like other human fabrics, are subject to the general and ordinary dispensations of Providence." * But a pagan philosophy got as far as that. It would be sheer atheism to withhold so timid and scanty a concession. It would be safe to go further and affirm with Grotius that the omniscient Governor exercises not merely a general, but also a special individual and particular providence over the dominions, royalties, and empires of the world. "He putteth down one and setteth up another." Every human imperium has distributively His personal presence and supervision. "His kingdom ruleth over all." And whether the fact is or is not permitted to have its due effect upon the decisions of the so-called sovereign potentates-it notwithstanding remains solemnly and premonitively true that every such potentate stands in personal, special, and individual responsibility to that august and sacred Being who is by incommunicable and everlasting pre-eminence "THE KING OF KINGS AND LORD OF LORDS."

"There is no power," writes St. Paul, "but of God" -which is correctly taken by De Wette as an universal affirmation of the divine origin, (göttlichen ursprungs) of state authority, to be understood however, as much of the idea of such authority per se as of its historical and actual

* Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. ii. 435.

"Sunt philosophi," writes Cicero, "et fuerunt, qui ÓMNINO NULLAM HABERE CENSERENT RERUM HUMANARUM PROCURATIONEM DEOS. Quorum si vera est sententia, quæ potest esse pietas? Quæ religio? Quæ sanctitas ?-De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. §2.

evolution during the course of the divine providence. * Here we have stated the true moral derivation of all magistracy-considered purely as a question of civil theology. The historical investigation as to the origin of political society is valueless to the topics herein debated. Whatever the historical facts may be, it still remains a moral fact that all rulers whatsoever are, to cite again the language of St Paul," the ministers diakovoi of God."

This is the doctrine of the Civil Diaconate. Its duties are delegated. It is a divine and sacred ministry-Its existence and its authority are derived from God. And its derivation is moral and immediate.

It does not arise out of any compacts or combinations effected between man and man. It is not "an ignoble and dastardly brat of fear" + as Hobbes would have it. It is not a human convention-not a creature of the "contrat social" of Rousseau-nor of the mutual compact of Locke. Neither is it a mere creation of "utility," as has been asserted by Paley, Bentham, and others. No compacts or quasi-compacts between man and man-no possible combination of events in the gradual evolution of humar history could create or confer powers which pertain to the prero

* οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κτλ.] "Denn es ist (an sich) keine Obrigkeit als von Gott her,Göttlichen ursprungs; allgemeiner Satz, der sich eben sowohl von der Idee der Obrigkeit an sich als von ihrer durch göttliche Fügung, geschehenen factischen Einsetzung verstehen lässt."-Erklarung d. Briefe an die Römer cap. xiii. 1-7.

+ R. Cudworth, Intell. Syst. vol. iii., ch. v., § 5, p. 497.

gative of the Almighty. And yet powers of such a kind, are, and must necessarily be exercised, universally, by all political sovereignties.

Whenever and wherever, and however civil power has actually been acquired, the right to exercise such power, its authorization, is not less really derived from God. Whether the power has been that of a Nero, or an Alfred the Great-whether intolerant, or beneficent, notwithstanding all it has been "ordained of God." *

Indeed it is true that the connection between the general doctrine that God is the supreme governor of the universe, and the particular doctrine that he is the governor of kings, is the same in kind as that between the whole and its parts. The things are in logic and in fact alike inseparable. The truth cannot be obviated. As Daniel the Prophet, himself a statesman of the highest order, has declared, "The Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will.”

All civil authority, therefore, is in an especial manner, derived from God.

And this appears yet further from the very nature of political duties. This is the true foundation of the "jus

ὑπὸ Θεοῦ

* De Wette is again discriminating and clear. KTλ.] "Sind von Gott verordnet bestimmte Behauptung des factischen göttlichen Rechtes. Auf die Streitfrage, ob auch eine revolutionäre Regierung, ein usurpator das Göttliche Recht für sich habe, nimmt der Ap. nicht Rücksicht; und in jedem Falle würde er Unterwerfung auch unter eine solche Gewalt fordern."-Erklarung des Briefe an die Römer von De Wette, p. 173., Leipzig, 1840.

C

"the power

vitæ ac necis"-as the lawyer terms it, or of life and death." It is vain to ground the right upon public utility. For "utility" includes no moral element. Its province is that of advantages and disadvantages-pleasures and pains-profit and loss. The utmost measure of utility cannot make acts obligatory. It is murder to take away human life, whatever the pretext, how much soever the public good might seem to require it, where the authority for such act has not been patented, as it were, by the decree of the omnipotent creator. But such a sanction—such a patent has been issued, in the case of bodies-politic; under given circumstances they have this solemn prerogative; and they exercise it solely in virtue of the special powers derived to them from God in their vicariate capacity.

But the legislative power of human governments is equally a fact of special divine derivation. No compacts, -no stress of circumstances,-no principle of political expediency, ever called such a "right" into existence. On the contrary, it is a maxim universally applicable, that the will of God is the source of all law. Law-making is a divine prerogative. Man cannot make a law except vicariously. Even were the social contract a fact, there could not arise out of it any legislative authority. Rules might be created, but they would lack the essential element of law; for there is no law where there is no obligation to obedience.* And in order that rules or principles of conduct should become obligatory, they must become a part

* "Obligatio dicitur vinculum juris."

of duty; but duty implies a pre-existent law. Hence the obligation pertains not to the human convention, but to the implied pre-existent divine enactment. The obligatory character of human enactments is due solely to the transfer to civil governments of the legislative faculty; they are invested, within limits, with divine powers. ments are laws in virtue of this vicariat. place of God in all matters political. this political deity it pertains to enact, to judge,—to acquit, or to condemn.

Their enact

They are in

And hence to

But again, the sanctity of an oath has never ceased to be held necessary to the safety of both public and private interests. It is in fact, indispensable to the validity of every form of judicature. And why? Because it is what it is an oath! In the words of St. Paul " an oath for confirmation is an end of all strife." It is the last resort against deception and falsehood, and that for the reason that higher sanctions than those of human law are solemnly called into operation. "Men swear by the

greater." God is adjured. The sanctions of religion are invoked. "Whatever be the form of an oath," writes Paley, “the signification is the same: it is the calling upon God to witness, i.e. to take notice of what we say," and it is "invoking his vengeance or renouncing his favour if what we say be false, or what we promise be not performed."*

* Moral and Political Philosophy, book III. chap. iii, § 16.The definition of Cicero is-"Sed in jurejurando, non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi. Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa. Quod autem affirmate, quasi Deo teste, promiseris, id tenendum est." De Off., lib. III, c. xxxiii. Pufendorf follows