Such appears to be the sum of what is to be alleged against these habits.

Nothing can be less reasonably a subject of controversy than that, if the injury and unhappiness of which a man is the author, outweigh the contrary effects, he is to be regarded as a bad member of society. No splendour of talents, no grandeur and generosity of sentiment, can redeem this one plain proposition, in any case where it can be fairly asserted. Men who have practically proved themselves the greatest pests and enemies of their species, have frequently been distinguished by eminent talents and uncommon generosity *.

But, if this proposition is to be rigidly applied to the condemnation of men, for whom, even while he condemns them, a well formed mind will not fail to experience sympathy, it ought on the other hand to be as rigidly applied to the benefit of men whom the world is accustomed to censure.

Nothing can be less defensible than that we should overwhelm with our censure, men, in whom usefulness will perhaps be found greatly to preponderate, and whose minds overflow with the most disinterested kindness and philanthropy.

* Political Justice, Book II, Chap. IV, octavo edition.

SECT. III.

USES OF POPULARITY.

HAVING endeavoured to ascertain the rules according to which reputation is ordinarily distributed, it may be a matter of just curiosity to enquire into the value of that, the acquisition of which is thus capricious and uncertain.

The value of reputation is unquestionably great, whether we consider it as the instrument of personal happiness, or as an ally whose office it is to render efficacious our services to others.

As the instrument of personal happiness. Man in society is to be regarded, in all the most fundamental questions of moral or intellectual science, as an individual. There are points of view however in which he is scarcely an individual. The seats of contact and sympathy between any one human being and his fellows are numerous. The magnetism of sentiment propagates itself instantaneously and with great force. It is scarcely possible for a man to adhere to an opinion or a body of opinions, which all other men agree to condemn. It is scarcely possible for a man to experience complacency and satisfaction in a conduct, in which he is utterly unsupported by the suffrage of his neighbours. Every one seeks to gain partisans, and upon them he rests as his securities. Failing in this, he takes refuge in imaginary suf

frages, drawn from the recorded past, from the supposition of generations yet unborn, or from the doctrines of an invisible world. With these he is obliged to content himself; but they are usually feeble, cold and insufficient.

Nor is reputation more necessary as a security for the permanence of our own good opinion, than it is as an ally communicating efficacy to our services to others. Men will not allow force to the advice, they will not listen to the arguments, often they will even decline the practical good offices, of a person they disesteem. (If I would do good to others, it is for the most part requisite that they should not be vehemently prejudiced against me.) Though I spoke with the tongue of an angel, if they hate me, I shall scarcely convince them. To have a chance of convincing them, or in other words truly to gain from them a hearing, I must first counterbalance their prejudices. A powerful and happy mode of enunciating truth will effect this with some; but there are others, and it is to be feared very many, whose prejudices of a personal sort, when once they have taken deep root, no powers of enunciation, at this time existing in the world, will be able to conquer. He whom obloquy hunts in his terrestrial course, is like a man whose hands are tied, or whose mouth is gagged. He would serve mankind, but his exertions are nerveless; he would convince them, but they are deaf: hẹ

would animate them to generous action, but they are impenetrable to his exhortations.

If I am to do good to my fellow man, it is necessary, not only that I should act, but that he should co-operate with me. It is little that I can do for the man who sits with his arms folded, and in supine indifference. He must sympathise with my passions, melt with my regrets, and pant with my enthusiasm. To hear justly the ideas imparted to him, to read adequately the arguments I have digested and committed to writing, is an active service. In proportion to the activity which this implies, it is not merely desirable that he should feel no revulsion against me; it is to be wished that he should set out with some degree of favourable opinion. Undoubtedly the validity of my positions should be ascertained solely by the strength of my arguments; but he should prepare himself with a sentiment already conceived, that I am an advocate worth hearing. The most impartial investigator wishes only to read the best books that have been written on each side of a given question, not to abuse his time with the lucubrations of every miserable scribbler. If for some accidental purpose he take up a book that he expects to be bad, but finds to be able, the first thing he thinks of, is to turn back again the pages he has read, and re-enter upon the perusal with an attentive and respectful temper.

What species of reputation will best answer the purposes here described, of security to our own happiness, and efficacy to our services to others?

Undoubtedly the most extensive: that which includes the favourable judgment of the vulgar, along with the suffrage of all the instructed and all the wise.

It has appeared however that this is for the most part unattainable. He that would conduct himself with uncommon excellence, must in all probability expect to lose the kindness of a large portion of the vulgar, whether in an obscure, or a more conspicuous station.

In the mean time there is a species of reputation, which, though not so effectual as that above mentioned, will in an important degree answer the purposes of complacency and usefulness.

If we have reference only to the first of these objects, it will be sufficiently secured by the approbation of the acute and the excellent. So far as relates to a personal satisfaction in my opinions, I can dispense with the suffrage of the vulgar, provided they be confirmed to me by the consenting judgment of impartial thinkers and profound reasoners. So far as relates to my conduct, I shall have great reason to be contented, if I find myself honoured by numbers of those whom, upon mature investigation, I perceive reason to honour.