policy. The controversy still remains a source of irritation and a cause of perplexity to foreign countries. Indeed were we not, for the time being, in such an impregnable physical position, the issue might become important. At all events the enforcement or modification of the law at home is morally much more important.

Gradually and after what has seemed almost unnecessary caution, our relations with Mexico seem to be becoming both more cordial and regular. The reëstablishment of full diplomatic relations appears to be imminent. The Pan-American Conference is now over and our representatives seem to have wound up affairs there on good terms though practically nothing was accomplished.

So we come to the tangle of reparations, which for most of us means the occupation of the Ruhr by France. On this also turns the question of the limitation of armaments and the problem of debts. The adjustment of the terms for the payment of the British debt has been followed by proposals for settlement along similar lines by Finland and by Czechoslovakia. No other countries have so far taken any steps to adjust their indebtedness to us. Indeed we practically have to face the fact that neither France nor Italy can, at present, pay even the interest. In the mean time the adjustment of the entire international economic fabric awaits. There is no prospect of a conference to deal with that, largely because of the American insistence that we would not forgive even a portion of those debts. Today, with a Presidential campaign beginning ahead of time, no American party could venture on a policy which would apparently be throwing away even a remote chance of recovery of those debts. To enter a conference on world economics and at the same time to say that international debts to us were not to be discussed, would be an absurdity.

The occupation of the Ruhr is more than the gesture of France. It is really war of an economic sort. It represents the endeavour of France to secure for herself both the proper reparation due her and the security which, above all, she demands. Today Europe is not disarmed largely because there exists an inevitable fear. That fear is due to the failure of the Peace of Versailles to provide for a moral as well as a physical release from war. Small

wonder that we have a movement to "outlaw war", that the stinging memories of the recent struggle should provoke good people to attempt impossible results with feeble tools!

On the one hand are the positive evils of the Treaty of Versailles; chief among them the fact that reparations were fixed at too high a figure and that figure an indefinite one. There followed the deliberate attempt by Germany to twist out of paying even what she actually could pay. In this she was aided by the great industrial magnates, who saw the chance both to help their Government and to line their own pockets. The deposit of money in neutral countries and the opening up of large credits in banks which were outside of Germany saved such sums from legitimate taxation at home and left the printing of immense quantities of paper money as the only means of supplying the country with currency.

On the other hand is the failure of the guarantees to give France security. This was to have been by the treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and France. Add to this the general disregard into which the League of Nations was plunged by our rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and by the policies of European statesmen. These chose to negotiate by personal interviews and to depend among themselves on direct negotiations instead of lending support to the League of Nations. Under such circumstances the decisions of the League were at times disregarded. In the cases both of the Near East and of the Ruhr the problems seemed too great for the League, or to be complicated by outside factors. The result was that France finally determined on action to protect herself. The chance to break the passive resistance of Germany and to secure reparations and economic and military security as well seemed to her to be good. The result we can all see today is an involved and desperate problem. It includes the intricate question of control of mineral resources in a region which has been a battlefield for centuries. The economics of diplomacy has rarely faced a more difficult task.

And what can we say of the United States in this hasty survey of foreign politics? That we are well out of it. That it is a mess, and that Europe hates us but needs our money. That the United States should show its sympathy but should not join the

League of Nations. That we should join the League of Nations. All of these answers could be given. But are they quite true? Is there not another way of looking at the matter?

Some of us maintain that the first and greatest mistake was made when President Wilson "stood pat” and refused to accept any reservations to the Treaty of Versailles. The reasons for that do not now concern us. Certainly the lessons of the last four years have shown that the treaty is much in need of revision. The second mistake is no less vital; it is our refusal to undertake any responsibility for the state of affairs in Europe. As one man bluntly put it: "The Republicans have kept on making the same mistakes the Democrats did in the winter of 1920." By such mistakes we weakened our moral grip on the situation enormously. Furthermore, the loss of time in dealing with a constantly growing evil was more and more apparent.

If, for example, we had come forward in the spring of 1921 with the proposal which Secretary Hughes made last December, there is considerable chance that the occupation of the Ruhr would never have taken place. The obvious difficulty with that proposal was that it was made at least nine months too late. Opinions had become settled; decisions had been made; and the plan lacked effective power. To propose that a disinterested commission of business men should sit to determine what reparations should be paid, without the authority to enforce their findings, was lacking in diplomatic efficiency. Furthermore, both the French and the British were possibly ready to come to a decision which was approximately correct-namely, about $12,500,000,000. moral support could be taken for granted.

Our

The question goes deeper, though, when we include the problem of security; and it is fundamentally security which France requires. Here again it is by no means certain at present that France would now be willing to accept the American-British guarantee as offered in 1919 and later withdrawn in 1920. That guarantee was based on the French withdrawal of the claim for the Rhine frontier. Today who can say what sort of security France wishes? The truth is that as time goes on the economic as well as the military demands of France seem to grow apace. Meanwhile there is a constantly increasing bitterness. The

organized secret sabotage service of Germany is bent on real destruction while the feeling of lawlessness grows.

It would be idle to speculate on the circumstances and terms which may be secured. The main fact is that at present opinion is too inflamed for any one power to interfere alone in the problem. In that respect Secretary Hughes is unquestionably right. Indeed one man, whose country certainly has no reason to love the Allies, said the other day that under the circumstances he thought the United States had done well to leave the situation alone. "It was either a matter of cracking their heads together in Europe or of staying out." On the whole, therefore, an attitude of readiness to assist in a concrete way, when the time may be ripe, seems to be the best policy to pursue at present.

There remains, however, the question of security at large. This at once raises the complaint with regard to Europe that is now common among most Americans. Why is Europe spending money on armaments when budgets cannot be balanced? We have lectured Europe in vain; we have said that it was hopeless to expect that the United States would associate herself with States which seemed to be bent on bankruptcy. In this we showed the separation and the distance between "Trenton, New Jersey, and Paris, France". But it remained a sincere conviction that physical competitive armaments were at the root of the trouble. In such ideas we were possibly right; but we did not appreciate the "moral disarmament" that was also necessary. We did not take count of the fact that the League of Nations was as yet without sufficient prestige and active authority to be the real guardian of European peace.

Today we find by the statistics that in round figures the standing armies in Europe number 4,355,000 men. That is an increase of over 600,000 men as compared with the year before the war, when the figures stood at 3,747,000 men. In the mean time Austria has practically ceased to exist as a military state and Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria have been compelled to reduce their forces by 700,000 men. For the rest of Europe this means an increase of over 1,300,000 men who are now actually serving in armies. And yet the last war was "the war to end war"! Have we forgotten that at the end of 1918 Italian privates in

barracks had little shrines where three or four candles burned before the poster portrait of President Wilson? Here daily rough privates of the line knelt praying that President Wilson, as the one man in the world who might, would end all wars!

Now as we look at Europe we see her "Balkanized". Each of the smaller new states has its army; and it is largely to these that the new additions to the total of standing armies is due. "Selfdetermination" is not cheap in the new economics of unproductive consumption! France remains about as strong as before; Italy has reduced her forces; Great Britain is slightly larger than in 1913. The United States has already fixed her forces at a negligible figure which is in reality too low. As a matter of fact we have today less than 50,000 available for actual combat troops. However, as we look at Europe can we welcome the cry:

on in! The water's fine!"

cry: "Come

The root of the difficulty seems to be that people got into the habit of maintaining armed forces and cannot get out of it, especially in view of the miles and miles of new frontiers to be defended and in view of the numerous delicate disputes still remaining to be solved. Many of the new frontiers were hastily and arbitrarily drawn; many are not natural frontiers. They transgress areas of economic interest and do not give the protection of geography. The result is that a large part of the population of Europe lives under a burden of fear. Security is fundamental to such a situation and it is idle for us, in our sheltered trans-Atlantic position, to preach over the prospect.

What can be done about the matter? At present there is discussion of the problem before the League of Nations. That organization is in need of amendment and of supplement. The meaning of Article X is by no means clear, and, as Lord Robert Cecil acknowledges, it "is an ill drawn article. In practice it is doubtful whether it could ever be brought into operation." General Sir Frederick Maurice criticizes it from a military angle when he says: "No general staff could draw up plans of defense in reliance upon so nebulous an engagement". Thus the guarantee is attacked in the house of its friends. That article reads: