caution in listening to the evidence of servants in the house, still these circumstances must have their weight. They were, however, strongly confirmed by the account given of the deceased's incoherent correspondence; and the very fact of his wishing his wife and son to visit him when living in a state of open prostitution with this girl was in itself a proof of insanity. A further confirmation was afforded in the transaction at Lord Northwick's; and the Court could not but think the attempt to give it the colour of intoxication to have proceeded from fraudulent motives. Looking, then, at this evidence, it was not only sufficient to throw the burden of proving capacity upon the parties setting up the will, but it likewise proved the influence they exercised over the deceased; and it would be difficult to imagine the evidence that would be sufficient to sustain a will under such circumstances. Mr. Fox must have known of his daughter's prostitution; and this, added to his general conduct, did not go far to confirm his good character and hand-writing, in attestation of the act in question. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Cooke were both renouncing executors, and had released their legacies; the latter was also the writer of the codicil in his own favour. It was therefore probable, that they had expectations from the bounty of the executrix; and though this was not sufficient to discredit them, it must necessarily raise the presumption of their evidence being somewhat biassed. There was no reason to believe that the deceased's declarations of having made his will referred to either of the papers in question

and

they had the effect of disinheriting his son from one considerable part of his property, only to make an unreasonable provision for a woman with whom he lived in public adultery. The will itself bore strong internal marks of confusion and irregularity, and appeared to have been copied from some other not before the court. It was written very irregularly, with some names partly omitted in places, and others repeated in a varied manner, altogether shewing the deceased's confusion at the time, and, in the language of Lord Thurlow, "sounding his folly." So far, therefore, from any lucid interval being proved, there was every presumption of the continuance of the disorder, a presumption confirmed not only by the general state of the evidence, but also by the contents and appearance of the will itself. The Court was, therefore, bound to pronounce against its validity; and considering the active part taken by Miss Fox in this transaction, with all its attendant obloquy, the Court felt that it would not sufficiently mark its disapprobation of such practices, and hold out a discouragement of them for public example, did it not condemn her in the costs incurred. Costs decreed accordingly.

Lady Frances Elizabeth Brudenell Wilson, and the Right Hon. Charles Abbott, Speaker of the House of Commons, against Sir Berkeley William Guise, Dart.This was a question upon the admission of an allegation, pleading a nuncupative codicil to the will of William Wright, Esq. late of Chelsea, deceased.

Mr.

Mr. Wright died on the 13th of February, 1814, having on the 5th of August, 180o, made his will, appointing Lady Wilson and the Honourable Charles Abbott executors, and bequeathing to the former the residue of his property, after payment of his debts, and some specific legacies. He had also subsequently made several codicils to this will, and the allegation now offered pleaded that the deceased, on the 11th of February, two days only before his death, being very ill, addressed himself to two or three persons who were with him, and declared his intention to give one thousand pounds out of the money he had invested in the Bank to a friend of his. The words used by him for this purpose were reduced into writing on the 15th of March, after his death, and attested by the persons in whose presence they were uttered.

The admission of this allegation to proof was opposed on the ground that the statute 29 Car. 2, commonly called the statute of frauds, required that no written will should be revoked or altered by a subsequent nuncupative one, unless the same be in the lifetime of the testator reduced into writing and approved by him, and proved to have been so by three admissible witnesses; and that no nuncupative will should be proved by witnesses after six months from the making, unless reduced into writing within six days, nor should it be proved till fourteen days after the testator's death, nor until the relations should have been cited to oppose the same if they thought proper. From the facis, however, stated in this alle

gation, it appeared that the money in the Bank included both gene. rally and specifically in the resi duary clause of the regularly executed will, was the fund out of which the nuncupative legacy was to be paid. This therefore was an alteration by the nuncupative codicil of the disposition of the property made by that will within the meaning of the act, and as the provisions of that act requiring the words of nuncupation to be reduced into writing within six days had not been complied with, the nuncupative codicil was void, and the allegation pleading it inadmissible.

It was contended on the other hand, that the allegation was ad missible, because the court was not justified in shutting out the parties, by a rejection of it, from an investigation of the case by which it might appear that the requisites of the act had been complied with, as in the case of Brown and Manby in 1770.

Sir John Nicholl recapitulated the facts of the case, and observ ed, it was clear that the money in the Bank was given both generally and specifically by the residuary clause of the will, and it was equally so that the effect of the nuncupative codicil would be to alter this bequest. The act, on account of its general objects, was to be strictly construed and enforced to its fullest extent. It was, therefore, imperative upon the court in this case, and left it no discretion. The Court would have wished to have had the authority of some case to justify a further investigation of the present one by sending the allegation to proof, but none such had

bcen

been cited. In that of Brown v. Manby, the words were pleaded to have been written in the deceased's life-time, and with his privity, and therefore it was possible the requisites of the act might appear on proof to have been complied with, and upon that ground the allowances admitted; but in the present case the facts pleaded shewed demonstratively the impossibility that they could have been so. He therefore felt himself bound to reject the allegation; but as the will was opposed on the ground of incapacity, and might ultimately be invalidated upon that ground, in which case the nuncupative codicil would not then contravene the act by altering a more regular disposition of the property, but would only be open to the usual opposition from the next of kin ; and as they might be deprived of the benefit of that opposition, by the six months allowed by the act for that purpose being by that time elapsed, the Court postponed pronouncing its judgment until all the next of kin should have been cited to become parties to the proceeding.

Harris against Bedford, formerly Munnooch. This was a question as to the validity of the will of Francis Fagg Manneoch, Esq. Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspecting Field Officer of the Volunteer Corps for the South-West District, and of Fareham, Hants, deceased, at the instance of Lieut.Henry Harris, R. N. one of the executors, against Catherine, the wife of the Rev. Mr. Bedford, formerly Manmooch, and widow of the deceased.

Colonel Mannooch, it appeared, died in June 1909, and the will

in question was dated the 7th of January preceding. It was all of the testator's hand-writing, and spoke of his wife and children in the most affectionate terms. It bequeathed the greater part of his property to his natural son, Lieut. Harris, assigning as his reason for it, that his wife and legitimate daughter were amply provided for by his marriage settlement; but concluded thus, "This being written with my own hand, I am led to believe, from counsel's opinion, that it will stand good in the eye of the law; I therefore, revoking all former wills, have hereunto set my hand and seal," &c. The will was duly signed, but without a seal, and the usual clause of attestation was added, purporting that it had been duly executed in the presence of witnesses; but none such appeared subscribed to it.

The evidence in support of this paper went to establish the deceased's regard for Lieutenant Harris, his hand-writing to the will, and a recognition of his intention that it should operate, by his reading it over to his wife, and declaring so to her, and then depositing it in his writing case.

It was opposed by Mrs. Bedford's counsel, on the ground that the presumption of law, afforded by the clause of attestation to the paper, of an intention in the mind of the testator to execute his will in the presence of witnesses, had not been satisfactorily repelled by the evidence produced; that he lived a sufficient time afterwards without having done so; and it was, therefore, to be presumed that he had abandoned his intention.

Sir John Nicholl said, the court

Was

was bound to presume an intention to complete the imperfect paper and the only question was, whether that presumption was sufficiently repelled in evidence. The strong language of the will, and the deliberation with which it appeared to have been made, were such as to require but slight circumstances to do so. The testafor was a military man, unacquainted with the forms of business, and had been led to believe, from counsel's opinion, that the will would be valid without witnesses; he might, therefore, have copied the clause of attestation from some form, without knowing the legal effect of it; his wife and daughter were amply provided for by his marriage settlement; and this will was, therefore, especially designed to provide for his natural son, in conformity to the regardhe was proved invariably to have felt for him. Nothing could be stronger than the terms in which that intention was expressed in the will; the deceased was a man of reserved habits, except to his wife, in whom he placed the greatest confidence; to her he reads his will, declares it to be so, and again deposits it in her presence; this amounts to a republication of the paper; and the court having no doubt, under all the circumstances, of the deceased's intention that it should operate after his death, felt itself bound to pronounce for its validity as the will of the deceased.

Doe ex dim. Hicks v. Ring.-In this case the only question was, whether the reversion of an estate, to which the testator was entitled, passed under a devise of all his effects to his wife.

Mr. Serjeant Blossett, for the devisee, the lessor of the plaintiff, said, that the will was so short that little argument as to his intention by this word could be adduced either way. It had been always held, that words were to be taken in the sense in which the testator employed them throughout the will, however dissimilar that meaning might be from the proper or ordinary sense. Thus in Doe ex dim. Tofield v. Tofield, 11 East, 246, it was held, that real property might pass under the words "personal estates," it being manifest from the whole of the instrument that such was the devisor's intention. In the case before the Court, the duty of the testator required the disinheriting of the heir at law, in favour of a reputed wife and her children: and it was quite certain that he intended to do so; the only question being, whether that intention was sufficiently expressed in the will. He knew that his personal effects were only of the value of 1181. whereas his real were worth 401. per annum; and it was clear he knew that he was entitled to this reversionary estate, for an offer was made him to purchase it a little while before his death. He called in four witnesses to attest his will, being one more than the statute requires for the passing of real estate. If the Court were satisfied that the testator's intention was to pass real property under the word effects, it was insignificant what was the exact meaning of the word; but if the Court were not so satisfied, the etymological meaning was in the Learned Serjeant's favour, if any thing: in the etymology of the word there was nothing that implied

any

any thing personal in contradiction to real. The word meant property acquired in general, and it was only a secondary meaning which confined that property to personal. In the four decisions which were to be found on this word, in East's Reports, three held it to extend to real, and only one confined it to personal estate; and by the lower classes of people particularly, it was frequently used to signify real .estate. He quoted Cowp. 298, in which, although the devise was of the residue of the testator's "effects, both real and personal," a good deal turned on the meaning of the word effects, which was argued to mean only personal property, and it was contended that real effects meant only chattels; but Lord Mansfield denied that the word effects was ex vi termini so confined. The word had been used to signify real property by the legislature, who made it felony in a bankrupt to conceal his monies or effects. This extended to real property, although in a criminal case the most rigid construction would be put upon a word. He cited 2 New, 221, 1 East, 33, 3 East, 516, in which the word from the context received an opposite construction, and 11 East, 290.

Lord Ellenborough. In all these cases there was context; but when all explanatory context is absent, have you any case where the word effects per se is held to extend to real estate ?

Mr. Serjeant Blosset admitted he could carry it no further than the dicta of Lord Mansfield, and the intention in the will to pass every thing, to which the most extended sense would be given.

Mr. Best, contra, was stopped by the Court.

Lord Ellenborough said, that unfortunately there was here a destitution of any thing that could enlarge the word beyond its natural, ordinary, and obvious sense, which was confined to personal property. There was a great number of acts of parliament in which the word extended to nothing but personal property. If the heir at law was not disinherited, he was entitled.

Mr. Justice Bayley.- In case of doubt, the heir would be entitled to judgment; and here the word is equivocal.

Rule to enter a nonsuit.

LANCASTER ASSIZES, THURSDAY, SEPT. S.

Before Sir John Bayley and a Special Jury.

Bootle, Esq. M. P. and Others v. Blundell, Esq.-Sir W. Garrow stated the case to the jury. It was an issue out of the Court of Chancery, and the plaintiffs were Wilbraham Bootle, Esq. a member of parliament, and other persons, devisees of the late Mr. Henry Blundell, of Ince, near Liverpool, and the defendant was Charles Blundell, Esq. the son and heir of Henry Blundell. The question to be tried was, whether the late Mr. Henry Blundell, at the time he made his will in July 1809, and his codicil in May 1810, was of sound mind. That at both those periods he was of sound mind, he should shew beyond all doubt. To make the subject more intelligible to the jury, the learned advocate