might have been committed till they so became bound. (c) And their being bound in the Spiritual Court did not excuse them from this custom, as they might still have been compelled to give other security to the Chamber of London. (d)

The rights of the Orphan Chamber, and the powers of the Court of Orphans, in these times, formed important matter for consideration in the affairs of the freemen of the city of London and their families. These are stated at large in the books which treat of the custom of the city of London. But the business of the Orphan Chamber, in regard to the property of orphans, and of the Court of Orphans, is now of much smaller importance.

It appears that the mayor, commonalty, and citizens of the city of London had, by taking in the monies of orphans, contracted a debt to the orphans, and other creditors, for principal money and interest, much greater than they were able to pay and satisfy without assistance. By an act of the 5th of W. III. (e), provision was made for the relief of the orphans and other creditors of the city of London. It was fixed that an interest of four per cent. should be paid upon the money of the orphans; and it was specially provided (§ 18.), that no person or persons should thenceforth be compelled or obliged, " by virtue of any custom within the said city, or any order or process of the Court of Orphans, or otherwise howsoever, to pay or deliver into the chamber of the said city of London any sum or sums of money, or personal estate, due or to be due, or belonging to any orphan or orphans, or any freeman of the said city, any law or usage for enforcing the same notwithstanding." (ƒ)

(c) Priv. Lon. 280–287.

(e) 5 W. 3. c. 10.

(d) Law of Exec. p. 252.

(ƒ) There was a regular mode of proceeding, on the death of any freeman, for calling the orphanage money into the chamber of the city.

At the present day, the Court of Orphans and the Orphan Chamber, though they still subsist, and their powers have not been specially abolished, have neither the persons nor property of any orphans under their charge; neither do they interfere to call any executors or administrators of freemen to account to them, for the orphanage part of the children of freemen. This resulted from the embarrassments into which the city had fallen, and the clause in the act of William III. before recited, doing away the compulsory power of calling in the orphanage part of a freeman's personal estate into the chamber of the city. (g)

It sometimes happens (now less frequently than it was formerly) that before marriage an agreement is made, that the personal estate of the husband, a freeman of London, shall go, at his death, according to the custom. This is a good and binding agreement; and, in such case, notwithstanding his will, two thirds of the personal estate would go according to the custom; and he could only dispose of the other third, or deadman's part, by such will. (h)

The following rules appear to be still in force, in regard to the distribution of personal estate, in a case of intestacy, under the custom of London:

On the death of a freeman leaving children under age, the clerk of his parish gave notice thereof to the common crier, who summoned the executor or administrator to appear before the court of aldermen, there to be bound to bring in an inventory of the estates of the deceased.— (Seymour's Survey of London, &c. vol. ii. p. 260.)

(g) In books treating of the custom, the powers of the Orphan Chamber and of the Court of Orphans are mentioned as if still in force. (Burn's Eccles. Law; Lovelass, Dow's edition, &c.; Foster on Executors; Williams on Executors and Administrators, &c., on this point.) Upon inquiry in the office of the chamberlain of the city of London, I learned, that though the powers of the Court of Orphans had not been exercised for the last eighty years, they were understood still to be in existence.

(h) Webb v. Webb, 2 Vern. 111.; 2 Roper on Husband and Wife, p. 3. 2d ed.

1. The custom takes place only in regard to the rights of the widow, and of the child or children of a freeman of London; under the custom, the widow and children have certain rights in the personal estate of the intestate; and the children, while under age, have certain rights among themselves to the orphanage part: but if there be no widow and no child, the whole personal property shall be distributable under the statutes of distribution, without any interference of, or reference to, the custom. (¿)

The widow is entitled to her customary share, whether the children be of her or of a former wife; and the children are entitled to their customary share, though they were born out of the city, and though their father did not inhabit or die in London (k); and though the estate is not situated within the city, but elsewhere. (7)

2. If a freeman of London die intestate in London or elsewhere, leaving a widow and a child, or children, his personal estate (after his debts paid, and the customary allowance for his funeral and the widow's chamber, are deducted thereout), is by the custom of the city to be divided into three equal parts, and disposed of in the following manner; to wit, one third part thereof to the widow, being her pars rationabilis; another third part to the children; and the other third part thereof is deadman's part, subject to the statutes of distribution. Thus in such case, dividing the whole into nine parts, four ninths belong to the wife, and five ninths to the

(i) 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 442-444.

(k) Ibid.

(1) Priv. Lond. 288.

children. (m) And if there be an after-born child, such child will be entitled to a share, or come in with the rest for the customary and statutory shares of the father's personal estate. (n)

The widow's apparel and furniture of her bed-chamber in London are called the widow's chamber. (2 Blacks. Com. 518.) In the case of Biddle v. Biddle, before Lord Parker, 18th of March, 1718, it was said that the widow was entitled to the furniture of her chamber; or in case the estate exceeded 2000l., then to 50%. instead thereof. (0) Thus in the case of a widow and children, as part of the personal estate is distributable by the custom, and part by the statute, the same intricacy of distribution prevails, as already stated in regard to distribution under the custom of the province of York.

3. The wife of a freeman may be compounded with for, and barred of, her customary share, by a settlement before marriage, either by a jointure upon land, or out of personal estate. (p)

But the bar must be clearly made out: a jointure in bar of dower, or thirds, or other portion at common law or otherwise, will not bar the wife of her customary part. (9) And where the wife is barred, it is held as if there were

(m) 2 Salk. 426.; Redshaw v. Brasier, Ld. Raym. 1328.; Rutter v. Rutter, 1 Vern. 180.; 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 442. 444.

(n) Walsam v. Skinner, Pre. Cha. 499.; Gilb. Eq. Rep. 153.; 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 444.

(0) Viner, tit. Customs of London, b. 2.

(p) 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 444.

(9) Babington v. Greenwood, 1 P. Wms. 530.; Cleaver v. Spurling, 2 P. Wms. 527.; Onslow v. Onslow, 1 Sim. 18.; 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 444.

no wife, and the division is bipartite; one half to the children, the other half to the deadman's part. (r)

4. The heir-at-law is entitled to an orphanage share, along with the other children, notwithstanding of such heir taking any lands or real estate from the intestate by descent, by settlement, or otherwise. (s)

In this respect the custom agrees with the statutes of distribution, but differs totally from the custom of the province of York. (t) In the establishment of the custom, the citizens of London appear to have had no regard to real property, on the supposition that a freeman would not purchase land, but employ his whole fortune in commerce. (u)

5. If any child be fully advanced by the father in his lifetime, such child is barred from taking any share of the orphanage part with the other children; but no grant or settlement of lands or real estate on a child, is to be held as an advancement within the custom. (x) And when a freeman leaves a widow and an only child, no advancement by the father excludes such only child from the orphanage share. (y)

6. But where a child is not fully advanced, and

(r) Lewin v. Lewin, 3 P. Wms. 16.; Hancock v. Hancock, 2 Vern. 665.; 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 444, 445.

(s) Civil v. Rich, 1 Vern. 216.; 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 477.

(t) Supra, p. 343.

(u) 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 446.

(x) Rich v. Rich, 2 Chanc. Cas. 160.; Cox v. Belitha, 2 P. Wms.

274.; 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 446.

(y) 4 Burn's Eccles. Law, 451.