THE

PRESBYTERIAN MAGAZINE.

SEPTEMBER, 1855.

Miscellaneous Articles.

HUMAN ABILITY AND INABILITY.

WITHIN a few months, the Rev. Dr. TYLER, Professor in the Theological Seminary at East Windsor, Connecticut, published a Discourse on Human Ability and Inability, which has been the subject of considerable animadversion. His high standing among his brethren, his noble defence of the truth against the Pelagian errors of New Haven, and his position at the head of an Institution which was established about thirty years ago, as the exponent of what was regarded in New England as Old School theology, have given to his Discourse an importance in the public estimation, far above its intrinsic merits. His utterances possess a kind of official ex cathedra authority, which, with many readers, is next to oracular. Hence, it is not wonderful that the guardians and friends of that Seminary should view with concern any appearance on his part of favouring the new divinity, on a point of so much practical importance as that which is treated in this Discourse. Dr. HARVEY, who has reviewed the Discourse, was one of the founders of that Seminary, and Mr. CASE, who has also reviewed it, was an alumnus. Whatever Dr. Tyler may say of their criticisms, he cannot, we presume, complain of them for want of courtesy. As the correspondence between Dr. Tyler and Dr. Harvey, in the Presbyterian, has fairly introduced the subject to Presbyterian readers, we shall not, we trust, be regarded as obtrusive in expressing our views in the pages of the Presbyterian Magazine.

Dr. Tyler states his doctrine thus: "God does not require of men what they have no power to do." This he subsequently explains thus: "When I say that God does not require of men what they have no power to do, my meaning is, that all his commands

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are limited by the faculties which he has given them." Again, he modifies his view, by saying, "You will observe that I do not affirm that sinners have all power to do their duty; in other words, that they are able in every sense to do what God requires." What he means by power to do a thing, he defines thus: "A man has power to do a thing when he possesses all those faculties of body or mind, or both, which enables him to do it, if it is his desire or wish to do it." And again, he says: "My meaning is that God does not require of men what they might not do if rightly disposed. That they have all the power which is necessary to render them proper subjects of moral government, and to render their disobedience in every case inexcusable."

By putting together these explanations and modifications, his brief and startling proposition becomes a much longer and an apparently different statement. "God does not require of men what they have no power [i. e., faculties] to do [if it is their desire or wish to do it or what they might not do if rightly disposed]." As he is not discoursing about matter, but religion, he must mean by power not physical, but moral power, and by faculties, moral faculties, viz., the understanding, will, and affections. His statement, then, might read thus: God does not require of men what they have no understanding, will, and affections to do, if these faculties were rightly disposed, i. e., if the understanding were spiritually enlightened, the will entirely renewed, and the affections placed supremely on God. This is sound doctrine. It is not only in harmony with the sacred volume, but is explicitly and abundantly taught in it.

But is this what Dr. Tyler means? We fear not. The ability above described is a gracious ability. It is the fruit of the Holy Spirit. But Dr. Tyler refers to the ability of the sinner, irrespective of Divine grace and antecedent to it. Says he, "If man has no ability to do his duty without grace, God is in justice bound either to give him grace, or to excuse him from doing his duty." This sentiment might be expected from an Arminian or Pelagian, but from a Calvinist it sounds strangely. And though by nice and subtle distinctions it may possibly be vindicated from absolute contradiction with the main proposition of the Discourse, as qualified and explained by the author, yet to plain and unsophisticated minds it will not be easy to make them appear consistent with each other. We have long been familiar with those distinctions, and are well aware for what purpose they were introduced into theology. We were early taught to employ them, and to regard them as useful and important. But instead of deriving any advantage from their use, we found them cumbersome, like Saul's armour on the youthful warrior, David, who, in his contest with Goliah, preferred a sling and some smooth stones from the brook to the weapons furnished by the king. The result proved his wisdom. Natural ability and moral inability, as understood by those who maintain this distinc

tion, though metaphysically true, are of no practical value in preaching the Gospel. On the contrary, instead of producing the effect upon the sinner for which the distinction was designed, viz., to impress him with a sense of moral obligation and accountability, and thus convict him of sin, and drive him to Christ, it has oftener produced the opposite effect, viz., to foster pride and induce procrastination.

The venerable author of this discourse very properly gives the following caution, viz. (it has already been quoted), "You will observe that I do not affirm that sinners have all power to do their duty; in other words, that they are able in every sense to do what God requires." If this caution is addressed to a sinner, he will naturally inquire, "As you admit I have not all power to do my duty, can you inform me how much I have, and how I am to supply the deficiency. And further, as I am not able in every sense to do what God requires, please explain to me in what sense I am able, and in what sense unable." Our author replies, "My meaning is, that men have all the power which is necessary to render them proper subjects of moral government, and to render their disobedience in every case inexcusable." Is this all? If so, we are furnished with a key to understand the remark already noticed, that "if man has no ability to do his duty without grace, God is in justice bound either to give him grace, or to excuse him from doing his duty." Moral agency is essential to accountability, and it is not conferred by grace, but by nature. It is that divine endowment by which the human race is distinguished from brutes. But if this is all which is meant by ability, what necessity is there for arguing the question? Why stultify a man of intelligence by attempting to prove to him that he is not a brute. The inspired writers do not argue this point, but assume it. But if more is meant, the inquiry returns, how much more? Does the sinner possess the ability, without Divine grace, to do all which God requires, i. e., an ability which is available for this end? The author does not maintain the affirmative of this interrogatory, but the negative. For all practical purposes, therefore, the argument in favour of ability is given up, and the sinner is told, after all, that he is dependent upon God for power, strength, ability (it is immaterial which term we employ), to exercise those affections which are essential to salvation. And this is his real condition-the one in which the fall of man has placed him, and for which the Gospel remedy provides relief.

The moral impotence of the sinner to change his own heart, to repent of sin, and exercise faith in Christ, without the gracious agency of the Holy Spirit to renew his depraved nature, is clearly and largely taught in the Holy Scriptures. "The carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither, indeed, can be. So then they that are in the flesh [i. e., in an unconverted state] cannot please God." "You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins." "No man can come to me

except the father which hath sent me draw him." "If any man be in Christ Jesus, he is a new creature." "Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." "By grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God." It is remarkable how strongly the sacred writers express themselves on this point, and with no such qualifying words and phrases as appear now to be deemed by some necessary, in order to guard the reader against misapprehension. The idea does not seem to have occurred to them that the sinner's ability must be asserted in some form, in connection with their humiliating statements about his depravity and dependence upon God, as though he must be guarded against abusing the doctrine of his moral weakness by a denial of his guilt and criminality. The idea of sinfulness involves that of ill desert. Sin cannot be predicated of inanimate matter, nor of brutes. If men are sinners, they are necessarily guilty, and under condemnation. This state is a helpless one, so far as the sinner's recovery depends on himself. The Gospel scheme is based on this fact. "When we were without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly." We were not only without strength to procure redemption, but also to apply it. "God, who is rich in mercy for the great love wherewith he loved us, when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ." Again, "It is written, and they shall be all taught of God. Every man, therefore, that hath heard and learned of the Father, cometh unto me." This entire helplessness of the sinner is what rendered the vicarious atonement of the Son, and the work of the Holy Spirit necessary to our recovery from the ruins of the fall. It made the preaching of the Gospel by the Apostles "glad tidings of great joy" to those who perceived and groaned under their condition as sinners, while to others, as now, it was a "stumbling block," ," "a savour of death unto death." "If our Gospel be hid," says Paul, "it is hid to them that are lost. In whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." But he did not attempt to cure this blindness by argument. He said nothing about meeting Satan in foro conscientiæ, at the bar of the sinner's conscience, and debating the question of moral obligation and human ability, but proceeded to state explicitly that the sovereign remedy lay in God alone. "For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Until it can be shown that the Apostles treated this subject unskilfully, or that their mode of treating it was prejudicial to their success in winning souls to Christ, we shall do well to imitate their example.

The framers of our Confession of Faith (and all Calvinistic confessions are substantially alike in this particular), while they took