Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of EthicsLongmans, Green, 1879 - 438 sayfa |
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Sık kullanılan terimler ve kelime öbekleri
absolutely according action apodictic attain autonomy belongs called categorical imperative causality cause command conceived conception condition conformity connexion consciousness consequently contradiction contrary critique determining principle disposition duty effect empirical empiricism evil existence experience faculty of desire feeling of pleasure former freedom give happiness hence heteronomy human nature hypothetical imperatives idea inclination intelligible intuition judgment Kant Kant's kingdom of ends knowledge lative latter law of nature maxim means merely metaphysic of morals moral law moral worth motive namely necessarily necessary necessity never notion noumena noumenon objective law objective reality ourselves perfection person philosophy physical possible postulate practical law practical principle precept principle of morality priori propensity pure practical reason pure reason purpose rational recognised regard requires respect satisfaction self-love sensible world speculative reason spring summum bonum supersensible supposed synthetic proposition theoretical thing tical tion unconditional understanding universal law virtue world of sense
Popüler pasajlar
Sayfa xviii - Ten thousand thousand precious gifts My daily thanks employ ; Nor is the least a cheerful heart, That tastes those gifts with joy.
Sayfa xlvii - Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do unto them ; for this is the law and the prophets.
Sayfa 5 - NOTHING can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.
Sayfa 15 - For love, as an affection, cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty's sake ; even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination, nay, are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion. This is practical love, and not pathological, a love which is seated in the will, and not in the propensions of sense, in principles of action and not of tender sympathy; and it is this love alone which can be commanded.
Sayfa 18 - I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.
Sayfa 15 - That an action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object 'of desire.
Sayfa 59 - A rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when, although giving universal laws in it, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign when, while giving laws, he is not subject to the will of any other. A rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom of will.
Sayfa 13 - Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist was clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose...
Sayfa 351 - Incertaeque rei, Phalaris licet imperet, ut sis - Falsus, et admoto dictet periuria tauro, Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori Et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.
Sayfa 49 - I say: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end.