to pronounce such sentence as his view of the case may require. And in conclusion, each party frequently adds reasons or legal grounds in support of or in opposition to the appeal. The cases are respectively signed by the counsel retained on each side. With the view to the saving of expense, a joint appendix is usually printed, containing a transcript of such proceeding as may require to be particularly noticed. According to the practice in the Court of Delegates the parties were heard in the same order in which they had been heard in the courts below. This practice has however been altered by the judicial committee; and the practice now is that the appellant's counsel in all cases should begin, the respondent's follow, and one of the appellant's counsel be heard in reply.(j) Prohibition to the Judicial Committee.]-A party, who appeals to the judicial committee of the privy council against a decree of an inferior ecclesiastical court is not thereby prevented from applying to the court of Queen's Bench to prohibit the judicial committee from further proceedings in the suit.(k) After sentence in the ecclesiastical court the court of Queen's Bench will not grant a prohibition, unless it is shown *clearly that there was a total want of juris [ *554 ] diction.(1) It has been assumed by the judges of the court of exchequer that they have jurisdiction to issue a prohibition, if the judicial committee exceed their jurisdiction.(m) But there is no appeal against their decision regarding the practice of their own court although wrong, if they have jurisdiction in the cause.(n) In a suit for a divorce in the Consistory Court in London, the defendant put in an answer under protest, which protest was afterwards overruled ; but the court refused to compel the defendant to appear absolutely, or to admit the plaintiff's libel. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Arches from that decision, but not in due time; and the appeal was dismissed. The plaintiff afterwards applied to the Consistory court to be allowed to correct her libel; but the court refused the application. The plaintiff appealed from the decision to the Court of Arches, who pronounced in favour of the appeal. From that decree the defeudant appealed to the king in council, praying that it might be reversed, and the cause retained, and he be dismissed from all observance of justice therein. The plaintiff also prayed that the cause might be retained. The appeal was referred to the judicial committee of the privy council, who reported in favour of the appeal, that the decree ought to be reversed, and the principal cause retained, but the defendant should appear absolutely. The report was confirmed, and the order for theappearance was made and served upon the defendant. On a motion for a prohibition to the judicial committee, it was held, that as the judicial committee had jurisdiction over the cause, and they had retained the cause, this must be taken to be a step taken in the cause; (j) Knapp, P. C. 45, n. (k) The Queen Ex parte Farmer v. Chesterton, 1 Will. W. & Hodg. 19. See Ricketts v. Bodenham, 4 Ad. & Ell. 433-446; Byerly v. Windus, 5 R. & C. 1. (l) Hart v. Marsh, 2 Harr. & Woll. 341. (m) Ex parte Smyth, 2 Cr. M. & Rosc. 748; 1 Tyrw. & Gr. 222. (n) Ibid. As to a prohibition from the Court of Exchequer, see Llen v. Seymore, Palmer, 525; Catesbie's Case, Lane, 39; Com. Dig. tit. Prohibition (B); Bac. Abr. Prohibition (M); also 3 Bl. Comm. 112; Jobbin's Case, Cro. Jac. 535; Soames v. Rawlings, 1 Tyr. & Gr. 46; Grant v. Gould, 2 H. Bl. 100. and if wrong, that it was a matter of practice, over which that court had no jurisdiction.(0) Mandamus.]-Where a cause has been brought before the judicial committee of the privy council on appeal from the *Court of Arches, and the judicial committee has decided in favour [ *555 ] of the appeal, at the same time retaining the principal cause, and ordering the unsuccessful party to appear absolutely, subject to the approbation of the king in council, which approbation has been afterwards given, the court of King's Bench cannot, on a suggestion of error in the decision, issue a mandamus to the privy council to receive a petition for a rehearing of the appeal. Nor will the court issue a prohibition to the committee, on a complaint that they have exceeded their jurisdiction in ordering the party to appear absolutely, it not being shown that they have either transgressed the general law of the land, or interfered in any matter not of ecclesiastical cognizance.(p) Right of Appeal, how waived.]—Where a party denies the jurisdiction, he would not be allowed in the principal cause, in which he had never appeared, to appeal from a step in the principal cause.(q) The praying a judge to rescind any order perempts an after appeal from that order. The judge's refusal to accede to such prayer is not itself an appealable grievance, any more than his refusal to permit witnesses to be examined "on the day assigned to propound all facts;" even though such witnesses are actually in court, and are sworn to be necessary witnesses.(r) A party who does acts in furtherance of a sentence bars his right of appealing, and the attendance of the proctor of the party on the taxation of costs is an act amounting to the desertion of an appeal; though one party asserted that such attendance was given with an understanding that it was not to prejudice the prosecution of his appeal, but the other party positively denied any such understanding, and no entry of any such reservation was made on the record. (s) But a protest against an appeal, on the ground that the party (by bringing in an exceptive allegation, subject as alleged to a condition that the question as to the admission should be reserved to the hearing of the cause) had perempted his right to appeal, was overruled.(t) The right to appeal is *barred by a defendant acquiescing in the admission of the article, by complying [ *556 ] with the assignation of the court in giving a negative issue subsequent to their admission.(u) The sentence not having been appealed from within the time limited by law, the order to carry that sentence into execution cannot be appealed from.(x) Object of Court of Appeal.]-The court of appeal will endeavour in the best way it can to get at the substantial justice of the case, and not allow either party to be injured by the irregularities of the inferior jurisdiction (y) but put them in the situation in which they would have been if the court below had done right.(z) In considering the proceedings of the inferior jurisdiction, the Court of Arches endea (0) Ex parte Smyth, 2 C., M. & R. 748; 1 Gale, 274. (p) Ex parte Smyth, 3 Ad. & Ell. 719. (t) 4 Hagg. Eccl. R. 246. (u) Schultes v. Hodgson, I Addams, 105. (z) Ibid. 400. vours to look the justice of the case, and is not strict as to the proceedings, but there are some irregularities which the court cannot overlook. (a) But to avoid defeating substantial justice, the court will, as far as it can with propriety, disregard mere forin. But an appeal for a frivolous sum will be discountenanced by the court, and if vexatious, will be dismissed with costs.(b) Appeals are sometimes entered with little if any hope of obtaining the reversal of the decision, but to harass the other party with expense and delay, and to extort a compromise.(c) The court has no means of preventing a husband and wife from harassing each other.(d) The only check which can be imposed on improper appeals is the responsibility of counsel under whose advice the appeal is prosecuted, and a condemnation in the whole costs. In matrimonial suits it is incidental to the very nature of the marriage state that vexatious appeals should more frequently occur, as in cases where the wife is proceeded against, and her adultery has been held to be proved, she has a double motive for appealing to a superior jurisdiction, namely, the continuance of alimony pendente lite, and the consideration that the expense of the [ *557 ] appeal in ordinary cases must be borne by the husband. The orders of court, made a few years ago, have tended materially to expedite causes which before, from delay in furnishing instructions to the proctors, generally proceeded at a slower pace. Many short cases are now disposed of in a single term; and it scarcely ever happens that a cause ready for hearing at the end of a term goes off to a following term.(d) Appeals of two Sorts.]-Appeals lie from definitive sentences and from interlocutory decrees, or as they are termed, grievances, which may travel through the same course and may occur repeatedly in the same suit.(e) In criminal suits an appeal is allowed to the party prosecuting as well as to the defendant. (f) An interlocutory sentence or decree is that which is pronounced between the beginning and end of the cause; not upon the principal cause, but upon some incidental point, as the admission or amendment of the libel.(g) So many grievances may, in the course of a suit, become causes of appeal, that to enumerate all of them, as observed by Conset, (h) "is not within the bounds of any man's knowledge or foresight to particularize." The refusal of a citation may be a grievance and good ground of appeal.(i) It is sometimes a question whether the matter appealed against amount to a definitive sentence or a grievance.(j) All the several acts done on one court day make up but one decree, at least so as to warrant the inhibition's going as to the whole.(k) No appeal from a sentence lies till final sentence be actually given; when there (a) Ibid. 583. (b) 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 682. (e) Ibid. 20. It was said by the court to be "the great and incurable grievance in the ecclesiastical courts that parties may appeal from every step, and that causes by the occupation of the court of delegates may be hung up long before an interlocutory decree can be pronounced. The court will in prac tice consolidate the steps as much as it can, (f) Miller v. Palmer, 1 Curteis, 550. (i) Cotterell v. Mace, 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 744; 1 Com. R. 190; Gibs. Cod. 1007. (j) Dearle v. Southwell, 2 Lee, 119. fore a cause had been set down in the prerogative court for sentence on the second assignation it is not competent to either party to interpose an appeal; whatever is done after the cause is concluded and comes on for hearing until final judgment [ *558 ] is pronounced, is part of the hearing, and to be considered as one continuous act.() In a divorce case,(m) after the hearing had commenced, the wife brought in an affidavit offering to prove fresh facts, which the court refused to admit, as she might appeal from the whole decree as a continuous grievance, that was a case of great length, and the argument was not concluded in one and the same term. In a case of such a nature, if an inhibition were granted and served, the court could not proceed, for it would then become a contempt in the judges to continue the hearing; but if a mere appeal were permitted to be interposed in such a stage, and to stop the proceedings, no cause could be effectively concluded. So further time to bring in an allegation was refused as the party aggrieved might appeal from the whole decree if he thought fit.(n) Time for Appealing.]-The time for lodging and interposing an appeal according to the civil and canon law(o) is ten days, but the statute(p) allows the party grieved to appeal within fifteen days next after judgment or sentence given. The court of appeal will not entertain a question as to the admissibility of articles upon an appeal entered more than fifteen days after their admission by the inferior court.(q) The time fixed by any existing law or usage for appeals was adopted by the privy council.(r) It seems that the fifteen days must be taken as one exclusive and the other inclusive.(s) Thus where there was a decree for costs on the 8th April, and the appeal was not entered till the 21st, it was *considered by the court as the last day but one on which it could be entered.(t) [ *559 ] Stamps.]-The stamps on proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts, imposed by the statute 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, have for the most part been repealed by 5 Geo. 4, c. 41, but a protocol of appeal is a notarial act and still requires a 5s. stamp.(u) It seems that an appeal to the delegates signed but not sealed with a private or official seal is valid.(x) Inhibition.]-An inhibition is a writ to forbid a judge from further proceeding in a cause depending before him, being in the nature of a prohibition, and more commonly issues from a superior ecclesiastical court to an inferior upon an appeal. (y) Its object is to stay the exe (l) Barry v. Butlin, 1 Moore, P. C. 96. (m) Raybould v. Raybould, cited 1 Moore, P. C. 102. (n) Ansley v. — cited ib.; Oughton, tit. 116. (0) Ayliffe, Parer. 80; 1 Addams, 108. (p) 24 Hen. 8, c. 12, s. 7. (q) Schultes v. Hodgson, 1 Addams, 105. (r) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, s. 20; ante, p. 549. (8) Castle v. Burdett, 3 T. R. 623; Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 248; see Reg. Gen. No. 8, Easter T. 1832; see Ayliffe, Parer. 80. As to the rule of computing days, Pellew v. Hundred of Wonford, 9 B. & C. 134; 4 M. & R. 130; Hardy v. Ryle, 9 B. & C. 603; 4 M. &. R. 295; Webb v. Fairmanner, 3 M. & W. 473; 6 Dowl. 549; Blunt v. Heslop, 8 Ad. & Ell. 577; 3 Nev. & P. 553; Rex v. Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & Ell. 173; Young v. Higgon, 4 Jurist, 125. (t) 3 Hagg. Eccl. R. 481. (u) Smyth v. Smyth, 4 Hagg. Eccl. R. 75. (x) Ib. 76. (y) Terms of the Law, Inhibition; F. N. B. 39; 2 Burn's Eccl. L. 339. cution of the sentence in the inferior court until the appeal shall be determined. If an appeal be interposed from grievances or a definitive sentence pronounced or inflicted by an inferior judge in remote parts, an inhibition is first to be requested from the judge to whom it is appealed, (in which inhibition is usually inserted a citation for the party who obtains the sentence,) or at whose petition the grievance was imposed (which party is called the party appellate) to answer in a cause of appeal; and by virtue of this inhibition the judge from whom it is appealed, his register and the party appellate, are to be inhibited that they proceed not further to the execution of the sentence pronounced against the appellant whilst the appeal depends, nor do any thing to his prejudice. And this inhibition is to be certified to the judge to whom it is appealed, with a certificate thereupon, mentioning what day the judge and party were inhibited, and on what day the party appellate was cited to answer in this cause of appeal. And if the party appellate do not appear, he is to be proceeded against in the same manner as in other cases of contumacy.(z) By the 96th canon(a) no inhibition can issue without the [ *560 ] subscription of an advocate; this is required to prevent frivolous suits, and applies to all cases civil and criminal and to appeals as well from a definitive sentence as from a grievance.(b) The signature of the advocate is not sufficient, it must be exhibited, in order that the judge may be informed of the quality of the crime and the nature of the grievance; though in' ordinary practice no question is made on granting an inhibition, still the judge must exercise his judgment on the point, and decide whether there is sufficient (z) Conset, 188. (a) Inhibition not to be granted without the Subscription of an Advocate.]-It is or dained and provided that no inhibition shall be granted out of any court belonging to the Archbishop of Canterbury at the instance of any party unless it be subscribed by an advocate practising in the said courts, which the said advocate shall do freely, not taking any fee for the same except the party prosecuting the suit do voluntarily bestow some gratuity upon him for his counsel and advice in the said cause. The like course shall be used in granting forth an inhibition at the instance of any party by the bishop or chancellor against the archdeacon, or any other person exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and if in the court or consistory of any bishop there be no advocate at all, then shall the subscription of a proctor practising in the same court be held sufficient. (96 Canon, 2 Phill. R. 437, n.) Inhibition not to be granted until Appeal shall be exhibited to the Judge.]-It is further ordered and decreed that henceforward no inhibition be granted by occasion of any interlocutory decree, or in any cause of correction whatsoever, except under the form afore said; and, moreover, that before the going out of any such inhibition, the appeal itself, or a copy thereof, (vouched by oath to be just and true,) be exhibited to the judge, or his |