Kants' Theory of Ethics Or Practical Philosophy: Comprising 1. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. 2. Dialectic and Methodology of Practical Reason. 3. On the Radical Evil in Human NatureLongmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer, 1873 - 262 sayfa |
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absolutely according adopted apodictic assume attain autonomy belonging called capacity categorical imperative causality cause command conceive conception condition conformity connexion consciousness consequently contradiction contrary desire determining principle disposition duty effect empirical existence experience faculty feeling former give happiness Hence heteronomy holiness human nature hypothetical imperative inclination intelligible world interest judgment kingdom of ends knowledge lative latter laws of nature legislation maxims means merely metaphysic of morals mind moral law moral worth motives namely necessarily necessary necessity never notion noumenon objective laws objective principle one's ourselves perfect duty perfection philosophy physical possible postulate practical law practical principle precept principle of morality priori priori law propensity to evil proposition pure practical reason pure reason purpose rational regard requires respect satisfaction self-love sensible world speculative reason summum bonum supposed synthetic proposition theoretical thing tion uncon unconditional universal law virtue volition world of sense
Popüler pasajlar
Sayfa 21 - For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake ; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination, nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love, and not pathological, a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense, in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.
Sayfa 19 - Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist was clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose...
Sayfa 25 - I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.
Sayfa 50 - Now it is impossible that the most clear-sighted and at the same time most powerful being (supposed finite) should frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this. Does he will riches, how much anxiety, envy, and snares might he not thereby draw upon his shoulders? Does he will knowledge and discernment, perhaps it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him, and that cannot be avoided, or...
Sayfa 65 - I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end.
Sayfa 15 - ... misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising,...
Sayfa 94 - The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes determining it...
Sayfa 11 - NOTHING can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.
Sayfa 40 - From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely d priori in the reason, and that, moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle...
Sayfa 67 - whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only.