Rule admits of relaxation. AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAT RELATIO NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA. (Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 4).—Relative words refer to the next antecedent, unless by such a construction the meaning of the sentence would be impaired. Relative words generally are referred to the next antecedent, where the intent upon the whole deed does not appear to the contrary (r); but, although this general proposition is true in strict grammatical construction, yet there are numerous examples in the best writers to shew that the context may often require a deviation from this rule, and that the relative may be connected with nouns which go before the last antecedent, and either take from it or give to it some qualification (s). For instance, an order of magistrates was directed to the parish of W., in the county of R., and also to the parish of M., in the county of L., and the words "county of R." were then written in the margin, and the magistrates were, in a subsequent part of the order, described as justices of the peace for the county aforesaid: it was held, that it thereby sufficiently appeared that they were justices for the county of R. (t) And this rule likewise holds in the case of an indictment; in which, however, if there be no necessary ambiguity, the Court is not bound, it has been observed, to create one by reading the indictment in the only way which will make it unintelligible (u). (r) Com. Dig. "Parols," (A. 14, 15); Jenk. Cent. 180; Dyer, 46 b ; Wing. Max., 19. (s) Judgment, Staniland v. Hopkins, 9 M. & W. 192; in which case a difficulty arose as to the proper mode of construing a statute. (t) Rex v. St. Mary's, Leicester, 1 B. & Ald. 327; and the remarks, per Curiam, on Rex v. Moor Critchell, 2 East, 66; Baring v. Christie, 5 East, 398; Rex v. Chilverscoton, 8 T. R. 178. (u) Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 4; Rex v. Wright, 1 A. & E. 448; Rex v. Richards, 1 M. & Rob. 177. pleading. In pleading, also, in favour of a reasonable intendment, Examples in even the strict grammatical construction will not always be regarded. Thus, in assumpsit on a bill of exchange, the declaration stated that the drawer required the defendant to pay a sum of money "to his order;" and the Court held, on special demurrer, that they would refer the word "his to the drawer, and not to the defendant, though the word "defendant" was the last antecedent (x). A declaration in debt stated, that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff for goods sold and delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff at his request. The defendant having demurred specially to this declaration, on the ground of ambiguity, the Court set the demurrer aside as frivolous, observing, that it was sufficient, if a declaration is certain to a common intent in general, and that, judging by the context, the word "his" clearly referred to "defendant " (y). The above rule of grammar is, of course, applicable to wills. wills as well as to other written instruments, and one very recent case may be sufficient to shew its application to this subject. A testator devised the whole of his property situated in P., and also his farm called S., to his adopted child M. He left to his nephew W. all his other lands, situated in H. and M.; and the will contained this subsequent clause: "And should M. have lawful issue, the said property to be equally divided between her lawful issue." It was held, that these words, "the said property," did not comprise the lands in H. and M., devised to the nephew, (x) Spyer v. Thelwall, 1 Tyr. & Gr. 191; S. C., 2 C., M. & R. 692. See Brancker v. Molyneux, 1 Scott, N. R., 553, where a question was raised, on a motion for a new trial, as to the meaning of the words "last mentioned" in a new assignment. (y) Deriemer v. Fenna, 7 M. & Grammatical rules. although it was argued that they must, according to the true grammatical construction of the will, either comprise all the property before spoken of, or must refer to the next antecedent (z). NOSCITUR A SOCпs. (3 T. R. 87).—The meaning of a word may be known by reference to the neighbouring words (a). It is a rule laid down by Lord Bacon, that copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu (b)—the coupling of words together shews that they are to be understood in the same sense. So, where the meaning of any particular word is doubtful or obscure, or where the particular expression when taken singly is inoperative, the intention of the party who has made use of it may frequently be ascertained and carried into effect by looking at the adjoining words, or at expressions occurring in other parts of the same instrument; for quæ non valeant singula juncta juvant (c)— words which are ineffective when taken singly operate when taken conjointly: one provision of a deed, or other instrument, must be construed by the bearing it will have upon another (d). It is not proposed to give many examples of the applica (z) Peppercorn v. Peacock,3 Scott, N. R., 651. See also Doe d. Gore v. Langton, 2 B. & Ad. 680, 691; Cheyney's case, 5 Rep. 68; and the cases collected in Rex v. Richards, 1 M. & Rob. 177; Owen v. Smith, 2 H. Bla. 594; Galley v. Barrington, 2 Bing. 387. (a) This, it has been observed, in reference to King v. Melling, 1 Vent. 225, was a rule adopted by Lord Hale, tion of the above rules, nor to enter at length into a consideration of the very numerous cases which might be cited to illustrate them: they are, in truth, comprised in that principle which universally obtains, that courts of law and equity will, in construing a written instrument, endeavour to discover and give effect to the intent of the party. They are, moreover, applicable, like other rules of grammar, whenever a construction has to be put upon a will, statute, or agreement; and although difficulty very frequently arises in applying them, yet this results from the particular words used, and from the particular facts existing in each individual case, so that one decision, as to the inference of a person's meaning and intention, can be considered as an express authority to guide a subsequent decision only where the words and circumstances are similar. insurance. One instance of the application of the principle, noscitur Policy of à sociis, to a mercantile instrument may, however, be mentioned on account of its importance. The general words inserted in a maritime policy of insurance after the enumeration of particular perils are as follow:-" and of all perils, losses, and misfortunes, that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods and merchandizes, and ship, &c., or any part thereof." These words, it has been observed, must be considered as introduced into the policy in furtherance of the objects of marine insurance, and may have the effect of extending a reasonable indemnity to many cases not distinctly covered by the special words: they are entitled to be considered as material and operative words, and to have the due effect assigned to them in the construction of this instrument; and this will be done by allowing them to comprehend and cover other cases of marine damage of the like kind with those which are specially enumerated, and occasioned by similar causes; Exposition of wills. that is to say, the meaning of the general words may be ascertained by referring to the preceding special words (e). That the exposition of every will must be founded on the whole instrument, and be made ex antecedentibus et consequentibus, is, observes Lord Ellenborough, one of the most prominent canons of testamentary construction; yet where between the parts there is no connexion by grammatical construction, or by some reference, express or implied, and where there is nothing in the will declarative of some common purpose from which it may be inferred that the testator meant a similar disposition by such different parts, though he may have varied his phrase or expressed himself imperfectly, the Court cannot go into one part of a will to determine the meaning of another, perfect in itself, and without ambiguity, and not militating with any other provision respecting the same subject-matter, notwithstanding that a more probable disposition for the testator to have made may be collected from such assisted construction. For instance, if a man should devise generally his lands, after payment of his debts and legacies, his trust (f) estates would not pass, for, in such case, noscitur à sociis what the land is which the testator intended to pass by such devise: it is clear he could only mean lands which he could subject to the payment of his debts and legacies. But, from a testator having, ex. gr., given to persons standing in a certain degree of relationship to him a fee-simple in certain land, no con (e) See the judgment, Cullen v. Butler, 5 M. & S. 465, where it was held, that plaintiff might recover on a special count, the ship having been sunk owing to another ship's firing upon her through mistake. Phillips v. Barber, 5 B. & Ald. 161; Devaux v. J'Anson, 5 B. & C. 519. In Bor radaile v. Hunter, 5 Scott, N. R., 445, 446, this maxim is applied by Tindal, C. J., (diss. from the rest of the Court), to explain a proviso in a policy of life insurance. (f) Roe v. Read, 8 T. R. 118; 1 Jarman on Wills, 645. |