such a separation is not only possible, but even of probable occurrence.

So far, we have spoken of the idea of separation from communion, or disunion in faith and doctrine. But further, the separate or independent exercise of the supreme Pontifical authority in no way imports separation or disunion of any kind.

1. It is de fide that the plenitude of jurisdiction was given to Peter and his successors; and that its exercise over the whole body, pastors and people, imports no separation or disunion from the Body. How then should the exercise of infallibility, which is attached to. that jurisdiction, import separation?

2. Again, it is de fide that this supreme jurisdiction and infallibility was given to maintain and perpetuate the unity of the Church. How then can its exercise produce separation, which it is divinely ordained to prevent?

It is therefore de fide that its exercise excludes separation, and binds the whole Church, both Body and Head, in closer bonds of communion, doctrine and faith.

3. Lastly, it is de fide that in the assistance promised to Peter and his successors, all the means necessary for its due exercise are contained. An infallible office fallibly exercised is a contradiction in terms. The infallibility of the head consists in this, that he is guided both as to the means and as to the end. It is therefore contrary to faith to say, that the independent exercise of this office, divinely assisted, can import separation or disunion of any kind. It is a part of the promise, that in the selection of the means of its exercise, the successor

of Peter will not err. If he erred as to the means, either he would err as to the end, or he would be preserved only by a series of miracles. In escaping from the supernatural, the objectors fall into the miraculous. The Catholic doctrine of infallibility invokes no such interventions. It affirms that a Divine assistance, proportionate to the burden of the primacy, is attached to it as a condition of its ordinary exercise in bonum Ecclesiæ. The freedom as well as the prudence of the Pontiffs, in selecting the means of exercising their office of universal Doctor, is carefully expressed in the fourth Chapter of this Constitution. "The Roman Pontiffs, as the state of times and events induced them, sometimes by convoking Ecumenical Councils, or by ascertaining the mind of the Church dispersed throughout the world, sometimes by local Synods, sometimes by employing other helps which Divine providence supplied, have defined as truths to be held, such things as they by God's assistance knew to be in harmony with the Scriptures and Apostolical traditions."*

It may be well here to add two passages which complete this subject.

Melchior Canus says: "Inasmuch as God promised firmness of faith to the Church, He cannot be wanting to it, so as not to bestow upon the Church prayers and other helps whereby that firmness is preserved. Nor can it be doubted that what happens in natural things, the same occurs in supernatural; namely, that he who gives the end gives the means to the end."

* Constit. Dogmat. Prima, de Eccl. Christi, cap. iv.

"If God should promise an abundant harvest next year, what could be more foolish than to doubt whether men would sow seeds in the earth? So will I never admit that either Pontiff or Council have omitted any necessary diligence in deciding questions of faith. It might happen to any private man, that he should not use diligent attention in seeking truth, and yet to do so should entirely give himself to the work, and, though his error be inculpable, nevertheless fall into error. But even inculpable error is far from the Church of God, as we have proved in a former book. Which fact is an abundant argument that neither Pontiff nor Council has omitted, in deliberation, any necessary thing." "Let us therefore grant that to the Judges constituted by God in the Church, none of those things can be wanting which are necessary for a right and true judgment.'

"Cum Ecclesiæ fidei firmitatem fuerit pollicitus, deesse non potest quominus tribuat Ecclesiæ preces, cæteraque præsidia, quibus hæc firmitas conservatur. Nec vero dubitari potest, quod in rebus naturalibus contingit, idem in supernaturalibus usu venire; ut qui dat finem, det consequentia ad finem.--Quod si Deus in sequentem annum frugum abundantiam polliceretur, ecquid stultius esse posset quam dubitare, anne homines semina terræ mandaturi sint?—Ita nunquam ego admittam aut Pontificem aut concilium diligentiam aliquam necessariam quæstionibus fidei decernendis omisisse. Id quod privato cuicunque alteri homini accidere potest, ut nec diligentem navet operam ad disquirendam veretatem, et ut navaverit integrumque sese in ea re præsterit, errat ad huc tamen, quamvis error sine culpa sit. Error autem vel inculpatus ab Ecclesia Dei longissime abest, quemadmodum libro superiore constituimus. Quæ res abunde magno argumento est ut nec Pontifex nec concilia necessarium quicquam in deliberando prætermiserint.-Concedamus ergo judicibus a Deo in Ecclesia constitutis nihil eorum deesse

Cerboni, a theologian of the Dominican order, says:

"When once anything of faith has been defined by the Supreme Pontiff, it is not permitted to doubt whether he has used all diligence before such definition."

"It absolutely cannot be said, that the means necessary for the Supreme Pontiff in the investigation of truth have been neglected by him, even though he should be supposed to have defined anything ex cathedra, without first seeking the judgment of others."

"The privilege of infallibility, when the Supreme Pontiff defines anything ex cathedra, is to be ascribed not to those whom he has previously consulted, but to the Roman Pontiff himself.

"Inasmuch as the truth and certainty of those things which are defined 'ex cathedra' depend on the.authority and infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff, it is not necessarily requisite, that he should first consult these (counsellors) rather than others, this rather than that body, concerning the matter which he is about to define ex cathedra."*

posse, quæ ad rectum verumque judicium sunt necessaria."-Melchior Canus, De Locis Theol., lib. v. cap. 5, pp. 120, 121, Venice, 1776. "Semel ac a Summo Pontifice quidpiam ad fidem spectans definitum habeatur, dubitare non licet, utrum omnem diligentiam anti hujusmodi definitionem ille præmiserit.

Quæ ad investigandam veritatem media in summo Pontifice requiruntur, ab eo neglecta fuisse, absolute dici non potest, etiamsi aliorum non exquisita sententia quidpiam ex cathedra definiisse præsupponatur.

Privilegium infallibilitatis, dum a Summo Pontifice aliquid ex cathedra definitur, non iis qui antea consulti fuerint, sed ipsi Romano Pontifici tribui debet.

Ex eo quod veritas et certitudo eorum quæ ex cathedra definiun

From all that has been said, three things are beyond question; first, that the privilege of infallibility in the head of the Church, neither by its possession nor by its exercise, can in any way import separation or disunion between the head and the body. Such a supposition involves, as we have seen, heretical notions at every turn. The very reverse is true: that the supreme privilege of infallibility in the head is the divinely ordained means to sustain for ever the unity of the Universal Church in communion, faith, and doctrine.

And further, that the independent exercise of this privilege by the head of the Episcopate, and as distinct from the Bishops, is the divinely ordained means of the perpetual unity of the Episcopate in communion and faith with its head and with its own members.

And lastly, that though the consent of the Episcopate or the Church be not required, as a condition, to the intrinsic value of the infallible definitions of the Roman Pontiff, nevertheless, it cannot without heresy be said or conceived that the consent of the Episcopate and of the Church can ever be absent. For if the Pontiff be divinely assisted, both the active and passive infallibility of the Church exclude such a supposition as heretical. To deny such infallible assistance now after the definition, is heresy. And even before the defin

tur, a Summi Pontificis auctoritate et infallibilitate pendeant non necessario requiritur, ut Summus Pontifex de eo quod est ex cathedra definiturus, hos vel illos potius quam alios hunc vel illum coetum præ alio antea consulat."-Cerboni, De Jure et Legum Disciplina, lib. 23, cap. 6, apud Bianchi de constitutione mon. Eccles. p. 158. Rome, 1870.