certitude of the person who now governs at Naples, that he would not be supported by any one, would render useless the employment of force; but if the contrary should happen, those only of the allies of King Ferdinand would be necessary, who should think proper to lend him their support. "Is it feared that, in this case, the war should spread beyond the limits of the kingdom of Naples, and that the tranquillity of Italy should again be interrupted? Is it feared that foreign troops should again traverse Italy? These fears may be obviated by stipulating that the kingdom of Naples should not be attacked by the Italian continent. Austria appears to be engaged towards him, who governs at Naples, to guarantee him from all attack on this side; and if, as we are assured, Austria has only engaged herself for this (how can it be supposed that the Emperor has given his guarantee against the rights of a prince, at once his uncle and his father-in-law, to the possession of a kingdom which he lost in making common cause with Austria), she cannot be embarrassed in reconciling with justice to the consideration of the papers to be produced by the noble earl. He should wait to see those documents; and if they appeared to him to be defective, he had no doubt that the noble earl would have the candour to supply the deficiency. He repeated, that in his opinion this was a case which demanded that a communication should have been made to their lordships from the Crown; that all the papers should have been laid on their lordships table by command of his royal highness the Prince Regent, accompanied by an explanatory statement on the part of his Majesty's ministers. that was not the case. I trust that that | had entered with marshal Murat, the letter is attributable only to the master- more especially as they had experienced hand that is skilled in such productions; important co-operation from him under for, in the worst transaction of the worst circumstances of a very critical nature. period of the worst government that ever The question would be fully open to disexisted in the vilest deceit, the most in-cussion when their lordships should come famous perfidy, the foulest crime that ever occurred in the blackest record of fraud and imposture that is to be met with in the annals of the world, nothing can be found more flagrant and heinous-nothing more hateful for its treachery-nothing more contemptible for its baseness. Still in that paper not a word was said of the King of Naples having forfeited his sovereignty by his conduct. All that was said was, that although he could not be attacked through Italy, he was assailable by sea; and the writer, with a degree of insult to his correspondent which it was difficult to conceive how a British minister could bear, concluded that lord Castlereagh had authority from his Court to assent to the proposed measure, and, if not, requested that he would obtain it. He would abstain from saying any thing further on the subject at present. All that he now stated was, that it required a very strong case to exempt the Allies from the engagements into which they and with the natural sentiments of affection, the engagements into which extraordinary circumstances made her enter. "It appears to me, therefore, that we may at one and the same time satisfy all our duties, and all our interests, and all our engagements, by an article such as the following: Europe, united in Congress, recognises his Majesty Ferdinand 4, as King of Naples. All the Powers engage to one another not to favour, nor to support directly or indirectly any pretensions opposite to the rights which appertain to him in this title; but the troops which the Powers foreign to Italy, and the allies of his said Majesty, may march to the support of his cause, cannot traverse Italy.' "I persuade myself, my lord, that your excellency is sufficiently authorized to subscribe such a clause, and that you have no need of a more special authorization; but if you should think otherwise, I shall request of you to require this authority without delay, as you have been good enough to permit me so to do (ainsi qu'elle a bien voulu me le permettre). "" Agree, &c. &c. (Signed) "Le Prince de TALLEYRAND." (VOL. XXXI.) The Earl of Liverpool did not rise to prolong the discussion, but to say that he so far agreed with the noble earl, that if the papers which he would produce should not be considered satisfactory, it would be perfectly just to supply any deficiency which might exist in them. He must, however, beg leave to offer to their lordships a few words in explanation of his former statement. No specific obligation had ever been entered into to restore the kingdom of Naples to the King of Sicily. It was clear that cases might occur in which the interests of the King of Sicily might be distinct from the restoration of Naples to him. His Majesty's Government was bound, in consequence of the Treaty between the Courts of Vienna and Naples, to secure to his Sicilian Majesty an adequate remuneration for the loss which he would sustain. It was distinctly notified to Austria, to Naples, and to all the other Powers concerned, that the condition on which we agreed to the peace with marshal Murat, was, that an adequate compensation should be afforded to his Sicilian Majesty. He perfectly agreed with the noble earl, that we were bound to follow up the Treaty between Austria and Naples by a peace with the latter power. The question which it would be for their lordships to discuss when the papers should be before them would be, whether there had been that kind of cooperation on the part of marshal Murat which every body must have understood was the condition of the arrangements made by the Allies with him. The noble earl had asserted that the cause of the (C) Allies had derived great advantage from his co-operation. The papers would, however, show, that persons of very high authority were of a different opinion. Lord William Bentinck (of whose character the noble earl had spoken with such just respect) entertained considerable doubts whether, on a consideration of all the circumstances of the transaction, more good or more evil had resulted from marshal Murat's co-operation; and whether, had the Allies refused to conclude the armistice, they would not have obtained greater advantages in Italy than with his co-operation, so conducted as it had been. If that was the fact, combined with suspicions, and still more, combined with evidence of his treachery, the Allies were unquestionably justified in consider ing themselves absolved from their engagements. He should be perfectly prepared, on the production of the documents, to defend and justify every part of the transaction on the soundest views of policy and on the strictest principles of justice. Lord Grenville did not know how he could regularly oppose the production of papers, which his Majesty's Secretary of State thought it was fit, both in time and manner, to produce. It appeared to him highly proper to adhere, on such occasions as the present, to the established principles of parliamentary usage; and having been told by the noble earl that we were in actual hostility with the person who was, de fucto, King of Naples, there could be no doubt that a communication of that fact ought to be made by the Crown, calling upon Parliament for that support, which had never been refused, in a case in which the honour of the Crown, the maintenance of good faith with our Allies, or the just rights and interests of the country were involved. The noble earl had stated that there was no precedent of such a communication on the rupture of an armistice; but there were many such precedents of communication, on the rupture of negociations, of the pacific issue of which much less hope had been entertained than of that of the armistice in question. This was not merely a matter of form. There were few of our forms in which there was not essential substance; and if he were called on to point out one, an adherence to which was more essential to the preservation of the constitutional principles of Parliament than another, he would declare that it was that which, in the present instance, was unreservedly | violated. He had witnessed with great concern, and, if he might take the liberty to say so, with much disapprobation, another most essential departure from ancient usage, in the way in which a treaty, not ratified, but of the highest importance, had been laid before Parliament, as the substance of an engagement not concluded, and of the precise stipulations of which, therefore, it was impossible that Parliament could be in possession. For substantial reasons it was the established usage that the engagements of ministers on the question of peace or war, however those ministers were invested with the fullest powers of negociation, were never considered as binding on their respective sovereigns until they had been brought under their immediate view, and had received their ratification. Then, and not till then, ought a treaty to be laid before Parliament. In the present instance, the Treaty had not even been ratified by his royal highness the Prince Regent, but with the accompaniment of an explanatory declaration. The probability was, that this declaration would occasion a counterdeclaration, without of course by possibility knowing the nature of which, the Treaty had been laid on the table, and had become subject to the discussion of Parliament. With respect to the papers now moved for, one of two propositions must be true. Either the transactions to which they referred had arrived at a stage which rendered it fit that they should be communicated to Parliament, or they had not. If they had not, the noble earl was leading their lordships into an error in proposing an address for their production. If they had, what could relieve his Majesty's ministers from the sacred duty of advising his royal highness the Prince Regent, on this renewal, or rather on this commencement of a war, to lay before Parliament all the information necessary to enable them to form a judgment on the merits of the case? By assenting to the motion the duties of ministers would be transferred to Parliament, who would take on themselves the responsibility which ought to attach alone to the servants of the Crown; and Parliament would thus relieve the Executive Government from their responsibility, with the inconvenience on their part of not knowing to what exact point to frame their Address, while, if the information were contained in a spontaneous message from the Crown, it would be communicated with the distinct pur the substance of a treaty before its ratification, as he agreed it was, his Majesty's ministers were innocent of the offence. pose of enabling Parliament to determine how far the conduct of the Power with whom we had commenced war justified hostility on our part. In conclusion, his lordship expressed a hope that the noble earl would withdraw his motion, and, when the proper time came, that he would advise the Crown to lay the papers before Parliament. Earl Bathurst said, it had been asserted, that the Address was moved for the purpose of explaining the grounds of the commencement of hostilities. But that was not the ground of the motion. Ministers had been charged with breach of faith and gross misconduct, and the House was summoned this day to hear that charge made good, or to vote for papers which should prove that charge. It had not been thought proper to make the charge; but his noble friend had deemed it essential to the honour of his Majesty' Government to put the House in possession of those papers, in order to vindicate that honour. The House would understand, therefore, that the papers were not produced to explain the grounds of the commencement of hostilities, but to vindicate the conduct of ministers from the charge of the noble lord opposite. As to the assertion of his noble friend, that it was contrary to all precedent that there should be no communication from the Crown on this subject, he could assure him that there was no instance of a communication from the Crown upon the rupture of an armistice. But then the noble lord had identified an armistice with a negociation, to which it was not at all similar. There never was any formal notification of the existence of an armistice; and negociations were often broken off without any notice being given to the House. With respect to the Treaty of Vienna, it had been moved for by a noble lord, who usually voted with the Opposition, and was not laid upon the table by ministers without the consent of the House. All the objectionable circumstances were known when it was moved, for it was known to be a treaty not ratified, and with a declaration affixed to it; and the House, with the knowledge of all this, had consented to the motion, in consequence of which its substance was laid before them. As to the disrespect which ministers were charged with having shown the House, all they did was to advise the King to produce the substance of the Treaty in consequence of the vote of the House. If it was objectionable to produce Lord Grenville protested against being considered as a participator in every measure consented to by his Majesty's ministers which he did not directly oppose. He could assure the noble earl, that it was one of many motions, some brought forward by individuals with whom he generally acted, and others introduced by the noble earl and his colleagues, which he did not approve of, although he did not formally object to them. What the noble earl had stated, proved the inconvenience of granting imperfect documents. Ministers ought to know what papers it was proper or improper to grant, since they alone were informed of their contents. If ministers would discharge their duty in making communications from the Crown to the House, the responsibility of producing those papers would fall on them alone: but when they resorted to the inconvenient mode of an address to produce papers, they reserved to themselves the power of saying, such production is not the act of his Majesty's Government, but only the dutiful compliance of ministers with the address of the House. The Earl Grey denied, that he had made any long speech, with reference to the war in Italy, which contained charges against his Majesty's ministers. He had stated to the House, on a former night, the existence of a war between the Neapolitans and Austrians. The circumstance appeared to him of such a nature, as called for the early attention of Parliament, and he, therefore, desired an answer from the noble lord opposite, as to the state in which this country was placed with_respect to our relations with Naples. answer of the noble lord was, that the only relation was the existence of an armistice, which, in consequence of events that had recently occurred, would probably be put an end to. Not conceiving this to be a sufficient answer, he alluded to the existence of a treaty, to which he understood this country was pledged, and gave notice, that he would bring the subject under the consideration of the House. In this course, he was determined to persist; but, when he came down to the House this day, he learned that the noble earl intended to grant the papers; and, therefore he did not think it necessary to institute a discussion where the object was |