V DANTE'S STATEMENT OF THE MEANING OF THE POEM LETTER TO CAN GRANDE.1 To the magnificent and victorious lord, the Lord Can Grande della Scala, Vicar General of the Most Holy Roman Empire in the city of Verona and the town of Vicenza, his most devoted Dante Alighieri, a Florentine by birth, but not by character, desires a life happy throughout the duration of many years, and a perpetual augmentation of his glorious name. 1. The glorious renown of your magnificence, which Fame proclaimeth abroad on never resting wing, leadeth different men to such opposite conclusions, that it emboldeneth some to hope for good fortune and driveth others to fear for their very existence.3 Indeed, I once thought such a renown, too lofty for modern deeds, somewhat beyond the truth and 1 Dante's Eleven Letters, translated by Chas. S. Latham. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. The notes also are Mr. Latham's. The authenticity of this letter is disputed by some, but is generally accepted. (Used by permission.) 2 Interea pavidam volitans pennata per urbem Nuncia Fama ruit. 8 On him rely, and on his benefits; (Eneid, ix. 473, 4.) By him shall many people be transformed, (Paradiso, xvii. 88-90.) excessive. But that a long uncertainty might not keep me in too great suspense, as the Queen of the East sought Jerusalem,1 as Pallas sought Helicon, so sought I Verona to examine with faithful eyes the things that I had heard. And there I beheld your splendor; and likewise I beheld and enjoyed your bounty. And even as at first I had suspected an excess in the reports, so afterward I recognized that the excess was in the deeds themselves. And thus it came to pass, that as before from hearsay alone I had been, with a certain subjugation of spirit, your wellwisher, so on first seeing you I became both your most devoted servant and your friend. 2. Nor do I think I shall incur the imputation of presumption in assuming the name of friend, as some perchance might object, since those of unequal rank are united by the sacred bond of friendship no less than equals. For if one chooseth to glance at pleasant and profitable friendships, very frequently it will be evident to him that persons of preeminence have been united with their inferiors; and if his glance is turned to true friendship — friendship for its own sake will it not be acknowledged that many a time men obscure in fortune but distinguished in virtue have been the friends of illustrious and most great princes? And why not? Since even the friendship of God and man is in no way hindered by disparity ? But if this assertion should seem unbecoming to any one, let him hearken to the Holy Ghost, who doth avow that certain men have been made participators in his friendship; for in the Book of Wisdom in regard to wisdom it is written: "For she is a treasure unto men 1 1 Kings x.; 2 Chron. ix. that never faileth; which they that use become partakers of the friendship of God." 1 But the ignorance of the herd formeth judgments without discretion;2 and even as it thinketh the sun is a foot in magnitude, so in regard to the one thing and the other it is deceived by its credulity. But to those to whom it is given to know the best that is in us, it is not befitting to follow in the steps of the vulgar: nay, rather, they are bound to oppose their errors; for as they are vigorous in reason and intellect and endowed with a certain divine freedom, they are held in check by no custom. Nor is this to be marveled at, since they are not guided by the laws, but the laws by them. It is clear therefore that what I said above that I am your most devoted servant and friend is in no wise presumptuous. - 3. Accordingly, preferring your friendship to all things, I wish to guard it like a most precious treasure with earnest forethought and studied care. And thus, since it is taught in the dogmas of moral philosophy 4 1 Wisdom, vii. 14. 2 Cf. Convito, i. 11; iv. 8: "The most beautiful branch that springs from the root of reason is discernment." 8 Cf. Convito, iv. 8: "For we know that to most people the sun appears to be a foot in diameter." 4 Aristotle, Ethics, ix. 1, in init. See also Convito, iii. 1: “As there can be no friendship between those who are dissimilar, where we see friendship there must be likeness. . . Whence we must know that (as the Philosopher says in the Ninth of the Ethics), in the friendship of persons of unequal station, some mutual relation is necessary for its preservation which should reduce that dissimilarity as much as possible, as in the case of master and servant. For although the servant cannot render to his master such benefits as he receives from him, he ought, nevertheless, to return the best he can by such solicitude and promptness, that that which is unlike in itself becomes like by the demonstrations of good-will, which show friendship, and confirm and preserve it." that friendship becometh equal and is preserved by some proportion, it is my sacred duty to preserve the proportion in return for the benefits conferred upon me. And on this account time and time again I have carefully looked over the little things that I could give you, and separated and examined them each by each, seeking the most worthy and pleasing for you. Nor did I find anything more suitable even for your preeminence than the sublime Canticle of the Comedy which is graced with the title of "Paradise ;" and that with the present letter, as dedicated with a proper inscription, I inscribe, offer, and, in fine, commend to you. 4. In like manner my ardent affection will not permit me to pass over simply in silence, that in this gift more honor and fame may seem to be conferred upon my Lord than upon the gift;1 of a truth even in its title I have seemed, to those who have given the matter sufficient attention, to express a presage of the increasing glory of your name; and this is of design. But new to your favor, for which I thirst, and considering my life of small account, I will press forward to my proposed goal. Therefore, since I have completed the epistolary formula, I will attempt briefly, after the manner of a commentator, 2 to say something as an introduction to the work offered. 5. In the Second of the Metaphysics the Philosopher spoke thus: "A thing hath a relation to truth according to the relation it hath to existence,' 1 Convito, i. 8: "Therefore, for a change in things to be praiseworthy, it must always be for the better, because it ought to be superlatively praiseworthy; and this the gift cannot be, unless it becomes more precious by its transfer; and it cannot become more precious unless it be more useful to the receiver than to the giver." 2 [See Giuliani, Le opere latine di Dante Alighieri, ii. 184.] 8 A careful reading of the Second of the Metaphysics does not reveal this passage. the meaning of which is this: that the truth of a thing, which subsisteth in truth as in its subject, is the perfect likeness of the thing as it is. Indeed, of those things that exist certain are of such a kind that they have their being absolute in themselves; certain others are so made that they have their being dependent on something else in a certain relation, as existing at the same time and being connected with something else; just as father and son, master and servant, double and half, whole and part, and things of a like sort, inasmuch as they are such, are related. And inasmuch as their existence is dependent on something else, it doth follow as a consequence that their truth will be dependent on something else; for if the half is unknown, the double is never known; and thus in regard to the others. 6. To those, then, who wish to give any introduction to a part of any work whatsoever, it is necessary to give some conception of the whole of which it is a part. Therefore, I also, wishing to write something in the manner of an introduction of the part of the comedy above named, thought something ought to be said first in regard to the whole work, in order that there might be an easier and more perfect entrance to the part. Six, therefore, are the things that are to be sought at the beginning of every doctrinal work; that is to say, the subject, the agent, the form, the aim, the title of the book, and the kind of philosophy. Of these there are three in which the part, which I have purposed to dedicate to you, differs from the whole : namely, the subject, the form, and the title; but in the others there is no diversity, as will be evident to whosoever examineth them. Therefore, for a consid |