"Neither, yet, feest thou thy Soul, Ariftodemus; which, however, moft affuredly governs thy body:-although it may well feem, by thy manner of talking, that it is Chance, and not Reafon, which governs thee."

"I do not defpife the Gods, faid Ariftodemus; on the contrary, I conceive fo highly of their excellence, as to fuppose they stand in no need either of me or of my fervices."

"Thou mistakes the matter, Ariftodemus;-the greater magnificence they have fhewn in their care of thee, fo much the more honour and fervice thou owest them."

"Be affured, faid Ariftodemus, if I once could be perfuaded the Gods took care of men, I fhould want no Monitor to remind me of my duty."

"And canft thou doubt, Ariftodemus, if the Gods take care of men! Hath not the glorious privilege of walking upright, been alone bestowed on him, whereby he may, with the better advantage, furvey what is around him;-contemplate, with more eafe, thofe fplendid objects which are above; and avoid the numerous ills and inconveniencies which would otherwise befal him? Other animals, indeed, they have provided with feet, by which they may remove from one place to another; but to man they have alfo given hands, with which he can form many things for his ufe; and make himself happier than creatures of any other kind. A tongue hath been bestowed on every other animal ;-but what animal, except man, hath the power of forming words with it; whereby to explain his thoughts, and make them intelligible to others? And to fhew that the Gods have had regard to his very pleafures; they have not limited them like thofe of other animals, to times and feafons; but man is left to indulge in them, whenever not hurtful to him.

"But it is not with respect to the body alone that the Gods have fhewn themselves thus bountiful to man! Their most excellent gift is that Soul they have infufed into him;-which fo far furpaffes what is elsewhere to be found. For by what animal, except man, is, even the existence of thofe Gods difcovered, who have produced, and ftill upheld, in fuch regular order, this beautiful and stupendous frame of the universe?What other fpecies of creatures are to be found, that can ferve that can adore them!-what other animal is able, like man, to provide against the affaults of heat and cold;of thirst and hunger!-that can lay up remedies for the time

of fickness; and improve the ftrength nature hath given, by a well-proportioned exercise !-that can receive, like him, information and inftruction; or fo happily keep in memory what he hath feen, and heard, and learnt? These things being fo;-who feeth not that man is, as it were, a God, in the midst of this vifible creation; fo far doth he furpass, whether in the endowments of foul or body, all animals whatsoever, that have been produced therein! For, if the body of the ox, had been joined to the mind of man, the acutenefs of the latter would have stood him in fmall ftead; while unable to execute the well-defigned plan: nor would the human form have been of more ufe to the brute, fo long as it remained deftitute of understanding. But in thee! Ariftodemus, hath been joined to a wonderful Soul, a body no less wonderful ;-and fayeft thou after this," the Gods take no thought for me!"--what wouldest thou then more, to convince thee of their care."

"I would they should send and inform me, faid Ariftodemus, what things I ought, or ought not, to do; in like manner as thou fayest, they frequently do to thee."

"And what then, Ariftodemus! supposest thou, that when the Gods give out fome oracle to all the Athenians, they mean it not for thee?--If, by their prodigies, they declare aloud to all Greece, to all mankind,-the things which shall befal them ;-are they dumb to thee alone?-And art thou the only perfon whom they have placed beyond their care? Believeít thou, they would have wrought, into the mind of man, a perfuafion of their being able to make him happy or miserable, if fo be they had no fuch power ?-or would not even man himself,-long ere this,-have feen through the grofs delufion? How is it, Ariftodemus, thou remembereft, or remarkeft not, that the kingdoms and common-wealths, most renowned as well for their wisdom as antiquity, are those whose piety and devotion hath been the most obfervable?and, that even man, himself, is never fo well difpofed to serve the Deity, as in that part of life when reafon bears the greateft fway, and his judgment fuppofed in its full ftrength and maturity. Confider,. my Ariftodemus! that the Soul which refides in thy body, can govern it at pleasure; why then may not the Soul of the univerfe, which pervades and animates every part of it, govern it in like manner?-If thine eye hath the power to take in many objects, and these placed at no fmall distance from it; marvel not if the eye of the Deity can, at one glance, comprehend the tubole!And as

thou

thou perceivest it not beyond thy ability to extend thy care at. the fame time to the concerns of Athens,-Egypt,-Sicily; why thinkeft thou, my Ariftodemus! that the Providence of God may not easily extend itself throughout the whole univerfe?As, therefore, among men, we make beft trial of the affection and gratitude of our neighbour, by fhewing him kindness; and difcover his wifdom, by confulting him in our. diftrefs;-Do thou, in like manner, behave towards the Gods: and, if thou wouldst experience what their wisdom, and what their love,-render thyfelf deferving the communication of fome of thofe divine fecrets which may not be penetrated by man; and are imparted to thofe alone, who confult, who adore, who obey the Deity. Then fhalt thou, my Ariftodemus! understand there is a Being, whofe eye pierceth throughout all nature; and whofe car is open to every. found-extended to all place;-extending through all time ;and whofe bounty and care can know no other bounds, than thofe fixed by his own creation!"

By this difcourfe, and others of the like nature, Socrates taught his friends, that they were not only to forbear whatever was impious, unjuft, or unbecoming before men; but even when alone, they ought to have a regard to all their actions; fince the Gods have their eyes continually upon us; and none of our defigns can be concealed from them."

We fhall close this article with acquainting our Readers, that they will find in this work fome judicious Notes, by the learned and ingenious Mr. Harris of Salisbury: Author of Hermes*, and other much efteemed performances.

A Vindication of the exclufive Right of Authors to their own Works: A Subject now under Confideration before the Twelve Judges of England. 8vo. Is. Griffiths.

TH

HE ingenious Author of this Vindication fets out with obferving, that it will, perhaps, be matter of furprize to those who are not accustomed to the use of artificial reason, that a question should be made-Whether at Common Law, an Author hath a perpetual and exclufive right to fell his own works?" Doubtlefs it will; but it will be no matter of furprize to those who know how far fuch artificial reafon may, by a ridiculous affectation of technical terms and phrafes, by making imaginary diftinctions, and adopting

*See Review, vol. VI. page 129.

equivocal

equivocal definitions, perplex the moft fimple and obvious of all queftions. Not that we can prefume the prefent to be fuch, after being told, that it hath exercifed the talents of fome of our ableft advocates; and hath been found of fuch difficulty and importance, as to be referred to the confideration of the twelve Judges; before whom, after repeated arguments, the fubject ftill lieth open for farther difcuffion." A very acute and fubtle Cafuift, indeed, has taken upon him, and that in a very fhrewd and able manner, to controvert the right in queftion. The prefent Writer enters the lifts on the oppofite fide, and fhews himfelf, if not a greater Cafuift, at leaft as intelligent a Lawyer as his adverfary. In fpeaking of the pamphlet of the former, we mentioned our design of leaving this matter to be controverted by the Learned in the Law; but it having been intimated to us, that our Readers would naturally expect a more circumftantial account of an affair fo interesting to literature; and as the piece before us is probably the laft that may appear on this fubject, before the matter is finally determined; we fhall endeavour to fet the whole in a fair point of view, by giving a fummary of the principal arguments advanced on both fides the question.

*

It is maintained, by those who oppofe the right contested, ift, That a literary copy is not fufceptible of property. 2. That, if it were, it is incapable of perpetual, exclufive poffeffion.

3. That a right in fuch copy cannot be protected by law, and that it never has been protected by the common law of England.

4. That the establishment of fuch a right would be prejudicial to the advancement of letters, and even of ill-confequences to Authors themselves.

The advocates for this right undertake to prove the contrary of every particular: their feveral arguments will be confidered in due order.

To prove that a literary copy is not fufceptible of property, the Author of the Enquiry, to which pamphlet the prefent is a reply, confiders this property as exifting partly in the ideas contained in the book, and partly in the form and compofition, by which it is moft easily diftinguifhed and afcertain

An Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Literary Property. See Review for laft July, page 73.

REV. Sep. 1762.

M

ed.

cd. The former, he fays, is ideal, therefore incorporea, and yet totally different to every other incorporeal right acknowleged by law. Hence, he declares, the Author's right to his copy to be not real, but ideal and chimerical. To this, the prefent Writer replies; it is true, this property is not real," in the technical fenfe of the word. But here lieth the error. He [the Author of the Enquiry] ufes the word real ambiguously, not only as oppofed to chimerical, but as contra-diftinguished from perfonal property. Thus, when he faith, the children cannot inherit, or the wife be dowable of a literary copy, his conclufions are juít, in the technical fenfe of thofe words. For an inheritance, and even a freehold cannot fpring but out of lands, tenements, or hereditaments: or, as the old Lawyers would phrase it, fomething which founds in the realty. But tho' this property is not inheritable, it is tranfmifible; that is, it may be transferred by the proprietor in his life-time; it may be bequeathed by will; or it may be divided according to the directions of law, in cafe of inteftacy. Again, it is true, that a wife is not dowable of this property, becaufe dower muft iffue out of lands or tenements: but a wife will be entitled, under the Statute of Diftribution, to her fhare or portion of the profits arifing from the fale of this property."

A farther argument is, however, made ufe of by the Author of the Enquiry, which the present Writer seems to have overlooked, refpecting the difference between this and al other incorporeal rights. "Every incorporeal right, fays the Enquirer, acknowleged by law, is capable of diffeiffin. Grantee of a rent-feck at common law may be diffeiffed by a Refcous. An advowfon may be ufurped. In the fame manner, rights of common, eftovers may be forcibly divefted from their feveral owners. But how can the proprietor of a copy be put out of poffeffion? Other men felling impreffions will not prevent him from doing the fame."-Surely this Gentleman must be ignorant of the manner in which a profit arifes from the fale of books! The more Venders there are of any book, the fewer impreflions muft each be capable of felling. Whoever fells the books offered to fale by another, prevents the latter, in effect, from difpofing of what he offers to fale. To maintain the contrary, would be the fame thing as to maintain, that if an hundred people had a right of common, the claim of a thoufand others would be no infringement of the right of the former. This Writer, indeed, favs, "if feveral perfons claim eftovers in a wood, if there be fufficient

for

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