The definition of this compact

rights which flow from it.

is then given, with the

The Social Compact then is a tacit agreement fubfifting between the members of a society; the principles of which exift in nature, but are developed and analyzed by reafon.

"Upon the bafis of this compact reft the following claims: "First, to protection of perfon and property.

"Secondly, to be compelled to do nothing, which the welfare of the fociety at large does not require.

"Thirdly, to be allowed to do any thing which does not injure another.

"Thefe claims conftitute the original primary rights of association, in which every individual member is, without the fmallest exception, equal." P. 39.

From thefe pofitions very unexpectedly, but we think very foundly, the political inequality of men is deduced, in the obfervations which clofe the fifth Sketch.

"So long as the equality in the claims of the feveral members to the primary rights of affociation is maintained, two confequences will refult:

First, the moft perfect political liberty.

"Secondly, an inequality in the condition of the members.

"The latter may perhaps appear, at first fight, fomewhat paradoxical, but, upon a nearer infpection, it will be found to be strictly true; for fo long as every member is equally protected, and continues to receive the whole furplus of power which is due to him; in other words, fo long as he enjoys an equal liberty of employing his faculties in any way, which is not detrimental to another, his condition in the fociety, fetting afide the accidental occurrence of untoward events, to which every man is equally expofed, will principally depend upon his own ability and exertions. Taking therefore, to adopt the language of mathematicians, the point from which any individual ftarts, as given, his relative fituation, or condition in fociety, will be nearly as the product of his talents and industry; but as these are probably different in every individual, that will be alfo different.

"No means whatever can operate, fo as to level the conditions of men, without previously deftroying the equality of their primary rights." P. 43.

The tendency of thefe regulations towards change being argued, the concluding fketch of part the firft infifts upon the neceffity of fome ftrong measures, to organize fociety in fuch a manner, as to infure the permanency of its rights.

*The author adopts the term compact in compliance with common ufage, but objects to it as implying an actual agreement which never exifted.

Having thus eftablished with much clearnefs the elements. and base of government, this very ingenious writer proceeds, in Part II. with no less ability, to the practice and fuperftructure. Laying down, in Sketch VII. the object of affociation to be that of defence from foreign and domeftic enemies," and confidering all the varieties of human government as reducible into the True Republic, and the different modifications of Aristocracy, he proceeds in Sketch VIII. to examine the first principles of republican government. Here he makes a very folid reply to the most plaufible defence of republicanifm. He argues that civil fociety is an artificial ftate, that it is to be confidered (for the reafons before stated) as an aggregate of diffimilar parts; and, therefore, differs effentially from the early state of the focial union, when the community might have been reputed an aggregate of fimilar parts, and when the fhades of difference between the qualifications of one member and another were fcarcely ftrong enough to be accurately diftinguifhed." Having inveftigated, with confiderable ftrictness, this part of his fubject, the author concludes againft the principles of republicanifm; and conveys, in his ninth Sketch, fome ftrong and sensible animadverfions upon the false luftre that has been thrown around republicanifin, particularly in a late" Letter to the National Convention of France."

Having expofed the incompetency of the first mode, the writer proceeds to a confideration of the second; and affigns, what to his judgment appears, the perfection of a political machine.

First, the prefervation of the focial compact; that is, the full enjoyment of the primary rights of fociety.

Secondly, fufficient energy, or ability, to preserve itself entire; without which the first mentioned property would, in courfe, be tranfient.

"Thefe properties, liberty and permanency, feem to be, in some fort, at variance with each other: for the mode of organization, which would produce either in the greateft poffible extent, will be proportionably deficient in yielding the other. A middle course must be therefore fteered, a fort of compromise be entered into, and that arrangement adopted, which fhall partake of both properties; the deficiencies of the one being made up by fupplies from the other: no more of either being fought for, than is confiftent with a due propor. tion of the other." P. 105.

This is afterwards rendered more exprefs in the commencement of the eleventh Sketch.

"A perfect government, or conftitution, confifts in fuch an arti ficial arrangement of thefe individuals, as fecures to them all a perpetual enjoyment of the conditions into which they have entered. So

that,

that, notwithstanding the change which takes place among the individuals themselves, the arrangement continues the fame, and the fame properties and advantages are derived from it.

"The whole nation, in the ftrict and true meaning of the word, is the aggregate of every particular part; that is, of every fingle individual of the affociation. But thefe individuals, being prevented by various felf-evident causes from assembling together upon all occafions, cannot, in the aggregate, take upon themselves the direction of the national concerns: befides, if, upon any occafion, they could be fo affembled, yet, being variously qualified in point of intereft, abilities, and information, it would be impoffible, as has been fhown in Sketch VIII. to ascertain and estimate their real opiniors; in fuch a manner, as that, in the event, their intentions might be fulfilled. It is clear, therefore, that the whole nation, under this view of it, is not competent to fulfil the ends of its association; and it follows that, for all practical purpofes, fuch an idea of the whole must be rejected, and the term be applied to fome felection or deputation, which, containing the properties of the aggregate, or real whole, may, at the fame time, be divefted of the inconveniences, which would attend their individual deliberations, and which, confequently, may be capable of directing, to the greatest poffible advantage, the interests of the nation at large." P. III.

The doctrine advanced in this laft paragraph, leads the author to a difcuffion of the queftion respecting representation. Having divided the interefts of the community into perfonal, commercial, and landed, he limits the propriety of reprefentation to the two laft. The concluding part of this difcuffion is fo ably decifive against perfonal reprefentation, that we shall prefent it in the words of the author.

"The followers of Rousseau, and all those who have habituated themselves to look to a popular, or perfonal, reprefentation, as the only true bafis of government, will not, at first perhaps, be able to reconcile this fyftem of organization to any ideas of justice or found policy. The reftrictions will appear arbitrary and unjust, and, in the first inftance, deftructive of that liberty, which it is the business of government to maintain. Every perfon, they will fay, has equally a title to be reprefented; and therefore every perfon ought equally to be permitted to contribute his vote to the choice of a reprefentative.

"This leads us to confider the nature of reprefentation in general; for, if it can be fhown that, in any inftance, individuals are reprefented, and that he, who has by vote contributed to the election of a member, is, in point of fact, more the object of representation than another perfon, who has not fo contributed, there will be an evident injuftice in the method propofed above, which will require fome further confideration and amendment.

"Reprefentation must be either individual or collective. Now, if N be individually reprefented, because he has contributed his vote to the election of X, then alfo are O, and P, and an hundred others, on the fame account, individually reprefented by him; and X be

comes,

somes, at one and the fame time, the reprefentative of more than an hundred perfons, individually confidered. But this is an abfurdity; because one perfon cannot reprefent, at the fame' moment, even two others, unless it can be shown, that those two are perfectly fimilar in all refpects; much lefs can he represent any greater number, fuch as an hundred. It follows, that X is the reprefentative of the whole collectively, and that N and O, and the rest of the electors, are not represented as individuals, nor because they have contributed by vote to the election; but because they conftitute a part of that body, of which X is now the reprefentative; and, therefore, that all other parts belonging to that body, though they may not have contributed by vote to the election of X, yet, being included in the whole, are alfo included in the reprefentation,

"Let us further illuftrate this matter, by fuppofing that X is the reprefentative of fome county in England, inhabited, and poffeffed, by it matters not what number of individuals. In what manner has X been elected? By the declaration of certain of those individuals, who, according to the regulations of the government, are the conftituted organs for that purpose. X then is the reprefentative of the whole county that is, of all perfons, collectively confidered, who have any particular intereft in the welfare of that county. He is the deputy, or advocate, if you will, of that intereft; by whom, the individuals concerned become acquainted with the general state of furrounding interefts, and through whom, they are enabled to make known the particular state of their own to the nation at large. But X is not the reprefentative of particular individuals in that county; on the contrary, if, during the time appointed for his holding the office, every individual were twenty times changed, their fucceffors would be equally reprefented by X, and he would still be the representative of the fame county.

"In like manner, the reprefentatives of this univerfity are not the reprefentatives of the fenate only, but of the whole univerfity collectively confidered-of those who have voted for, of those who have voted against them, of those who have not exercised the privilege of voting, and of those who do not poffefs it.

"Indeed, if it were otherwife, I would fain know in what manner a perfect reprefentation could be effected. The perfection would confift in the unanimity of the electors; now, provided two or more candidates propofed themfelves for one intereft, the electors would probably be divided in their opinions, and confequently a part only, a third perhaps, or ftill lefs, would be reprefented by the fuccefsful candidate. For, if it be true that thofe, who cannot vote, are not reprefented by the member, furely it must be true that thofe, who vote against him, are excluded.

Again, provided the reprefentation in this manner could be made perfect, how long would it continue fo? Scarcely one day. For in that time feveral electors would die, and others would acquire qualifications fufficient to entitle them to vote.

"In whatever manner, therefore, this matter is regarded, it teems with impoffibilities; and feems calculated merely to disturb th hap

pinefs of fociety, by fowing in the breafts of the members the feeds of jealoufy and difcontent.

"It is plain then, that the permanent interefts of a nation, which neceffarily include the individuals concerned in them, and not the individuals themfelves, are the objects of reprefentation; and therefore that, fo far as relates to representation, the state of the individuals is in nowife affected by the privilege of voting." P. 121.

For the incompetency of fimple delegation to the purposes of ftable government, urged in Sketch XII., the author propofes in Sketch XIII. two remedies: the first of these is, that adopted by the United States of America, and which he confiders as defective; the laft is that which conftitutes the aristocratical part of a government, and

"Confifis" (to ufe the words of our author)" in the appointment of a fecond house, selected from the principal poffeffors of property in the nation, whofe opinion is requifite, as in the former cafe, to fanction and ratify the refolutions of the deputies, and ultimately to conftitute a law; with this further addition, that the privileges, attached to this appointment, are granted in perpetuity, and are allowed to devolve in hereditary fucceffion. By this falutary provifion, the inefficiency of this firft mentioned method is entirely done away, and a fort of perpetual guardianship is eftablifhed. The individuals, who hold thefe privileges, from the great ftake of property which they poffefs, are equally interefted with the reft of the nation, in the general prefervation of the focial compact; and from the peculiar advantages which they are allowed to enjoy, they are particularly interested, in preferving the means, by which that compact is to be maintained." P. 137.

To obviate the objections against this Ariftocracy, the author reduces them to three heads, danger, folly, and injustice. His reply to thefe is at once manly and ingenious, and our readers will doublefs be gratified by its infertion.

"First, it is stated to be unfafe to the caufe of freedom, to trust a body of men with fuch privileges as render them no longer accountable for their future actions. But this argument is erroneously stated; for the privileges, alluded to, have no interference with the primary rights of fociety; for the fole fecurity of which they are granted and allowed. The individuals, therefore, who are permitted to enjoy them, remain equally amenable to the laws, and refponfible to the nation, in all the common concerns of life; and, in their official capacities alone they are not refponfible. And therein the great excellence of the inflitution refts, as they are placed above the reach of all influence, and remain the fleady bulwarks of the fyftem which they are intended to fupport.

"Neither