On a bill filed in the Court of Chancery by Thorne, another of the next of kin of William Watkins, against the defendant, his administrator, it was insisted for the defendant, that in accounting for William's personal estate, so much thereof as should arise and accrue to his share, from the personal estate of Richard, who resided and died in Scotland, should be accounted for in a different manner from the rest, viz. should be distributable according to the rule of the law of Scotland, where it was to be got in, and where half blood was not regarded (i): and it was compared to cases where the subject of discussion arose abroad; and he cited the case of The Hans Towns v. Jacobson. Lord

Hardwicke, at giving judgment, said, "This is a strange imagination, for which there is no ground, either from the nature of the property, or the manner in which that property is to be recovered. These are two distinct rights; for the estate of Richard must be sued in Scotland, and recovered in that right. William resided in England; and, upon his dying intestate, the defendant takes out administration, and by virtue thereof gives a bond to distribute according to the statute of distribution here; that is, every part of the personal estate which came to his hands. What ground is there for what is insisted upon? First, as to that which is to be recovered: - If a man die here, and administration be taken out here, where he has left a personal estate; and he have debts or part thereof abroad, in France, Holland, or the Plantations, that cannot be recovered abroad by virtue of the prerogative administration taken out here; but he must invest himself with some right from the proper courts in that country, as administration must be from the Governor of the Plantations if it arise there, which

(i) Some of the parties appear to have been of the half blood only, which by the law of Scotland would have narrowed the division into fewer shares.

must be for form; and then it is generally granted on foundation of the administration granted here, and then it must be distributed as here. But the present case is not so strong as that now put, because the defendant would not want that, but must sue in the courts of Scotland to recover the personal estate of Richard; - as representative of Richard must recover it there. When it comes into the hands of the defendant, he will retain his own share of Richard's personal estate to his own use, and be accountable for that share thereof belonging to William. So it stands as to the recovery of it, and therefore not so strong, or liable to objection, as it would be, if necessary to sue as representative of William to get in any part of his personal estate. But that is not so material, as how it stands on the foot of the right. The person resided and died in England; all his effects in England, and letters of administration taken out of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury. He had no right to any specific part of the personal estate of Richard whatever; only a right to have that personal estate accounted for, and debts and legacies paid out of it; and so much as should be his share on the whole account paid to him, which is only a debt, or in nature of a chose in action, due to the estate of William. Then it comes to this: a subject of England, residing here, and administration of his personal estate taken out here, with debts due to him, or demands in nature of choses in action in Scotland, to be recovered by his administrator, whether that is to fall under a different rule of disposition from the rest of his personal estate. That never was thought of, and would create confusion. And this question relates not to the articles of union, which indeed preserve the laws of the different countries, the jurisdictions, forums, and tribunals of each country; but this question would be the same after as before the union of the two crowns, and would be the same on a question of this sort arising in France or Holland;

whether to be distributable according to the laws of those countries, or of England. The reason is, that all debts follow the person, not of the debtor in respect of the right or property, but of the creditor to whom due. Therefore, in the case of a freeman of London, debts due to him any where, are distributable according to the custom (otherwise it would be most mischievous if they were to follow the person of the debtor); and then, when got in, it is distributed; and of that opinion I was in Pipon v. Pipon. This also came in question in the House of Lords lately, in a case arising on the lunacy of Mr. Morison; for there the question was, whether the rule would be the same in the Courts of Scotland; and the opinion was that it would be the same; and it was taken that it would be the same on a question between a court of France and a court of England: it was the same; and different from the articles of union. This is just the same case in respect of that As to the Hans Towns v. Jacobson, it was the case of merchants, subjects of England, going to reside at Hamburgh, and is different. It never was thought that, on the death of a person having those funds, a bill must be brought by the next of kin of a particular part of that personal estate; the rule must be, that a bill be brought for the whole, according to what I laid down in Pipon v. Pipon, otherwise it would destroy the credit of the funds; for no foreigner would put into them, if, because a title must be made up by administration or probate of the Prerogative Court of England, it was to be distributed different from the laws of his own country. The defendant therefore must account for the whole."

In these cases of Pipon v. Pipon, and Thorne v. Watkins the law is so clearly laid down by Lord Harwicke, that it is to be regretted that they appear to have been totally unknown, during a considerable period, to the lawyers in Scotland, though the last of them reltead to property

situated in that country. He draws a clear distinction, between the right with which the executor or administrator was to be invested by the proper courts, within which the property was situated, and the right of succession or right in distribution; the first was to be regulated by the municipal laws of the country within which the property was situated, or was to be sued for; the other was to be regulated by the law of the domicil, or of the country within which the testator or intestate had his residence at the time of his death. The doctrines now universally assented to, appear to have been familiar to that most eminent person.

One of the cases mentioned by Lord Hardwicke, that regarding Morison's lunacy, appears to be of some difficulty in international law. () George Morison, son to the late Morison of Prestongrange, was born and resided in England. In July 1742 he lent 2100l. to his nephew, the Earl of Sutherland, then in London, who granted bond for it in the English form. On a commission of lunacy in England, Mr. Morison was afterwards found to be a lunatic, and two grants were issued under the great seal; one by which the custody of the person of the lunatic was granted to Sir Nicholas Bayly; the other, by which the custody of the estate and effects of the lunatic was granted to Walter Baynes and Penelope his wife, the brother-inlaw and sister of the lunatic. These last, as such committees, brought an action upon the bond against the Earl of Sutherland, in the Court of Session. In defence, he contended, that the lunacy had not been established in Scotland; that the law upon this subject was different in the two countries; and that the rules of distribution of the

(k) Reported by Elchies, Idiotcy, Morison, &c. v. Earl of Sutherland, 21st June, 1749. Kilkerran, voce Foreign, 209. In the House of Lords, Baynes v. Earl of Sutherland, 13th February, 1749–50.

personal estate of lunatics, within the same, were also different.

The question of title was argued several times before the Lord Ordinary. The defender contended, that the Lord Chancellor had no power to direct the management of any estate extra territorium. The pursuers answered, that statuta personalia loci domicilii must bind every where ; and that mobilia sequuntur personam, and are regulated by the law of the place of domicil. The pursuers applied by petition to the Lord Chancellor, stating this process and defences; that the debt was in danger, and praying that the committees might have access to the lunatic, to obtain a power of attorney from him to authorise them to sue for this debt. This application the Lord Chancellor granted. The power of attorney was accordingly obtained, and the committees then insisted upon both titles. The Court of Session (21st June 1749) found, “that there was no sufficient title produced to carry on the action, and therefore sustained the defence, and decerned accordingly." But this judgment was reversed upon appeal to the House of Lords, and it was "declared, that there was a sufficient title in the appellant, George Morison, to carry on the action commenced by the appellants, and that the same be sustained at the instance of the said Morison."

In Lord Elchies's reports it appears, that he had understood that this case had been ultimately decided on the power of attorney; but in the above case of Thorne v. Watkins Lord Hardwicke puts it upon the broader ground of the general law. (1)

(1) This a very interesting case, though it be ambiguous upon what grounds it was decided. The doctrines of the civilians in regard to the different classes of statutes appear to have entered into the discussion in that case in Scotland. It was contended, on the one