sum of money, which she deposited in a bank. She married another man, and on that account the money was vested in trustees for the benefit of herself and her illegitimate children. She was afterwards tried, convicted, and executed for murder. The trustees expended a considerable sum in her defence, and made an application to the bankers for the money so deposited; but it appeared that such application was not made bona fide in execution of the trusts of the settlement, The first husband claimed the *money, and the parties having all been brought into court by an interpleader [*649 ) rule, an issue was directed to try whether he was entitled to it, in which he recovered. The court refused to allow the trustees their costs out of the fund, and directed that the costs of the bankers should be paid by the plaintiff (the husband), to be repaid to him by the trustees.(t)

Husband's Liability after a Decree of Alimony.]-A husband separated from his wife by a decree a mensa et thoro for adultery on his part, is liable to necessaries supplied to the wife, if he omit to pay the alimony.(v) A husband is liable for necessaries provided for his wife pending a suit in the ecclesiastical court and before alimony decreed, although a decree was afterwards made, directing the alimony to be paid from a date before the time when the necessaries were provided for the wife. As where the wife, in March, 1824, instituted a suit in the ecclesiastical court against her husband for cruelty and adultery, and a decree was pronounced in December following that he should pay her 301. per annum pendente lite, to commence from the March preceding. On an action for diet and lodging furnished to the defendant's wife from July to November, the husband was held liable.(w) The husband is not liable where he has continued to pay the alimony under a decree by the ecclesiastical court, which had become inoperative, but which could have been renewed without any difficulty.(x) A wife, having sued her husband, in the Consistory Court, obtained a decree against him for alimony. He removed the cause into the Arches Court. The decree then become in law inoperative; but the husband continued making the payments under it; and it was proved that if he had omitted doing so, a new decree could, by a short process, have been obtained from the Arches Court; but that such application was not usually made, unless payment of the alimony were discontinued. It was held that he was not liable in an action for necessaries supplied to the wife while the above payments were going on; that such payments could not be considered a voluntary [ *650 ] allowance, and therefore that the Court of King's Bench could not inquire whether or not they were sufficient in proportion to the husband's means.(y)

After a sentence of divorce ab initio, the liability of a husband to the debts of his wife does not continue.(z)

When the Wife has Funds of her own.J-A husband is not liable for necessaries furnished to his wife, living apart from him, (there being

(1) Agar v. Blethyn, 2 C., M. & R. 699; 1 Tyr. & G. 160.

(v) Hunt v. De Blaquiere, 5 Bing. 550; 3 M. & P. 108.

(w) Keegan v. Smith, 5 B. & C. 375.
(x) Wilson v. Smyth, 1 B. & Ad. 801.
(y) Wilson v. Smyth, 1 B. & Ad. 801.
(z) Ansley v. Manners, Gow, 10.

no evidence of the cause of separation,) if she has a sufficient separate maintenance, although no part of it is supplied by the husband.(a) In an action against the husband for lodging and necessaries supplied to his wife, who lives separately from him, without any fault of her own, and who is possessed of funds of her own, the question is, whether she has such means as are adequate to her support, according to her husband's station in life.(b) A voluntary provision from the crown to the wife during pleasure will not exempt the husband from liability to be sued by his wife's creditors, who have supplied her with necessaries.(c)

What are necessaries.]-Necessaries for the wife mean such things as are requisite for her sustenance and protection.(d) The allowance must be sufficient, according to the degree and circumstances of the husband, and the adequacy of the allowance is a question of fact for the jury.(e) Prima facie, the amount of alimony decreed by the ecclesiastical court is evidence of the sufficiency of the sum allowed, the decree in that court being founded on evidence of the situation in life of the parties.(f) Furniture for a house may be considered as necessaries, provided it is suitable to the rank and income of the wife.(g) If wearing apparel is supplied to a married woman in quantities unsuitable to her husband's degree, and without his knowledge, for which credit is given to her, and her promissory note is taken in payment, the *husband is not liable for any part [ *651 ] of the goods, and in an action against him for their value, is not bound to prove that the wife was supplied with suitable wearing apparel from any other quarter.(h) An officer in the army, being required to join his regiment in the East Indies, left his wife in England, and settled a certain sum upon her, which was regularly paid. In an action by a tradesman for goods delivered at the house in which the wife was living, it was held that it was not to be treated as a case of separation, but that the questions for the jury were-1st, Whether the goods supplied were necessaries, considering the condition in life of the husband; 2dly, Whether the sum of money settled was sufficient; and, 3dly, Whether it was or was not notorious in the neighbourhood that the wife was living in a style not justified by the rank of her husband; and the jury having found the first question in the negative, and the others in the affirmative, it was held that their verdict must be for the defendant.(2) In assumpsit for goods sold, it appeared that the plaintiff, a jeweller, in the course of two months, delivered articles of jewellery to the defendant's wife amounting in value to 837.; that the defendant was a certificated special pleader, and lived in a ready furnished house, of which the annual rent was 2007; that he kept no man servant; that his wife's fortune upon her marriage was less than 40007.; that she had, at the time of her marriage, jewellery suitable to her condition, and that she had never

(a) Clifford v. Laton, 3 Carr. & P. 15; M.

& M. 101.

(b) Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark.

(c) Thompson v. Harvey, 4 Burr. 2177. (d) 2 Mees. & W. 265.

(e) Hodgkinson v. Flelcher, 4 Camp. 70; Hunt v. De Blaquiere, 5 Bing. 562.

(f) Wilson v. Smyth, 1 B. & Ad. 804. See ante, p. 592.

(g) Hunt v. De Blaquiere, 3 M. & P. 108; 5 Bing. 550.

(h) Metcalfe v. Shaw, 3 Camp. 22.
(i) Dennys v. Sergeant, 6 C. & P. 419.

worn, in her husband's presence, any articles furnished her by the plaintiff; it appeared also that the plaintiff, when he went to the defendant's house to ask for payment, always inquired for the wife, and not for the defendant. It was held that the goods so furnished were not necessaries, and that, as there was no evidence to go to the jury of any assent of the husband to the contract made by his wife, the action could not be maintained.(k)

If a married lady, who has sufficient clothes, go, contrary to her husband's wish, to a watering place, and go to balls, and for that purpose order dresses, some of them expensive, and [ *652 ] *unsuitable to her husband's circumstances, the husband is not bound to pay for any of them; and in an action for the price of the dresses, it is immaterial whether the plaintiff knew these facts or not, and whether the clothes the lady had before were paid for or not; and the fact that the husband afterwards saw some of the dresses does not vary the case, if it be shown that he disapproved of the conduct of the wife in ordering them.(1) In an action of assumpsit for carpets, rugs, &c., supplied to the wife of the defendant; at the trial before Lord Denman, C. J., it appeared that the goods were ordered by the wife of the defendant, who lived apart from him, and were delivered to her at a house in Bolton street, belonging to her uncle; that in the first instance, a bill amounting to 911. 7s. 6d. including other articles was made out to her; but at her suggestion it was subsequently divided into two, in one of which her uncle was debited, which was paid by him, and in the other, her husband, to the amount of 491.; that the cost of furnishing the house in Bolton street was between 500l. and 1000%; that the defendant was a police magistrate, with a salary of 8001. per annum, and that before his separation from his wife they lived in a moderate style, kept a carriage, and moved in the highest circles of society. No witnesses were called for the defendant. Two questions were made, whether the articles supplied were necessaries, and whether they had been delivered on the credit of the defendant or the defendant's wife, or on the credit of her uncle. The direction of the learned judge to the jury on the first point was, that they should consider whether these articles were necessaries for the wife of the defendant, living in a decent and handsome manner, in a state of separation from her husband, without her fault, looking also at the rich and expensive furniture in the house. The jury found a verdict for the defendant. The court refused to grant a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, and held that the question whether the articles in question were necessaries, was rightly left to the jury; and that, as to the second point, whether credit was given to the uncle of the defendant's wife, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to satisfy the jury that credit was given to *the defendant. Prima facie the wife deals for her hus

band; but in this case, of the wife living in a state of *653 ] separation from him, the circumstance of her being in her uncle's house, and the payment of part of the original bill by him, were evi

(k) Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631; S. C. nom. Montague v. Baron, 5 D. & R. 532; S. C. nom. Montague v. Espinasse, l

C. & P. 356. 502.

(1) Atkins v. Curwood, 7 Carr. & P. 756.

dence that she all along dealt for and as the agent of her uncle. The rule was refused.(m)

A tradesman, about to trust a married woman for what are not necessaries, and to an extent beyond what her station in life requires, ought in common prudence to inquire of the husband if she has his consent for the order she is giving.(n)

A husband is liable for necessaries furnished to his wife suitable to the appearance in life he permits her to assume. But if a tradesman trusts a married woman, deceived by the false appearance she assumes, when by cautious inquiries he might have ascertained her real situation, he cannot come upon the husband beyond the extent to which those inquiries would have shown him to be responsible.(0)

If a husband turns his wife out of doors, and it is necessary for her safety to exhibit articles of the peace against him, he is liable to an attorney employed by her for that purpose. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said, "The defendant's liability will depend upon the necessity for exhibiting articles of the peace against him. If that proceeding was uncalled for, his wife could not make him liable for the expense thereby incurred. But if she was turned out of doors in the manner stated, she carried along with her a credit for whatever her preservation and safety required; she had a right to appeal to the law for protection, and she must have the means of appealing effectually. She might therefore charge her husband for the necessary expense of that proceeding, as much as for necessary food and raiment."(p)

So if a husband separated from his wife, by his violent conduct renders it necessary for her to exhibit articles of the peace against him, he is liable for the expenses thereby incurred, although he allows her a separate maintenance.(q)

Where the wife, ill-treated by her husband, indicts him

[ *654 ] for *assaulting and imprisoning her, a party who advanc. ces money for her to the attorney, without which he would not have undertaken the prosecution, cannot recover the amount from her husband as money supplied to procure her necessaries; the court holding it impossible that, under any circumstances, a prosecution of the hus band is necessary for the wife within the rule on the subject, inasmuch as if she apprehends ill treatment from him she may exhibit articles of the peace against him.(r)

The reasonable costs of proceedings at law and in equity, instituted by an attorney against the husband on behalf of his wife, who had been forced to leave his house by extreme ill treatment, were recovered in an action on the case against the husband, on the ground that the husband had expressly agreed to pay the bill if reasonable.(s)

A husband, who had separated from his wife, agreed that a deed of separation should be prepared and executed, it was held that the husband was not liable for the expenses of his wife's trustee in procur

(m) Harvey v. Norton, 4 Jurist, 42.
(n) 3 B. & C. 636.

(0) Waithman v. Wakefield, 1 Camp. 120.
(p) Shepherd v. Mackoul 3 Camp. 326.
(q) Turner v. Rooks, 2 Perry & Dav. 294.

(r) Grindell v. Godmond, 1 Ad. & Ell, 755.

(8) Williams v. Fowler, M'Clel. & Y. 269; see 5 Ad. & Ell. 757.

ing a counterpart to be prepared and executed, in the absence of any promise by him to pay the expenses.(t)

In respect of Children of the Wife by a former Husband.]-A man who marries a woman having children by a former husband is not bound to maintain them, (v) but if he takes them into his house, and they become part of his family, he will be deemed to stand in loco parentis, and be liable in a contract made by his wife for their education.(w)

The father of a bastard child, if he has adopted it as his own, though no order of bastardy has been made on him, is liable for the nursing and necessaries furnished for its use.(x)

The court of chancery cannot on account of the misconduct of the wife provide for her children out of her separate property; as the wife cannot be compelled to maintain her children whilst her husband is alive.(y)

*By the poor law amendment act, 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, [ *655 ] s. 57, every man who, after the 14th of August, 1834, shall marry a woman having a child or children at the time of such marriage, whether such child or children be legitimate or illegitimate, shall be liable to maintain such child or children as a part of his family, and shall be chargeable with all relief, or the cost price thereof, granted to or on account of such child or children, until such child or children shall respectively attain the age of sixteen, or until the death of the mother of such child or children, and such child or children shall for the purposes of that act be deemed a part of such husband's family accordingly.

The stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 71, enacts that every child which shall be born a bastard after 14th of August, 1834, shall have and follow the settlement of the mother of such child until such child shall attain the age of sixteen, or shall acquire a settlement in its own, right, and such mother, so long as she shall be unmarried or a widow shall be bound to maintain such child as a part of her family until such child shall attain the age of sixteen; and all relief granted to such child while under the age of sixteen shall be considered as granted to such mother; provided always, that such liability of such mother as aforesaid shall cease on the marriage of such child, if a female.

On the marriage of a widow, having children uuder the age of sixteen, such children do not acquire the settlement of the second husband by the statute 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, the object of the legislature appearing to be not so much to keep the children with the mother as to make the second husband defray the expense of the maintenance, and for that purpose the children are declared part of the family.(z)

The putative father of a bastard child, born before the passing of the statute 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, whose mother is married to another

(t) Ladd v. Linn, 2 Mees. & W. 265.
(v) Tabb v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 118; Cooper

v. Martin, 4 East, 76.

(w) Stone v. Carr, 3 Esp. 1.
(x) Hesketh v. Gowing, 5 Esp. 131.

(y) In re Walker, 1 Lloyd & G. 328; Hodgens v. Hodgens, 11 Bligh, 104-107.

(z) Rex v. Inhabitants of Walthamstow, 6 Ad. & Ell. 301.