Stoz, another Papal authority, asserts that "a person who has committed a crime secretly, on being interrogated, may deny it, under the plea to himself that he has not committed a public crime."* Also,

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a culprit on being examined in a court of justice, respecting a crime which cannot be fully proved against him, unless he confess it, may deny that he is guilty, if a confession would risk the loss of his life, his liberty, or his possessions."+ "Finally," he adds, "in these and all similar cases the oath may be employed, should reason and the nature of the thing require it, provided it be accompanied with a good and convenient equivocation, for thus Lessius has decided."

Casnedi (a Jesuit of Lisbon, and Regulator of the Inquisitions of Spain and Portugal), in a work called Crisis Theologica, printed at Lisbon, in the year 1719, with the approbation of the theologians of the

ex honesta causa? Respondeo et dico primo, talem non esse perjurum.-Filliuc., tom. 2, tr. 25, num. 323.

* Potest quis suum crimen occultum negare, subintelligendo ut publicum. In his book entitled, The Tribunal of Penitence, 1. 1, part 3, p. 173, num. 220.

+ Reus a judice interrogatus de delicto quod sine propria illius confessione plene probari nequit, potest illud negare, si ex illa confessione sit incursurus periculum vitæ: Quod extenditur etiam ad quocunque aliud grave malum, e. g. exilium, bonorum omnium amissionem.-Stoz. Ibid.

Possunt hæc omnia, si res ita ferat, et ratio postulet, etiam Juramento confirmari: modo debita et congrua æquivocatio adhibeatur Lessius.-Stoz. Ibid.

Society, and of Father de Sousas, Provincial of Portugal, says,—

"I assert that a culprit, on being examined in a court of justice with a view to his being punished, is not obliged under pain of sinning to acknowledge his crime, if by a mental restriction, or a merely verbal equivocation, he can hide or dissemble it, so as to escape a considerable punishment; such as the galleys, a long imprisonment, the confiscation of his goods, great infamy, &c. He may even dissemble or conceal his crime by recourse to the oath, in taking of which he is at liberty to make some mental reservation, or to employ a verbiage purely material.”*

I shall conclude this subject with a decision of Filliucius, on engaging others to swear falsely for us. "It is a thing perfectly innocent in itself to request another to swear for us, though we are aware that in doing so he will perjure himself; provided it may serve our interest, or that we have just reason to avail ourselves of such a method on account of the

*Dico quod reus de commisso a se crimine interrogatus a judice juridice criminaliter, sive ut puniatur; si occultando restrictione sensibili, aut locutione pure materiali aut æquivoca, suum crimen, spem habeat evadendi pœnam capitalem, ut sunt magna infamia, triremes, carcer durissimus, bonorum omnium confiscatio, et similes pœnæ æquivalentes morti, non teneatur sub culpa, reatum suum candide fateri; quin licite possit suum crimen etiam jurejurando occultare, sive restrictione sensibili, sive locutione pure materiali.Casnedi, tom. v., disp. 9, n. 316, p. 76, col. 1.

pressure of our affairs, or from a hope of gaining by it; otherwise it would be a breach of charity to expose a neighbour by engaging him on such an occasion." And, notwithstanding, this champion of the Jesuits has the effrontery to add, "that it would be no violation of charity; for no man is obliged to prevent another's sin, by means of loss or damage to himself."+

From these specimens let any man judge of what the Jesuits are capable, when the honour or welfare of their Society is in question. What chiefly demands our attention is the tendency of this doctrine to destroy the force and meaning of oaths, by rendering them common, and multiplying occasions of perjury. Let it once be regarded as lawful to swear that we have not done a thing, though we know that we have done it, meaning that we did it not on a certain day, or before we were born; and how many will soon learn to trifle with an oath, and without scruple perjure themselves, whenever it may in any measure serve their interest!

* Non esse intrincesse malum petere juramentum ab eo quem scimus pejeraturum, dum modo serventur aliquæ conditiones.

Ut si aliqua justa causa id petendi, necessitas videlicit, vel utilitas; alioqui esset contra charitatem proximum constituere in tali occasione. Filliuc., tom. 2, tr. 21, c. 11, n. 346.

† Nec propterea est contra charitatem, quia hoc non obligat ad itandum peccatum alterius cum proprio damno.-Ibid.

ON SENSUALITY.

"WHAT," inquires Father Filliucius, "is the judgment we ought to form of persons who listen to filthy discourse? I reply, that in itself it is a thing purely indifferent."* "The same," he adds, "may be said of reading indecent books, the contents of which are chiefly amorous."

The language of Filliucius on these particulars is too indecent for translation, I shall therefore give them in their original Latin: "Partes quæcunque corporis propriæ vel alienæ, quæ communiter et honeste in humano convictu ostendi solent, ut brachia, pectus, crura, absque peccato ullo aspici possunt.”+

But this Jesuit does not stop here; for he adds, "Totum etiam corpus coopertis pudendis in balneo vel flumine, si necessitas vel utilitas aliqua, vel etiam commoditas, vel delectatio ob sanitatem intercedat, absque ullo peccato aspici potest."

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In these liberties Escobar can see nothing that is improper. Enimvero," says he, "si esset aspectus partium quas pudor velat, vel ipsius concubitus, speculative quidem non damnarem."§

"An amplexus nudi cum nudo......possit etiam

* Quæres de auditione rerum turpium? Respondeo......ex se esse rem indifferentem.-Filliuc., tom. ii., c. 10, n. 212.

Filliuc., tom. ii., c. 10, n. 217.

§ Escob., tr. 1, ex. 8, c. 1, n. 4, p. 135.

Ibid.

esse inter tactus causa benevolentiæ ?" asks Filliucius. If it be possible to conceive anything more revolting than this question, it must be the answer that he subjoins: "Respondeo, si speculative loquamur, etiam illa est res indifferens."+ This is really very edifying, and admirably calculated to reform the morals of the public.

We will produce another question from Escobar, relative to persons under a matrimonial engagement to each other, which, with the reply, he has taken from Sanchez, the most filthy and licentious of all the Jesuits.

"Sanchez citatus ait licere oscula et tactus externos, etiamsi secutura pollutio prævideatur, dummodo adsit justa causa sponso, scilicet ad vitandam inurbanitatem, et austeritatis notam."

And yet, if you ask Lessius how it is that his colleagues, Escobar and Sanchez, permit persons in those circumstances to use such liberties, he will give you the following reason: "Sponsis conceditur quia est signum copulæ futuræ, in quam ratione matrimonii consentire quodammodo possunt."§ And when they are married they may give an unbridled licence to their passion, like the brute that has nothing but voluptuousness for its guide.

*Filliuc., tr. 30, c. 9, p. 174.

Escob., tr. 1, ex. 8, n. 74.

§ Less. De Just., 1. 4, c. 3, d. 8, n. 59.

t Ibid.