Right of determining elections. by the commons, is practically a law for the annual meeting of Parliament for redress of grievances; and it may also be said to give to the commons the chief authority in the state. In all countries the public purse is one of the main instruments of political power; but, with the complicated relations of finance and public credit in England, the power of giving or withholding the supplies at pleasure, is one of absolute supremacy. The mode in which the commons exercise their right, and the proceedings of Parliament generally, in matters of supply, will be more conveniently explained in the second book. Another important power peculiar to the commons is that of determining all matters touching the election of their own members, and involving therein the rights of the electors. Upon the latter portion of their right a memorable contest arose between the lords and commons in 1704. Ashby, a burgess of Aylesbury, brought an action at common law against the returning officers of that borough, for having refused to permit him to give his vote at an election. A verdict was obtained by him, but it was moved in the Court of Queen's Bench, in arrest of judgment, “that this action did not lie;" and in opposition to the opinion of Lord Chief Justice Holt, judgment was entered for the defendant; but was afterwards reversed by the House of Lords upon a writ of error. Upon this the commons declared that "the determination of the right of election of members to serve in Parliament is the proper business of the House of Commons, which they would always be very jealous of, and this jurisdiction of theirs is uncontested; that they exercise a great power in that matter, for they oblige the officer to alter his return according to their judgment; and that they cannot judge of the right of election without determining the right of the electors; and if electors were at liberty to prosecute suits touching their right of giving voices in other courts, there might be different voices in other courts, which would make confusion, and be dis honourable to the House of Commons; and that therefore such an action was a breach of privilege." In addition to the ordinary exercise of their jurisdiction, the commons relied upon an Act of the 7 Will. 3, c. 7, by which it had been declared that "the last determination of the House of Commons concerning the right of elections is to be pursued." On the other hand, it was objected that "there is a great difference between the right of the electors and the right of the elected: the one is a temporary right to a place in Parliament pro hâc vice; the other is a freehold or a franchise. Who has a right to sit in the House of Commons may be properly cognizable there; but who has a right to choose, is a matter originally established, even before there is a Parliament. A man has a right to his freehold by the common law, and the law having annexed his right of voting to his freehold, it is of the nature of his freehold, and must depend upon it. The same law that gives him his right must defend it for him, and any other power that will pretend to take away his right of voting may as well pretend to take away the freehold upon which it depends." These extracts from the report of a lords' committee, 27th March 1704, upon the conferences and other proceedings in the case of Ashby and White, give an epitome of the main arguments upon which each party in the contest relied.1 Encouraged by the decision of the House of Lords, five other burgesses of Aylesbury, now familiarly known as "the Aylesbury men," commenced actions against the constables of their borough, and were committed to Newgate by the House of Commons for a contempt of their jurisdiction. They endeavoured to obtain their discharge on writs of habeas corpus, but did not succeed. The commons declared their counsel, agents, and solicitors guilty of a breach of privilege, and committed them also. Reso See all the proceedings collected, in App. to 3d vol. of Hatsell's Precedents. The whole of this report, together with another of the 13th March, may be read with interest. Expulsion of members. lutions condemning these proceedings were passed by the The question which was agitated at that time has never since arisen. The commons have continued to exercise the sole right of determining whether electors have had the right to vote, while inquiring into the conflicting claims of candidates for seats in Parliament, and specific modes for trying the right of election by the house have been prescribed by statutes, and its determination declared to be "final and conclusive in all subsequent elections, and to all intents and purposes whatsoever."1 So complete is the jurisdiction of the commons in matters of election, that, although all writs are issued out of chancery, every vacancy after a general election is supplied by their authority. The speaker is empowered to issue warrants to the clerk of the crown to make out new writs; and when it has been determined that a return should be amended, the clerk of the crown is ordered to attend the house, and amend it accordingly. accordingly. During the sitting of the house, vacancies are supplied by warrants issued by the speaker, by order of the house; and during a recess, either by prorogation or adjournment, he is empowered to issue warrants, in certain cases, without an order.2 But, notwithstanding their extensive jurisdiction in regard to elections, the commons have no control over the eligibility of candidates, except in the administration of the laws which define their qualifications. John Wilkes was expelled, in 1764, for being the author of a seditious libel. In the next Parliament (3d February 1769) he was again expelled for another libel; a new writ was ordered for the county of Middlesex, which he represented, and he was re-elected without a contest; upon which it was resolved, on the 17th of February, "that, having been in this session 19 Geo. 4, c. 22, s. 54; 4 & 5 Vict. c. 58, s. 78. 224 Geo. 3, sess. 2, c. 26. of Parliament expelled this house, he was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present Parliament." The election was declared void, but Mr. Wilkes was again elected, and his election was once more declared void, and another writ issued. A new expedient was now tried: Mr. Luttrell, then a member, accepted the Chiltern Hundreds, and stood against Mr. Wilkes at the election; and, being defeated, petitioned the house against the return of his opponent. The house resolved that, although a majority of the electors had voted for Mr. Wilkes, Mr. Luttrell ought to have been returned, and they amended the return accordingly. Against this proceeding the electors of Middlesex presented a petition, without effect, as the house declared that Mr. Luttrell was duly elected. The whole of these proceedings were, at the time, severely condemned by public opinion, and on the 3d of May 1782, the resolution of the 17th of February 1769, was ordered to be expunged from the journals, as "subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom.” Expulsion and perpetual disability had been part of the many punishments inflicted upon the unfortunate Hall, in 1580, and on the 27th May 1641, Mr. Taylor, a member, had been expelled, and adjudged to be for ever incapable of being a member of the house;1 and during the Long Parliament incapacity for serving in the Parliament then assembled, was frequently part of the sentence of expulsion. But all these cases are only precedents of an excess of jurisdiction; for one House of Parliament cannot create a disability unknown to the law. On the 27th April 1641, Mr. Hollis, a member, was suspended the house during the session;2 a sentence of a more modified character, and one in which the rights of electors were no more infringed, than if the house had exercised its unquestionable power of imprisonment. 12 Com. J. 158. ' Ib. 128. See also other cases, 8 Com. J. 289; 9 Ib. 105; 10 Ib. 846. CHAPTER III. Privileges enjoyed by the law and custom of Parliament and by statute. Speaker's petition. GENERAL VIEW OF THE PRIVILEGES OF PARLIAMENT: POWER TWO HOUSES. BOTH houses of Parliament enjoy various privileges, in their collective capacity, as constituent parts of the High Court of Parliament; which are essential for the support of their authority, and for the proper exercise of the functions entrusted to them by the constitution. Other privileges, again, are enjoyed by individual members; which protect their persons and secure their independence and dignity. Some privileges rest solely upon the law and custom of Parliament, while others have been defined by statute. Upon these grounds alone, all privileges whatever are founded. The lords have ever enjoyed them, simply because "they have place and voice in Parliament;" but a practice has obtained with the commons, that would appear to submit their privileges to the royal favour. At the commencement of every Parliament since the 6th of Henry 8, it has been the custom for the speaker, "In the name, and on the behalf of the commons, to lay claim, by humble petition, to their ancient and undoubted2 rights and 1 Hakewel, 82. 2 See the memorable protestation of the commons, in answer to James 1, who took offence at the words used by the speaker in praying for their privileges as their antient and undoubted right and inheritance." 5 Par |