paying what they owe us."* Let every man, therefore, take care how he lays his hands on the revenues of the Jesuits, or deprives them of the means of living in easy circumstances. For as the ornaments of life are more to them than the life itself of him who may wish to take those ornaments away, even supposing him to be a king, they would immediately put him to death without the least respect to the sacredness of his person or situation. This is really a circumstance which demands more attention than some would imagine, and especially from princes, who by taxes or imposts may happen to put it out of the power of these Jesuits to live sumptuously.

Molina asserts, that he "should not dare to condemn as guilty of any sin, a man who had killed another for striving to take from him anything of the value of a crown or less." Whence Escobar has established it as a general rule, that "it is lawful to murder a man for the value of a crown." But not to multiply remarks on this point, I proceed to the famous question, whether it be lawful to murder persons who attack our honour or character? And here the logic of the Jesuits triumphs. "Ecclesiastics and monks," says Escobar, “are allowed to

* Si impedis inique meos creditores, ne mihi satisfaciant.-Less De Just. et Jur., d. 12, n. 78.

† Unius aurei, vel minoris adhuc valoris.-Molina, tom. 4, tr. 3, disp. 16, d. 6.

Escob., tr. 1, ex. 7, n. 44.

murder a thief, when it may be necessary for the preservation of their property." This is the principle. "Therefore it is also lawful for them to defend their honour by murdering him who attacks it." This is the conclusion.

Lamy the Jesuit also puts a sword into the hands of monks and ecclesiastics, to shed the blood of those who may happen to speak disrespectfully of them. His words are, "A monk, or an ecclesiastic, is permitted to take away the life of a calumniator who threatens to accuse him, or his order, before the public of some great crime, supposing he has no other means of preventing the publication; and no other means he appears to have, when the slanderer is about to assert his calumnies before persons of consideration, unless he be immediately dispatched."+

"It is lawful," Longuet the Jesuit likewise informs us, "to take away the life of another in defence of our honour, or for the purpose of repelling anything that might wound our reputation." There

* Licitum est clericis et religiosis, in tutelam suarum facultatum furem occidere, si alius modus non suppetat; ergo et in tutelam honoris.-Escob., tr. 1, ex. 7, ch. 3, n. 54.

+ Unde licebit clerico vel religioso, calumniatorem gravia crimina de se vel sua religione spargere minantem, occidere, quando alius defendendi modus non suppetit; uti suppetere non videtur, si calumniator sit paratus ea vel ipsi religioso, vel ejus religioni publice coram gravissimis viris impingere.-Lamy, tom. 5, disp. 36, num. 118.

+ Ad tuendum honorem suum et propulsandum infamium licet occidere.-Longuet, in his Dictum on the 5th precept of the Decal., q. 4, rep. 2.

is nothing in any of these dogmas capable of causing the Society to blush. The more they partake of the sanguinary and barbarous, the greater is the effrontery with which the Jesuits defend them; like the infamous females of whom Juvenal remarks, that "in proportion to the abominable nature of their undertaking, is their resolution and audacity in executing it."* Such is the true character of the Jesuits.

ON THE NATURE OF OATHS.

IN these few pages I purpose to show, without comment and from their own authorities, how the Jesuits instruct men in the art of deceiving by false promises, and teach them how to swear that a thing is false when they know it to be true. The first example which I shall bring forward is given by Filliucius, a Jesuit professor and casuist in the College of Rome.

He," says this Jesuit, "who has outwardly promised anything, but without an intention of promising it, on being asked whether he did make such a promise, may reply, No; meaning within himself that he made no promise which implied any obliga

* Sat. 6.

tion to keep it." Nay, he may go much farther than this, for "he may confirm his denial by an oath; because, otherwise he would be compelled to pay what he does not owe."*

Tambourin, another Jesuit, dispenses even with the word and oath of persons who are not quite certain that they intended to keep them: "Though you may be aware," says he, "that you have made a vow or an oath, it is, in my judgment, probable that you are under no obligation to observe either one or the other, supposing you are in any doubt as to your intending to bind yourself by that oath or vow."+

But Valentia, another authority of the Romish Church, goes farther still. It is his opinion that "though a man have deliberately intended to bind himself, he is not bound, unless he had an intention of executing what he promised." The reason assigned is curious: "It is," says he, "that the vow" (he should have said the oath also) "remains null so long as the man is unwilling to execute it."

* Afferri solent exempla aliqua, ut primo ejus qui promisit exterius, et absque intentione promittendi......Si enim interrogetur an promiserit, negare potest, intelligendo se non promisisse promissione obligante, et sic etiam jurare alioquin urgeretur solvere quod non debet.-Filliuc., tom. ii., tr. 35, n. 323.

† Si certo vovisti vel jurasti, at ambigis an animum te obligandi habueris per illa verba, seu per illud juramentum......Puto non esse improbabile te nequaquam obligari.-Tamb. in Decal., 1. i., ch. 3, parag. 7, n. 6.

Scio Valentium, Q. 2, d. 6, q. 6, p. 1, Censere: si promittat animo quidem te obligandi......sed cum voluntate rem promissam

An oath of subtle invention, by which we are to cause others to believe what is utterly false without any danger of perjuring ourself (according to Jesuit morality), is given by Sanchez. It is, "to say when we take an oath, whether by choice or compulsion, uro, which signifies, I burn; instead of saying, juro, I swear.' ""*

“A man may swear," says Sanchez, this adept in equivocation, "that he has not done a thing, though in fact he has done it, meaning, in himself, that he did not do it on a certain day, or before he was born; or understanding any other circumstance of a similar nature. And this," he adds, " will be found exceedingly convenient on numerous occasions."+

"There is neither sin nor perjury," says Filliucius, "in availing ourselves of an equivocation, when the purpose to be served is in itself good."‡

nullatenus exequendi, tunc nullam exurgere obligationem, quin si nullam habes voluntatem rei faciendæ, nullum emittis votum.Tamb. in Decal., 1. 3, c. 12, parag. 1, n. 4.

* Similiter non esset plusquam veniale mendacium dicere Uro, ablata J, cum vere nil urat.-Sanch., 1. 3, c. 6, n. 37.

† Si quis....Juret se non fecisse aliquid, quod re verâ facit, intelligendo intra se aliquid aliud quod non fecit, vel aliam diem ab ea in qua fecit....vel quodvis aliud additum verum, re verâ non mentitur, nec est perjurus....Immo hoc est utilissimum ad tegenda multa

Causa vero, Justa utendi his amphibologiis est, quoties id necessarium, aut utile est ad salutem corporis, honorem, res familiares tuenda....Item licebit respondere se non occidisse Petrum, intelligendo alium ejusdem nominis, vel etiam eundemmet, intelligendo antequam nasceretur.-Ibid., n. 15, 19.

Secundo quæro an sit perjurium vel peccatum uti amphilologiâ

I