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hieve either; but when the former now disavows the latter, and, in his second speech, as printed, he is made to say, that Ireland is to pay pretty much what she does now; that is to say, not as the minister here said, a million less,, but above four times as much as she paid in any former war, and many times as much as she is able; and such an expence as the rebellion, not the war produced;-I say, when the minister sets forth such, as our contribution hereafter, he does renounce all benefits predicted in finance; with as much candour as he abandons all benefits predicted in commerce, to result from his fatal measure of Union. His second speech, in short, deserts the boast of beneficial terms, and confines itself to errors and misrepresentations of another kind, which are there to be found in very great abundance. He sets forth that the Irish constitution is the cause of our misfortunes; his friends have stated the same thing, and have said, that they cannot administer the country on her revenues, or under her constitution; and such an argument in him and in them, is modestly urged to banish the Parliament, and to retain the ministry. Never was it known in a country that retained a trace of liberty, that a minister of the crown was suffered to impeach the constitution of the realm; suppose he were to say,

"I cannot administer a monarchical constitution, therefore banish the King;" or, "I cannot administer an aristocratic constitution, therefore banish the House of Lords." What, in fact, does the minister say, who uses this argument, but that his system was a grievance, as was predicted by part of his colleagues, who said they took office, to reform it; that it was not fit for a free people; that it would produce a civil war; that the public sale of honours, that his notorious attempts to pack Parliament, that the violence of some of his agents in this country, that his selection of persons for Irish affairs, who were rather panders than politicians, would aid the growth of French principles, and produce insurgency. Let us, however, give the minister every advantage; let us receive his charge and try the constitution. He will please to shew by what act she produced the rebellion; the mere co-existence of a constitution and a rebellion does not cònvict the former; it will be necessary for the accuser to specify facts, and it will be necessary for him to shew, first, that these facts sprung out of Parliament; second, that these facts produced the rebellion; his friends have advanced two facts, the Reform of Parliament, and the Emancipation of the Catholics; but it will be recollected, that Parliament was not the author of either of these questions, and it will be recollected also, that in the report of the two Houses, formed by the friends of the mi

nister, it is declared, that neither of these questions were the cause of the rebellion - for there it is said, that neither of those questions were an object to the people; thus is the constitution acquitted; and acquitted by the very ministry who prefer the charge; they have confined their charge to two questions; and they have declared these questions did not interest the people; and these questions, it is known, did not spring from the Parlia

ment.

They have affected to try the constitution, let us now try them; and I ask whether their own measures might not have caused the rebellion? Whether the sale of peerages, as notoriously took place in 1789 and 1790, by the then ministers of the crown, for the purpose of procuring seats in the Commons, for the dependants of the Castle, might not have destroyed in Ireland, the credit of British government?

I ask, whether the attempt to pack the Irish Parliament, as was notoriously practised in 89 and 90, by the then minister of the crown in Ireland, might not have sunk the credit of British Government? I ask, whether the profligate avowal of that profligate practice, by a profligate minister of the crown, might not have sunk the credit of British Government? I ask not, whether the introduction of the question of Parliamentary Reform, could have sunk the credit of British Government; but I do ask, whether the introduction, and the apostacy from that question, might not have helped to sink the credit of British Government? I ask, whether the introduction of the Catholic Question in Great Britain in 92; whether the opposition given to the Catholic Franchise, by the Irish Government in 92; whether the assent given to the petition for that Franchise, by the English ministry in 93; whether the abuse and Billingsgate accompanying that assent, and uttered by the Irish ministry at that time; whether the adoption of the pretensions of the Catholics, by the English ministry, at the close of 94; whether the rejection of those pretensions, and the recal of a Lord Lieutenant, because with the ministry's knowledge and acquiescence he honoured those pretensions; whether the selection of persons for distinguished trust, who had distinguished themselves by a perpetual abuse of the Irish, and who were notoriously hostile, and who since have acknowledged their hostility by a conspiracy against the parliamentary constitution of their country; I ask, I say, whether such a conduct, so incoherent, so irritating, so violent, so temporising, so corrupt, might not have very much aided the efforts of France, in sinking the character of British Government? I ask those questions, and I do say, if ever the causes of the late rebellion shall be dispassionately

discussed, the great, originating, and fundamental cause, will be found in the aversion of His Majesty's ministry to the independency of the Irish Parliament, and their efforts to subvert the same.

We follow the minister. In defence of his plan of union, he tells us the number of Irish representatives in the British Parliament is of little consequence: this doctrine is new, viz. that between two nations the comparative influence is of no moment. According to this, it would be of no moment what should be the number of the British Parliament. No, says the minister, the alteration is to be limited to the Irish Parliament, the number and fabric of the British is to remain entire, unaltered and unalterable. What now becomes of the argument of mutual and reciprocal change? or what does the new argument avow, but what we maintained, and the court denied, that the union was, with respect to Ireland, a merger of her Parliament in the legislature of the other, without creating any material alteration therein, save as far as it advanced the influence of the Crown direct or indirect.

The minister goes on, and supposes 100 Irish will be sufficient, because he supposes any number would be sufficient; and he supposes any number would be sufficient, because the nations are identified. Thus he speaks, as if identification was, at once, a cause to flow from representation, and an event which preceded it. You are one people, such is his argument, because you are represented, and what signifies how, or, indeed, whether you be represented; but the fact is, that you are identified (if you be identified, which I deny) in the single point of representation, and that representation is absorbed in the superior numbers of the English Parliament, and that apparent identification is, of course, lost, while you remain a distinct country, distinct in interest, revenue, law, finance, commerce, government. Suppose Yorkshire governed by a Lord-Lieutenant, and by a different code of law, she would not be a part of England, but a province of Great Britain; but now the martial law of Scotland must be the martial law of England, and therefore, the constitutional sympathy of England defends and renders the number of her representatives less essential; but the martial law of Ireland is not the martial law of England; the military government of Ireland is not the military government of England, and therefore the constitutional sympathy of England does not defend Ireland; but, on the contrary, the imperial jealousy of England endangers Ireland, and has taught the councils of Britain to think that our servitude is our safety.

"It is matter of no moment what are the number of Irish representatives, provided that they be sufficient to state the

wants, and watch over the interest of their country;" so do the public prints make the minister speak; why! three men are sufficient for that purpose, one man could do it a gentleman seated at the bar could do it: the American agents did that before the American war, but the minister is made to add another provision, which makes his doctrine less answerable in point of meaning, leaving it without any meaning at all, "provided that the numbers be sufficient to protect the rights of the country:" but, indeed, when he afterwards explains what protection those rights are to receive, then he sets your mind at ease-protection against Jacobinism; that's the only point, and that could be accomplished without a single representative; without a parliament; an absolute monarch could do that; martial law will do that; James the second would have done it; but are there no popular rights? Is liberty gone out of the calendar? Order, government, they are indispensable, but are they the whole? This is new doctrine in these countries, very familiar to a minister, but very fatal to a free people. He confines the purposes of Irish representation to two objects; 1st. watching and stating, which only requires one representative; 2dly, protection against Jacobinism, which requires no representative whatever. He then proceeds to ask himself a question extremely natural after such reasoning; what security has Ireland? He answers, with great candour, honour. English honour. Now, when the liberty and security of one country depends on the honour of another, the latter may have much honour, but the former can have no liberty. To depend on the honour of another country, is to depend on the will; and to depend on the will of another country, is the definition of slavery. "Depend on my honour," said Charles the First, when he trifled about the petition of right: "I will trust the people with the custody of their own liberty, but I will trust no people with the custody of any liberty other than their own, whether that people be Rome, Athens, or Britain."

Observe how the minister speaks of that country which is to depend hereafter on British honour, which, in his present power is, in fact, his honour. "We had to contend with the leaders of the Protestants enemies to government; the violent and inflamed spirit of the Catholics; the disappointed ambition of those who would ruin the country because they could not be the rulers of it;" behold the character he gives of the enemies of the Union, viz. of twenty-one counties convened at public meetings by due notice; of several other counties that have petitioned; of most of the great cities and towns, or indeed of almost all the Irish, save a very few mis

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taken men, and that body whom government could influence; thus the minister utters a national proscription at the moment of his projected Union, he excludes by personal abuse from the possibility of identification, all the enemies of the Union, all the friends of the Parliamentary constitution of 1782, that great body of the Irish he abuses them with a petulence more befitting one of his Irish ministers, than an exalted character, and infinitely more disgraceful to himself than to them; one would think one of his Irish railers had lent him their vulgar clarion, to bray at the people.

This union of Parliaments, this proscription of people, he follows by a declaration, wherein he misrepresents their sentiments as he had before traduced their reputation; after a calm and mature consideration, the people have pronounced their judgment in favor of an Union, of which assertion not one single syllable has any existence in fact, or in the appearance of fact, and I appeal to the petitions of twenty-one counties, publicly convened, and to the other petitions of other counties numerously signed, and to those of the great towns and cities. To affirm that the judgment of a nation is erroneous may mortify, but to affirm that her judgment against is for; to assert that she has said aye when she has pronounced no-to affect to refer a great question to the people; finding the sense of the people, like that of the Parliament, against the question, to force the question; to affirm the sense of the people to be for the question; to affirm that the question is persisted in, because the sense of the people is for it; to make the falsification of her sentiments the foundation of her ruin, and the ground of the Union; to affirm that her Parliament, constitution, liberty, honour, property, are taken away by her own authority, there is, in such artifice, an effrontery, a hardihood, an insensibility, that can best be answered by sensations of astonishment and disgust, excited on this occasion by the British minister, whether he speaks in gross and total ignorance of the truth, or in shameless and supreme contempt for it.

The constitution may be for a time so lost; the character of the country cannot be so lost, the ministers of the crown will, or may, perhaps, at length find that it is not so easy to put down for ever, an ancient and a respectable nation by abilities, however great, and by power and by corruption, however irresistible; liberty may repair her golden beams, and with redoubled heart animate the country; the cry of loyalty will not long continue against the principles of liberty; loyalty is a noble, a judicious, and a capacious principle; but in these countries loyalty, distinct from liberty, is corruption, not loyalty.