officer was selected. That, however good the local force of the late East India Company has proved itself to be, still it is the opinion of the majority. that a local force deteriorates more than one, which by frequent relief, has infused into it fresh European notions and feelings, and a vigorous system of European discipline; and that this would more particularly be the case in a climate like that of India, where according to the statistical statement of Sir Alex. Tulloch, backed by the professional opinion of Dr. Martin (himself an advocate for a local army), and others, the European constitution. can never be said to become acclimatized, but, on the contrary, deteriorates, gradually and surely, in increasing ratio. That the resources of the State, as regards Imperial purposes, would be crippled, by having a large body of its troops placed solely under the control of the Government of India. That the very fact of the local troops not being enabled to share in the battlefields of Europe, is a great disadvantage to them, and may lead to a feeling of inferiority on their part, which would be extremely prejudicial to their general discipline; and that, while the Crown ought to possess the advantage of giving to its army the most extended sphere of action, the very nature of a double army would, in a great measure, deprive the Line army of the valuable experience it would acquire in India, whilst the Local army would, in like manner, be debarred from all the benefits of field service in Europe. That no Government, under any circumstances, would ever venture to withdraw from India the troops necessary for its defence. The question as to the force to be maintained in that country, must be always decided by the Home Government, responsible to the Sovereign, and to the country, through Parliament. That regulations could be drawn up, for retaining in India officers of the line army, whose services might be required by the Local Government; and that officers of the Line would, undoubtedly, qualify themselves for employment in India, if such employment, and all the advantages attending it, were open to them; and so far from the resources of the Governor-General being curtailed by such an arrangement, it would, on the contrary, afford him a much larger field for the selection of able and useful officers. That in a financial point of view, Line regiments ought not to be, and with due regulations, as regards transport and organization, would not be, more expensive than local corps; but, even if they should be to some extent more costly, greater vigour would exist in their ranks, and the wisest economy consists in having the best organized body of troops the State can supply. This is more particularly the case in a vast empire such as that of India, in which the European army must ever play so conspicuous a part; and where, consequently, whatever tends to the greater efficiency of that army, must at the same time add to our power, and secure most effectually the safety of your Majesty's Indian Possessions. That the local army of India, as now constituted, is more expensive than the line in its non-effective charges. That a double system of recruiting, the natural result of a double army, would operate most injuriously on recruiting in general; and that it would be next to impossible to carry it on satisfactorily, or with good results, if worked by two distinct authorities. That England cannot raise, and maintain permanently, very large armies by voluntary enlistment; and therefore the best troops must be supplied, at even an increased cost, if necessary, in order to compensate by their efficiency and vigour for their numerical inferiority.

Should it, however, be ultimately decided, contrary to the strong and sincere conviction of the majority of your Majesty's Commissioners, that,

with a view of leaving undisturbed present vested interests, a local European force is to be maintained for service in India, they recommend that the amount of such force should be limited to that now authorized by Parliament to be raised and maintained out of the revenues of India. It is admitted, even by the witnesses in favour of a double army, that the local force is greatly benefited by the example set to it by the troops of the Line; and that it is most important, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, to retain a proportion of Line regiments in India. To diminish the relative proportion of line regiments to local corps, would render the line auxiliaries to the latter a fatal error, which must inevitably tend to lower the position of the line-by rendering it numerically, and, consequently, morally inferior to the local or larger force.

These views of the majority are supported by the valuable opinions of the following civil servants, and officers of the army, all of whom have great Indian experience:-Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay and late Governor of Madras; Sir George Clerk, Under Secretary of State for India; Sir Charles Trevelyan, appointed Governor of Madras; Sir Archdale Wilson, thirty-nine years in India; Sir Edward Lugard, twenty-six years; Major-General Pratt, twenty-five years; Sir Willoughby Cotton, sixteen years; Sir Sydney Cotton, thirty years; Sir Thomas Franks, fifteen years; Sir A. Tulloch, and others.

The minority take an entirely different view of the question at issue. They entertain a strong conviction, that the maintenance of a powerful local army, European as well as native, is essential to the efficiency and permanence of British rule in India. They fear that to replace a large body of officers, accustomed to the habits, and acquainted with the language, of the country in which they serve, by others, doubtless of equal ability, but who, during their comparatively brief residence in the East, would have neither time, nor possibly inclination, to qualify themselves in the same manner for administrative duty, would seriously impair the power and curtail the resources of the Governor-General, and governors of the several presidencies. They regard the anomaly, which has been referred to, of maintaining two separate armies under one sovereign, to be necessarily incident to the connection (in itself one of the greatest anomalies) of England with her Indian empire. They consider that late events have proved the benefit of having distinct armies for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; and that to dissever the native from the local European forces, by the fusion of the latter with the line army, would be to deteriorate the position, and destroy the esprit de corps of officers, serving with native troops, who would feel themselves reduced to a level below that of their brother officers of the line. The minority, bearing in mind the limited amount, and inelastic nature, of the revenues of India, the present financial difficulties of its government, and the great additional burthen, which they conceive the system advocated by the majority must impose, object earnestly on economical and financial grounds, to an arrangement which, in their opinion, would practically diminish the control of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, and of the Government of India, over the application of its revenues. The minority do not admit the validity of the unqualified objections raised to double recruiting, neither do they concur in the opinions expressed, as to the alleged deterioration of local European troops subjected to like discipline and organization with the line, or the crippling of the available resources of the State, by the existence of a local European force in India. They

consider such a force to be a wholesome check on the precipitate withdrawal of European troops from India, in cases where the Home Government might happen to find itself under the pressure of political emergencies in Europe; and they feel confident that the transfer of the Indian armies to the Crown will prove a source of present and future security to Her Majesty's empire in India, in proportion as radical and organic changes are few, and the weight and stability of the local armies are maintained by largely, but economically, increasing their European element.

The minority will not add to the length of this report by entering into any further discussion of the opinions of their colleagues, as embodied in previous paragraphs, neither do they deem it necessary to set forth any more detailed exposition of their own views on the subject, or to recapitulate any of the powerful and, to them, most convincing arguments, by which the expediency (not to say necessity) of maintaining a purely local European as well as native force, for the protection of our Indian possessions, has been manifested and upheld in the evidence adduced before your Majesty's Commissioners. In support, however, of the views which the minority take of this question, they would wish to call special attention to the evidence (viva voce or written) of the Governor-General of India, of the Earl of Ellenborough, of the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Madras, of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, the Military Secretary to Government of India, Sir John Lawrence and the Punjaub Commissioners, Sir James Outram, Sir R. H. Vivian, Sir Frederick Abbott, the AdjutantGeneral of the Bengal army, Colonels Holland and Durand, J. P. Willoughby, Esq., and others, as containing irrefragable arguments, and powerful reasons, for maintaining the policy which they advocate. There are, it is true, some able men who espouse the opposite side of the question; but it will scarcely fail to be remarked, that, with two or three exceptions, they are of much more limited Indian experience than those who concur in the views of the minority of the Commission, and comprise only three officers, Sir George Clerk, Sir A. Wilson, and Sir Charles Trevelyan, of the late East India Company's service, the remainder, with the single exception of the Governor of Bombay, being all officers of Her Majesty's army of the line. It may be added, that the minority of your Majesty's Commissioners are quite agreed, that a portion of the European force to be maintained in India hereafter, should be supplied from the army of the line, to the extent, perhaps, of one-fourth, or even one-third, of the whole.

On the fifth question, "The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the former portion, and securing the efficiency of the latter," your Majesty's Commissioners observe, that if it be determined that the European force be partly of the line and partly local, the periodical relief of the former portion may be effected, as has hitherto been done; but they strongly recommend that the tour of service in India should not exceed twelve years. The efficiency of the latter may be secured by the establishment of depôt battalions, composed of the officers of one company from each regiment, having a double proportion of non-commissioned officers attached, to which all newly appointed officers and all recruits should be sent, and thoroughly instructed in their duties, previous to proceeding to India; the depôt battalions to be disciplined under the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief, and to be considered available for service within the United Kingdom, in cases of emergency. The establishment of a con

valescent station at the Cape of Good Hope, for the invalids belonging to European regiments serving in India, is worthy of consideration.

With reference to the sixth question, " Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces, so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now in the service of the East India Company," your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion that, although there are many difficulties in so amalgamating the local European forces with those of the line, such an arrangement would be advantageous, if it could be effected without prejudice to existing rights. There is no obstacle to at once allowing the officers of the junior ranks (second lieutenants, cornets, and ensigns), to exchange from one branch of the service to the other; but there is a great difficulty in the higher ranks, arising from the seniority system of promotion, which exists in the armies of India. If no other interests were concerned than those of the two officers who proposed to exchange, the question might be settled between them, but it is obvious that in a seniority service the interest of every individual, junior to the exchanging officer, must be affected, for better or for worse, by every exchange that took place, unless (which is next to impossible) the ages, or rather the value of the lives of the two parties, could be ascertained and proved to be exactly the same. Much difficulty would also arise from the complicated nature of the arrangements, under which officers and their families hold beneficial interests in the funds maintained by themselves and aided by the local Government of India. Your Commissioners see no means of removing this difficulty, except by the Government taking upon itself the management of the funds, and guaranteeing all their liabilities, past, present, and future. Officers hereafter entering the service may do so under such regulations as your Majesty may prescribe as already stated; but if the Government should not take on itself all the liabilities and engagements of the funds, it will be necessary to continue the present system, of requiring all officers to subscribe to them from their first entering the army, or the insolvency of these admirable institutions, and their consequent inability to keep faith with their present and future annuitants. (widows and orphans), must be the eventual and inevitable result.

On the seventh question suggested for inquiry in your Majesty's warrant, viz., "Whether there should be any admixture of European and Native forces, either regimentally or by brigade," the preponderance of evidence is, that any admixture of the two forces, regimentally, would be detrimental to the efficiency and discipline of both, but that the admixture, by brigade, would be most advantageous. Your Commissioners concur in this opinion. On the eighth point," Whether the Local European Force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain," your Majesty's Commissioners are of opinion, that the European Force, if local, may be partially kept up by volunteers from regiments of the line returning to England; and that the recruiting in England should be carried on under the same authority and regulations as for regiments of the line, officers of the Local Force being employed on that service.

As regards the ninth question, your Commissioners consider that it would not be advisable to raise any regiments in the colonies, composed of men of colour, either for temporary or permanent service in India.

With regard to the tenth point, "Whether the Native Force should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportions," your Commissioners are of opinion, that the irregular system is the best adapted for native cavalry in India, and recommend that it be adopted. That the number of European officers, attached to an irregular cavalry regiment should be:-one commandant, one adjutant, one European officer per squadron, and a medical officer. Your Commissioners also recommend, that the pay of the irregular cavalry be increased to such an extent, as will enable them to purchase and maintain horses and arms of a superior description, rendering them in every respect more efficient. In the regular cavalry at Madras and Bombay your Commissioners would, for the present, make no change, but recommend, that the existing interests, both of the native officers and men, be most carefully respected: and if hereafter, the irregular system should be extended to those Presidencies, your Commissioners suggest, that the change should be introduced gradually, and with caution. That the native infantry be mainly regular, but that such number of regiments be maintained and organized on the irregular system, as the Governor-General and the Governors of the Presidencies may respectively recommend for the sanction of her Majesty's Government. The number and organization of irregular regiments being thus left to the discretion of the local authorities, your Commissioners are unable to fix a proportion between them and the regular native infantry, but are of opinion that the regular regiments should preponderate.

On the eleventh point, " Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned," your Commissioners would refer to the opinion already expressed in reply to the third question. Your Commissioners, however, submit, that every consideration should be given to those corps of native artillery which have proved their loyalty during the late events in India.

Your Commissioners are of opinion, with regard to the twelfth point, "Whether cadets, sent out for service with native troops, should in the first instance be attached to European regiments, to secure uniformity of drill and discipline," that such officers should be thoroughly drilled and instructed in their military duties in this country, as recommended in the reply to question five, before they are sent out to India.

Your Commissioners, having disposed of the questions specially referred for their inquiry, beg to submit the following recommendations on certain important points, which in the course of examination of evidence have come under their notice.

1. That the native army should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed promiscuously through each regiment. 2. That all men of the regular native army, in your Majesty's Eastern possessions, should be enlisted for general service. 3. That a modification should be made in the uniform of the native troops, assimilating it more to the dress of the country, and making it more suitable to the climate. 4. That Europeans should, as far as possible, be employed in the scientific branches of the service, but that corps of pioneers be formed, for the purpose of relieving the European Sappers from those duties which entail exposure to the climate. 5. That the Articles of War, which govern the native army, be revised, and that the power of commanding officers be increased. 6. That the promotion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, be regulated on the principle of efficiency, rather than of seniority, and that commanding officers of regiments have the same power