tion for the support of religion was compulsory, while its appropriation was left to the option of every individual. This usage is now, I believe, extinct. It seems to be the last piece of the old leaven which the young state had brought over from the old. It is purged out, and the whole has indeed become "a new lump." In the following argument, I do not need to advert very particularly to this form of Establishments. The compulsory principle being recognised, I oppose it on this ground. And the more reflecting among the friends and opponents of Establishments will agree in condemning it, as involving on the part of the community the sinful inconsistency of giving public countenance and support to all forms of belief and worship, and thereby tending to destroy practically religious and moral distinctions.

I. I argue against Civil Establishments of religion, first of all, because they imply on the part of the civil powers, a legislative judgment in religious matters, which, I hold, is not competent to them.

That a judgment in religious matters is implied in the very idea of a Civil Establishment of religion, is nearly self-evident; and will be obvious, whether we attempt to form the theory of Establishments abstractly, or advert to the history of their formation.

Suppose the chief magistrate, or the legislature of any country, about to establish some form of religion for the nation, the magistrate, or the legislature would sit in judgment on the question, What form of religion is it right to establish? and the public deed legalizing the form of belief and worship which had been determined on, would proceed on that judgment, and would be an authoritative declaration of it. The theory of an Establishment, then, is an overt declaration, on the part of the magistrate, or legislature, to this effect; To us it belongs to judge what form of belief and worship the nation over which we preside should receive and support; and we have judged and enacted accordingly.

History, in this instance, confirms theory. To go no farther than our own country, look at the origin of our religious Establishments, and it will appear that this right of judging in religious matters was assumed and exercis

ed by the Scottish and English monarchs, or legislature. At the Scottish Reformation, the parliament examined the question, whether the ancient or the new opinions should henceforth be the religion of the land; and by acts passed in the exercise of this unchallenged right, the parliament judged that the Popish faith should be abrogated, and the Reformed substituted in its place. Henry in England broke the fetters of Rome with his own despotic hand; proclaimed away the old religion; and authoritatively introduced the new. The struggles in Scotland, when Episcopacy and Presbytery contended for the mastery, were not merely a war of words, or books, or Churches-proselyting or counter-proselyting on the part of the rival sects; the court was the head-quarters of the strife-the Presbyterians, eager to obtain its judgment and sanction for Presbytery-and the Episcopalians as eager for the idolized authority on behalf of their loved Episcopacy. Even the Westminster standard-books were of civil as well as ecclesiastical authority; the parliament summoning the Assembly-ordering the books to be prepared-judging of their merits after they were finished -and enacting them by the sanction of their authority as the national creed. When Charles came back, he judged them unsuitable for England, and by his royal authority restored Episcopacy. And William, and his parliament, at the revolution, judged every thing over again; and fixed Presbytery for Scotland, and Episcopacy for the other two kingdoms.

Now, is this right competent to a human legislature? May a monarch, may a parliament, assume and exercise it, without delegation from those for whom they legislate? Should it be delegated to the ruler, or legislature of any country? Or is its assumption, when it is assumed, or its delegation, should it ever be delegated, the assumption or delegation of a supposed right, with which the civil powers should never be invested? I shall attempt to answer these questions.

That rulers have the right, and are under obligation, to judge for themselves in religion, is, of course, universally conceded. The highest public functions do not absorb this private right, do not exalt them above this personal

obligation. It were well for their own sakes, and for the interests of religion, if this right were acted on,`if this obligation were fulfilled, by those high in place, with more independence of the prejudices of birth, station, or fashion, with deeper seriousness of feeling, and a greater honesty of purpose, to avow and follow out their convictions, at whatever cost, than, it is to be feared, is generally done. Nor is it easy to conceive stronger temptations to denude themselves practically of this right, which the meanest of the subjects enjoys, to neglect this obligation which lies on high and low alike, than the circumstances of monarchs, and other high functionaries afford; who must either profess and officially defend a creed, which, in many instances, they neither believe, nor understand, nor regard; or forego their interests, their power, and their splendour.

The first insurmountable objection to this alleged right of a legislature to judge respecting a national religion, is, that it implies a judgment for others in that of which every man must judge for himself only. God has given us a revelation of his will, which he has commanded us to examine, to believe, and to obey. Every man must give account to God for complying with this heavenly mandate, or neglecting it. Where is the third party, who, without an express divine appointment dares to interpose, and authoritatively to decide, what interpretation it becomes the individuals composing a nation to put upon this record of God, and by what forms they ought to worship him? The assumption is impiously arrogant. Dr. Paley evidently felt the " serious inconvenience," as he calls it, of a national creed, enforced by human authority; and pleads for the indispensable necessity of abating the evil to the utmost, of making it " as simple and easy as possible”—and "adapting it, from time to time, to the varying circumstances of the Church"-and, after all, making its statements rather "articles of peace," than "confessions of faith,"*. -that is confessions of the subscriber's unbelief, doubt, or hypocrisy.

This objection becomes more forcible when it is considered that the sanction of civil law implies not only

* Mor. Phil.

authority, but force. Let there be no authority, and there is no law. And if the law does not secure obedience to itself if it has no penal enforcement connected with it— if it is left to the subjects to obey or disobey it at their option, then it is virtually no law; it is a mere mockery of legislation; the legislature, and the thing legislated for are brought equally into contempt; and the sooner this shadow of a law evanishes the better. All, accordingly, who have pleaded for Civil Establishments of religion, have invariably held that the coercive power of the law must be employed to enforce them; although they differ as to the extent to which this power must be carriedsome holding that it should repress religious errors opposed to the public creed-but all agreeing that it should sanction that creed by its authority, and enforce the pecuniary support of the Church. Dr. Ranken says, "The mere spiritual discipline of the Church may be slighted by light and ungodly minds, even among the clergy; the power of following it up with civil penalties, in their case, seems necessary to the general welfare." * Warburton, in his ingenious but most sophistical defence of the Church of England, on principles, and for objects, which even Dr. Paley reprobates, as serving only to "debase the institution," after demonstrating the natural independence of the Church on the state, proceeds to argue for his favourite alliance, for this, among other reasons, that the state may support the Church "by lending to it a coactive power." + Dr. Paley's definition of a "religious Establishment," comprehends, as its second term, a legal provision for the maintenance of the clergy," enforced, as a matter of course, by law, like any other tax. Besides the legal sanction to ecclesiastical formularies, Dr. M'Crie expressly asserts, that it is the duty of the magistrate to "suppress irreligion, impiety, profanity, and blasphemy."§ The Westminster Confession teaches, that the magistrate " hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed,

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* Essay on the importance of Religious Establishments, page 114. + Warburton's Alliance, page 99. Statements, &c. page 80.

+ Mor. Phil.

all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented, or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better ef

fecting whereof, he hath power to call synods, to be present at them, and to provide that whatever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God."*

Let us suppose, then, that the magistrate laden with obligations so onerous and so awful, addresses himself to the dread work of reducing these obligations to practice, the great question to be considered is, What form of religion shall he receive into the national code, and enforce by the national sanction? Shall we answer with some, "the true religion?" Were all minds in harmony on this most momentous subject, such a general expression might suffice, both for the conscience of the magistrate, and for the letter of the law. But as the law must be definite, and as the phrase," the true religion," is indefinite, the magistrate must proceed to define; and what then must he do? I shall not take the example of a Mahommedan, or a heathen magistrate; but of one existing amidst all the advantages of our own country. What shall he do? We know how magistrates have acted in establishing religion; the question before us is, How should they act? I do not wish to represent the divisions among Christians as more numerous or important than they are. I rejoice that in the leading points of truth and morals, Christians of many denominations so nearly harmonize. But the fact cannot be disguised that Christian denominations are many; and the question is not one of abstraction, but of practice, and must be grappled with, if the magistrate must legislate in religion-What creed, what class, shall he legalize?

As far as diversities of church order are concerned,

Dr. Ranken is abundantly facile: He says, "There is no form of church government prescribed in the New TesJesus Christ hath left the appointment of

tament

....

* Confession, chap. 23. In the church with which the Author is connected, the approbation given to the Westminster Formularies is qualified with the exception of whatever in these books teaches, or is supposed to teach, compulsory, persecuting, or intolerant principles in religion.

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