may be per saltum to the metropolitan, but the reason must appear by the formal instruments in the cause; for if the bishop thinks fit to appoint the same individual to both offices, they must be considered as consolidated and merged, otherwise the absurdity and extreme inconvenience of appealing from the same person to the same person would be introduced.(k) Different Kind of Peculiars.]-The court of peculiars is a branch of and annexed to the Court of Arches. It has jurisdiction over all [ *539 ] those parishes dispersed through the province of Canter bury in the midst of other dioceses, which are exempt from the ordinary's jurisdiction and subject to the metropolitan only. (1) In the other peculiars, the jurisdiction is exercised by commissaries, from whose sentence an appeal lies to the Court of Arches.(m) The very term peculiar supposes an exemption from ordinary jurisdiction. Peculiars are exempt jurisdictions, not because they are under no ordinary, but because they are not under the ordinary of the diocese, but have one of their own.(n) There are three sorts of peculiars. 1st. Royal peculiars, which were anciently exempt from the jurisdiction not only of the diocesan, but of the archbishops also, and which were immediately subordinate to the see of Rome until placed under the jurisdiction of the crown by stat. 24 Hen. 8, c. 12, and all appeals from them were formerly directed to the court of delegates,(0) and now to the privy council.(p) 2d. The second sort of peculiars are those in which the bishop has no concurrent jurisdiction, and are exempt from his visitation. These have their appeals directly to the archbishop, and not to the diocesan, within the circle of whose diocese they are locally situated.(g) Where an archdeacon has a peculiar jurisdiction, he is totally exempt from appeal to the bishop, and is not bound by the stat. 24 Hen. 8, c. 12, which applies to the ordinary(r) cases of archdeacons presiding in jurisdictions where they are subject to the superior jurisdiction of the bishop, and not to cases of peculiars. (s) By the general law, the appeal from a peculiar, and more especially from the, peculiar of a dean and chapter having exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all causes, without any concurrent jurisdiction whatever, and being exempt from the visitation of the diocesan, lies to the court of the archbishop. An appeal from the dean and chapter of Exeter lies to the Court of Arches, and not to the *Con[ *510 ] sistory Court of Exeter.(t) We have already adverted to the proposed alterations of the boundaries of ecclesiastical jurisdictions, but any peculiar belonging to either of the archbishops on the 13th August, 1836, except as may be otherwise provided by any order in council made under that act, remains subject to the same authority (k) Beare v. Jacob, 2 Hagg. Eccl. R. 257. Sce Cart v. Marsh, Str. 1080; Lee's case, Carth. 169; 1 Burn's Eccl. Law, 8th ed. p. 60. (l) 3 Bl. Comm. 65. (m) 1 Phill. R. 202, n. (n) Ayliffe Parer. 417; Gibs. Cod. 1050; Godo!. Abr. (0) 3 Phill. R. 245. (p) See post, p. 544. (r) Robinson v. Godsalve, 1 Raym. 123; Gibs. Cod. 1036. (s) Parham v. Templer, 3 Phill. R. 243. 11 Mod. 6. and jurisdiction as before.(u) Appeals do not lie from one co-ordinate to another, but from a subordinate to a superior authority. If the bishop appoint a commissary for the more remote and distant parts of an extensive diocese, who is called Commissarius Foraneus, the appeal will not lie from such commissary's decree to the chancellor of the consistorial court of the diocese, but immediately to the metropolitan court.(x) 3d. There is a third description of peculiars which is subject to the bishop's visitation, and liable to his superintendence and jurisdiction, in these the appeal lies from the peculiar to the diocesan.(y) Court of Arches.]—The Court of Arches is chiefly a court of appeal from the courts of the several bishops or ordinaries within the province of Canterbury, and its appellate jurisdiction extends to all causes or suits relative to wills, intestacies, tithes, church rates, marriages, and other matters cognizable in these courts.(z) It has no jurisdiction to determine the allowance to be made for the maintenance and education of minors.(a) This court has no jurisdiction to cite generally, except in the cases specified in the statute 23 Hen. 8, c. 9,(b) upon which the jurisdiction of this court is entirely settled. (c) An ordinary, com[ *541 ] missary, or official, or other judge offending against this statute is liable to double damages and costs, and a forfeiture of 107. for every person cited, one-half to go to the crown and the other to the party suing for it.(d) (u) Stat. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 77, s. 21. See ante, p. 538, n. (x) 4 Inst. 338; Parham v. Templer, 3 Phill. R. 244. (y) Parham v. Templer, 3 Phill. R. 246; see Johnson v. Lee, Skinn. R. 589. (z) Report of commissioners to inquire into courts of justice, 16th May, 1823, p. 4, cited 1 Hagg. Eccl. R. 4. (a) Fleet v. Holmes, 2 Lee's R. 140. (b) Hughes v. Herbert, 2 Lee's R. 287. See 94th canon, Gibs. Cod. 1050. (c) Butler v. Dolben, 2 Lee's R. 316. That no manner of person shall be from henceforth cited and summoned, or other wise called to appear by himself or herself, or by any procurator, before any ordinary, archdeacon, commissary, official, or any other judge spiritual, out of the diocese or peculiar jurisdiction, where the person which shall be cited, suminoned, or otherwise (as is aforesaid) called, shall be inhabiting and dwelling at the time of awarding or going forth of the same citation or summons; except that it shall be for, in, or upon any of the cases or causes hereafter written; that is to say, for any spiritual offence or cause committed or done, or omitted, forslewed, or neglected to be done contrary to right or duty by the bishop, archdeacon, commissary, official, or other persons having spiritual jurisdiction, or being a spiritual judge, or by any other person or persons within the diocese or other juridiction, whereunto he or she shall be cited or otherwise lawfully called to appear and answer, (23 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 2.) And except also it shall be by or upon matter or cause of appeal, or for other lawful cause, wherein any party shall find himself or herself grieved or wronged by the ordinary, judge or judges of the diocese or jurisdiction, or by any of his substitutes, officers, or ministers, after the matter or cause there first commenced and begun to be showed unto the archbishop or bishop, or any other having peculiar jurisdiction, within whose province the diocese or place peculiar is; or in case that the bishop or other immediate judge or ordinary dare not, nor will not, convent the party to be sued before him (see Cotterill v. Mace, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 747); or in case that the bishop of the diocese, or the judge of the place within whose jurisdiction or before whom the suit by this act should be commenced and prosecuted, be party directly or indirectly to the matter or cause of the same suit; or in case that any bishop, or any inferior judge having under him jurisdiction in in his own right and title, or by commission, make request or instance to the archbishop, bishop, or other superior ordinary or judge to take, treat, examine, or determine the matter before him, or his substitute, and that to be done in cases only where the law civil or canon doth affirm execution of such request or instance of jurisdiction to be lawful or tolerable, (Ibid. s. 3.) (d) 23 Hen. 8, c. 9, s. 3. Letters of Request.]-The Court of Arches, by statute 23 Hen. 8, c. 9, is empowered to take original cognizance by virtue of letters of request, of such causes as the civil and canon law allowed the inferior judge to devolve to the superior, which are those that are called arduous causes, of which matrimonial causes were always esteemed the chief; the statute vested the power of devolving in the judge, without mentioning consent either of the bishop or parties-in fact the bishop's consent was never required; and if the party's consent had ever been deemed necessary; there hardly could be a cause commenced in that court by request, for the defendant almost constantly desires as many opportunities of appealing as possible for delay. As to the discretion of the Arches Court, whether it shall accept or refuse letters of request when granted by a proper judge, the [ *542 ] delegates held in the case of Pelling v. Whiston (e) that the dean of the arches was bound to receive them ex debito justitiæ, but that it was in the discretion of the inferior judges whether they would grant them. Letters of request, offered by two ecclesiastical judges conjointly, are not invalid on that account.(f) Letters of request ordinarily lie where the appeal lies, and for this reason:-The judge who signs them, by so doing, waiving or remitting his own court, (which is all that he can do), the jurisdiction which, generally speaking, at once alone attaches, is that of the appellate court. Thus from all peculiars (i. e. places exempt from episcopal jurisdiction,) both appeals and letters of request lie at once to this the Metropolitan Court; for it is the jurisdiction of this court that at once alone attaches in those cases. For instance, [ *543 ] where an archdeacon, who has a peculiar, waives or remits his court, there is no other court which can take cognizance of the cause than this the Court of Arches; to which accordingly (e) 1 Com. Rep. 190; 2 Gibs. 1007, in which case the refusal of a citation in a libel of heresy was holden to be a good ground of appeal to the delegates. Form of Letters of Request for instituting a suit for a Divorce in the Arches Court instead of Diocesan Court. cese of Whereas A. B., of the parish of in the county of Middlesex, in the diocese of London, Esq., doth intend to commence and prosecute against his wife, E. of the same parish of and county of· -, and dio—, a certain cause or suit of divorce or separation from bed, board, and mutual cohabitation by reason of adultery by her the said E. committed, and for that purpose hath requested me the worshipful Vicar General of the Right Rev. Father , by divine permission Lord Bishand official principal of his Consistorial and Episcopal Court of, to grant to him letters of request that he may apply for the original citation or decree in the said cause of suit in the Arches Court of Canterbury; and whereas the applying for the said original citation or decree in the arches court of Canterbury will, as it is represented to me, be of advantage to all parties, not only in God, op of from the able assistance they can have of (L. S.) (f) 2 Lee, 316. (being also the appellate court) letters of request undoubtedly lie. So again from courts which are not peculiars, but subject to the diocesan, letters of request, generally speaking, go in the same course with appeals for the same reason. Thus where an archdeacon, who has no peculiar, waives or remits his court, the jurisdiction that immediately attaches is that of the diocesan court; to which court accordingly letters of request lie, (being here also again the appellate court,) repeatedly so decided. In short, where the inferior ordinary waives or remits his court, the appellate court, generally speaking, is alone competent to take cognizance of the cause; and this it is which has given rise to the notion-a notion generally speaking perfectly correct that letters of request go in the same course with appeals; or in other words, that the inferior ordinary must make request, or instance, of jurisdiction to that judge, into whose court the cause must have been appealed had he himself proceeded in it in the first instance. Letters of request from a bishop's commissary go in the same course with the appeal, that is, not to the diocesan but the Court of Arches.(g) Court of Delegates.]-Appeals to the see of Rome were abolished by statute 24 Hen. 8, c. 12, by which causes commenced before either of the archbishops or brought before them by way of appeal were to be finally determined by them without any further appeal. By statute 25 Hen. 8, c. 19,(h) for lack of justice (as the act expresses it) in any of the archbishop's courts it was made lawful for the parties aggrieved to appeal to the king in chancery, and upon every such appeal it was directed that a commission should issue under the great seal to such persons as should be named by the king to hear and definitively determine such appeals. The same right of [ *544 ] appeal was given by the same statute from certain monasteries and other places, which, by the grants both of kings and popes, were exempt from all ordinary jurisdiction. Each appeal was referred to a separate and distinct commission nominated for the occasion. This statute was the origin of the High Court of Delegates, which was the appellate jurisdiction from the courts of the archbishops of Canterbury and York, and from the ecclesiastical courts within the royal peculiars in each province. There was no appeal to the house of lords from a sentence of the court of delegates ;(4) but the decision of that court was final as of right, although in very special cases a commission of review was sometimes, though very rarely, granted on petition, addressed to the king in council, and referred for decision to the lord chancellor. Although the court of delegates has been abolished, and another tribunal substituted for it, there are some points respecting the former court which may be applicable to the latter, and therefore proper to notice. A commission of delegates might be granted at the instance of a person interested, though not an original party in the cause.(1) A suit commenced before the delegates did not abate by the death of (g) Burgoyne v. Free, 2 Addams, 405; see Taylor v. Morley, 1 Curteis, 405. (h) In Ireland, upon appeal from the archbishop's court to the king in chancery, delegates are appointed under Irish statute 28 Geo. 3, c. 32. (k) Saul v. Wilson, 2 Vern. 118; and see 2 Swanst. 326. (1) Jones v. Bougett, 1 Atk. 298. either of the parties, for the ecclesiastical law is their rule, and by the course of that law there is no abatement of the suit in such case.(m) If the delegates exceeded their authority, or proceeded in matters not properly within their conusance, they might be prohibited by the king's temporal courts.(n) On an appeal on a collateral point, the court of delegates, instead of remitting the cause to the arches, might retain it at the request of the party, and hear it on the merits.(o) The delegates were bound to proceed according to the ecclesiastical laws, and could neither fine nor imprison.(p) [ *545 ] *Judicial Committee of Privy Council substituted for Court of Delegates.]-The stat. 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 92, s. 1, enacts, that after the 1st day of February, 1833, it shall be lawful for every person who might theretofore, by virtue of either of the said acts 25 Hen. 8, c. 19, and 8 Eliz. c. 5, have appealed to the high court of chancery, to appeal to the king in council, within such time, in such manner, and subject to such orders and regulations, for the due and more convenient proceeding, as shall seem meet and necessary, and upon such security, if any, as shall from time to time be directed by order in council; power is given to the king in council to proceed to hear and determine every appeal to be made by that act, and to make all such judgments, orders, and decrees in the matter of such appeal as might theretofore have been made by the court of delegates; and every such judgment, order and decree so to be made, shall have such and the like force and effect in all respects whatsoever as the same respectively would have had if made and pronounced by the High Court of Delegates. Every such judgment, order, and decree shall be final and definitive, and that no commission shall thereafter be granted or authorized to review any judgment or decree to be made by virtue of that act. Judicial Committee, of whom composed.]—The stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 41, enacts, that the president for the time being of his majesty's privy council, the lord high chancellor of Great Britain for the time being, and such of the members of his majesty's privy council as shall from time to time hold any of the offices following, that is to say, the office of lord keeper or first lord commissioner of the great seal of Great Britain, lord chief justice or judge of the Court of King's Bench, master of the rolls, vice-chancellor of England, lord chief justice or judge of the Court of Common Pleas, lord chief baron or baron of the Court of Exchequer, judge of the Prerogative Court of the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, judge of the High Court of Admiralty, and chief judge of the Court in Bankruptcy, and also all persons members of his majesty's privy council who shall have been president thereof or held the office of lord chancellor of Great Britain, or shall have held any of the other offices herein before mentioned, shall form a *committee of his majesty's said privy council, [ *546 ] and shall be styled "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" but his majesty may from time to time, by his sign manual, (m) Vent. 133; Polyxphen's case, 2 Keb. 768. 777; Hetl. 108; Cro. Jac. 483; Lodge's case, 1 Leon. 277, 278. (n) Moore, 462, 463 Latch, 85, 86. 229; Bac. Abr. Eccl. Courts, (A.) 9. (0) Williams v. Osborne, Str. 80. (p) 4 Inst. 334; stat. 13 Car. 2, c. 12; Com. Dig. Prerogative, (D. 14.) |