för all, these rights interfere not one with another." Very true; but, fuppofe there be not fufficient for all? If Authors and Bookfellers could all find immediate customers for as many editions as they could print, the right contended for would not be worth difputing. But the fale of a book is, in a great measure*, confined to a certain number; and if that number be fold by one perfon, no other person can fell any: the profits, therefore, of an Author or Proprietor may hence be evidently diminished, and his right invaded. Our Lawyer will probably object, that this is not properly and abfolutely a diffeiffin; it may amount, however, in many cafes, to much the fame thing, and in fome to much worse; as when the proprietor of a book prints an edition of it, and is foreftalled, in the publication, by fome other Bookseller; in which cafe he is not only prevented from reaping the profits he expected from the fale of his impreffion, but is frequently obliged to fit down with a great lofs. Setting this latter confideration, however, afide, it must furely be thought a ftrange kind of law that does not allow a poffeffor a property in a thing because he cannot be totally divested of it, or stripped of it at once. If a man be not turned out of his house, it may be faid, he is not put out of poffeffion; but, if twenty or thirty people are allowed to enter it, and take up free quarters with his family, he might almoft as well, and fometimes better, be fairly kicked out of doors.

With respect to what the Author of the Enquiry hath advanced, concerning the right of property in Ideas, the prefent Writer does not think it neceffary to give his arguments a ferious refutation," as the principles themfelves from whence they are deduced, appear indefenfible." He might have rallied him, however, very fuccefsfully on a point which the latter feems to make of fuch mighty importance; and, particularly, on the following ftrokes of metaphyfical cafuiftry. Simple ideas, being obvious to all, cannot be ex

We fay, in a great measure. It is a maxim, indeed, in some commercial countries, that Traders generate Trade, and that the confumption of a commodity depends on the number of Venders. Thus it may be faid, if an Author has an exclufive right to his works, he will print no more copies than he can difpofe of through his own channel, and by his own induftry: whereas, if the right of printing were laid open, more people wou'd print and be interested in pushing off copies which circumftance would be advantageous to trade. This, however, is a political confideration, that does not affect the prefent point.

clufively poffeffed by any. Perhaps it may be faid, that the Author claims a property in the knowlege, fentiment, and doctrine contained in his book. All these are compofed of fimple ideas, and arife from our perception of their agreement or difagreement. Perception is a power or quality of the mind. To poffefs this power exclufively, is to restrain all men from exercifing their faculties on their own ideas. Perception is an accident, the mind is the fubftance. Perception is an acceffory, the mind is the principal. It is abfurd to claim a property in the acceffory or accident, when the fubftance or principal is incapable of it. Therefore we cannot pretend to limit mankind in their faculties, till we have proved ourselves intitled to a special property in their minds." Is it not furprizing that fo fubtle a Reafoner fhould not fee the paralogifm he is guilty of, in confounding an exclufive right to make a certain use of particular fentiments, and an exclufive tight of forming those fentiments in the mind? Again, he fays, "if a fentiment, thought, or doctrine is capable of property, it is neceflary that the proprietor fhould fignify to all men his intention of converting it to his own ufe." Now it is not to the intellectual or private use of such sentiments, that a right is pretended; but to a corporeal and public ufe of them; i. e. to the publishing for profit, or the vending written or printed copies of fuch fentiments. The Author alfo, in vending fuch copies, for a ftipulated price, gives a fufficient indication, as the prefent Writer juftly obferves, of his intention to appropriate such publication to himself.

The Author of the Enquiry affects to think it a strange phenomenon, that an incorporeal right fhould partake of the nature and qualities of a corporeal property. For our parts, we must own, we do not fee the great propriety of making ufe of this technical diftinction in the prefent cafe; and ftill lefs that of the Enquirer's reafoning on it. In fettling the natural foundations of property, he talks as if the first of all natural rights were corporeal, and obtained by occupancy. << If two perfons, in a state of nature, fays he, fhould have been willing to poffefs themselves of the fame fruit or animal, the difpute must have been decided by the ftrength and courage of the parties. To prevent hatred, animofity, and bloodfhed, mankind tacitly agreed, that what could not be enjoyed by all, fhould become the property of the firft-taker. This is the origin of property.". Now, fo far from thinking this the true origin of property, we conceive the first natural

right to be incorporeal. The firft, and moft indifputable, right of every man that comes into the world, is a right of exiftence. Self-prefervation is Nature's firft law; in fuch a ftate, therefore, every man had an equal right to the means of fubfiftence, even before he knew in what thofe means confifted. He had a right to provide for himfelf, and his property in fuch provifion commenced the moment he had made it. Each man having this right it became unjust in every other, either to deprive him of thofe means of fubfiftence which he had been at the trouble of providing, or to prevent his making fuch provifion. In cafes, therefore, where the means of fubfiftence were fo far poffeffed in quality, or accumulated in quantity by fome, as to prevent others from making the equally neceffary provifion for themselves, the poffeffors had evidently infringed the right, if they had not invaded the actual property, of the reft. It became requifite, therefore, that the firft-taker fhould defift from making fuch ample provifion for himfelf. Mankind cannot be suppofed ever to have tacitly agreed to any thing inconfiftent with their own fubfiftence and prefervation. Every man who fits down at Nature's table, has a right to elbow-room.

Hence, alfo, we may fee, that fuch a right of occupancy, as belongs to him who first takes poffeffion, and fets up his land-mark, is neither fo valid, nor fo well founded, as that of him who firft beftows his labour on the cultivation of the foil. In a state of nature, the right of a firft poffeffor is conditional, and his poffeffion ufufructuary. A time might come when he, who had before a juft claim to a certain portion of land, or the fruits of the earth, may lofe that right by the increase of his fpecies but no time could ever happen, in a state of nature, when one man could deprive another of his right of exiftence, or lay a juft claim to the produce of his ingenuity or industry. That natural, incorporeal right, therefore, which an Author has to his works, as the inventor of the scheme invented, or the maker of the thing made, is more indifputable than any corporeal right which may be claimed by occupancy to the things of nature.

But, fuppofing an Author's property in his copy to be no better founded than that arifing from occupancy, in the Enquirer's fenfe of the word; yet, furely a Writer's having made a difcovery of an intellectual fpot, or cultivating one that has been hitherto barren and fruitlefs, is fufficient to give him a right to it, or at leaft to the produce of his labour !

As to the other part of the property which depends on the form and compofition of the book, the Author of the Enquiry advances nothing better than that "it is an accident which never can be the fubject of property, of which the substance is incapable." This, however, is juft fuch a logical quibble as we have above inftanced; a mere playing with the words, fubftance and accident: It might as well be maintained, that the form and compofition of the moft laboured complicated machine, is no otherwife fufceptible of property than on account of the worthlefs materials'of which it may be composed. Nay, we fee little difference between this and the well-known. abfurdity which the fame Writer inftances and explodes.

If Titius compofes a poem, a history, or oration, on your paper, you are ftill the proprietor, and not Titius, for the writing is but acceffory."

The Author of the pamphlet before us, confiders the Proprietor's right to a literary copy in another point of view, and fhews, that it has all the qualities of property, and is easily governed by the known and eftablished rules of law: but what he advances on this head, will be, with more propriety, taken notice of under our third divifion. Before we difmifs the firft, however, we must go on to take notice of a diftinction or two, which the Lawyers have admitted as effential to property.

The Author of a Letter to a Member of Parliament, on this fubject, had obferved, that things fufceptible of property muft have thefe two effential conditions; that they be useful to mankind; and that they be capable of having their poffeffion afcertained. For without the firft, adds he very judicioufly, fociety will not be obliged to take the right under its protection; and without the fecond, it will never venture on the trouble. Now, it is affirmed, a literary copy, has both thefe conditions, The Enquirer maintains the contrary. An Author's property in a book, he fays, cannot be ascertained, because if fuch property exift at all, it exifts in the fentiment and doctrine contained in it, and not in the form and compofition. He obferves, that "whoever reflects on the number of excellent books that have been written on every subject, and compares with them the productions of modern Authors, will find very few of the latter whofe fentiments are new or original. Authors who feek redrefs for invasion of their property, muft prove the originality of their fentiments. Sce Review for July laft, page 73.

This, as a fact, must be fubmitted to the difcretion of a Jury. It may, perhaps, be difficult to determine, whether an Author would be more embaraffed in proving his cafe, or the Jury in giving their verdict, especially if the fubject of the compofition be an abftract science. If an improvement is made on the discoveries of another, may a fuit be instituted for a literary trefpafs? Admitting, in favour of learning, that a reasonable improvement might intitle us to a property in the ideas of another, how fhall the juft degrees be afcertained? By the law of England, the Judges can alone determine what is reasonable, and what unreasonable. Learned

as they are, they must be unequal to fuch a task, which requires univerfal reading and knowlege. The Courts of Westminster would be filled with fuits hitherto unheard of. Poet would commence his action against Poet, Hiftorian against Hiftorian, complaining of literary trefpaffes. Juries would be puzzled, what damage to give for the pilfering an anecdote, or purloining the fable of a play. What ftrange changes would neceffarily enfue !---In order to afcertain the true measure of damages, it must first be discovered wherein the property lies." Doubtlefs it muft; and we cannot help thinking, that fome of the advocates for literary property have made a blunder, in granting that the dotrines contained in a book conftitute its true and peculiar property." For notwithstanding all the Enquirer has advanced about the fubftantiality of ideas, we cannot help thinking, fuch property confifts chiefly in the form and compofition: at leaft, this being all that can be in any good degree afcertained, it is all the property capable of being legally fecured. We may expose a Plagiary; but we are afraid, that even in fuch a court of literary judicature as the Enquirer would establish, it would be very difficult to profecute him as a thief. A book which is not effentially diftinguished by its form and compofition, hath hardly any title to the name of a book, or literary copy, at It is efteemed a venial plagiarifm, to rob a Dictionary; fo that in fuch works the proprietors poffefs in fact no exclufive right to the publication of any thing but the title-page.

all.

It is very juftly obferved by the prefent Writer, that he who obtaineth the copy of a book, may appropriate the ftock of ideas contained therein, and, by oppofing fuch fentiments, may give birth to a new doctrine; or, fays he, fpeaking in the perfon of an Author," he may coincide with my notions, and, by employing different illuftrations, may place my doctrine in another point of view: and in either cafe he acquir

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