tainty of ruin, then existence is to him no blessing, but a curse; nor has the Creator dealt honorably or benevolently by him."-Pp. 36, 37.

Yet God, he holds-on the supposition that this life is man's first existence-has brought him into being in this condition of "radical derangement or corruption, resulting in a powerful tendency or propensity to sin," that is "certain to issue in ruin;" and that God, therefore, has not dealt "rightfully and honorably" by him, and consequently that man is "not responsible for the sin" which he exerts, but God. On the supposition that this is man's first existence, he asserts that-

"The actual facts of this world and of revelation are such that they logically lead us to the result that the present system is indefensible, and that God does not deserve the honor, reverence, and worship of his creatures."-P. 217.

This is truly an awful accusation of God; for as Dr. B.'s theory of pre-existence is demonstrably not true, and if it were, could not exempt the divine administration in the slightest degree from the objection which he urges against it, it follows, if his views are correct respecting the dictates of justice and the condition of man's nature, that man is not culpably an offender against God's law, but that God himself is alone blamable for his sin, and consequently that the whole government of the Most High is infinitely unjust; and thence that the work of redemption is no such work of grace as it is represented in the word of God; that it cannot, therefore, unless by the grossest delusion, be accepted as such; and if accepted, cannot be relied on. For if the imputation to men of sin, and their condemnation on account of it, is altogether false, who can tell but that the promise of deliverance from its penalty may prove to be an equal deception and mockery?

What the element is in the present condition of the human mind resulting from its fall, that on the supposition that this is its first existence, exempts it in such a manner from responsibility for its sins, Dr. B. does not clearly define. Much which he says implies that he regards it as that state generally which is expressed in the orthodox confessions in

the doctrine of the fall and of depravity. If it is that condition, however, it is absurd to imagine that it does not form as complete an exculpation of men, on the supposition that they fell here, as it would had their fall taken place in a preexistent state. For if it exempts men from the obligation to obey, or from the guilt of sin, it must be because of what it is; that is, because it involves or constitutes a physical disability which releases from obligation, precisely as the loss of a limb or a faculty releases from the obligation to exercise it. But if the very possibility of obedience, so far as the faculties of the mind are concerned, and thence the basis of obligation, are in that manner swept away, the mind is manifestly as completely released by it from all responsibility for its sins, if it is the result of a fall in this life, as it would be if it were the consequence of a fall in a pre-existent one. To assert that it is not, is to assert that what is held to be an absolute disqualification for the responsibilities of a moral agent, is in fact not a disqualification for them. If the present state of the mind induced by its fall, can in any circumstances exempt it from responsibility for its sins, and transfer the blame of them wholly to God, why does it not work that effect as naturally and necessarily, if it was induced by a fall in this life, as it could were it the result of a fall in a previous existence? If the loss of one's eyes, by destroying the possibility, extinguishes the obligation to see, what can be more contradictious and absurd, than to maintain that their extinction at this present time does not as effectually annihilate the obligation, as it would had it taken place at any previous period? In maintaining this view of the present state of the mind, Dr. B., accordingly, completely precludes himself from the result which he attempts to gain. by his theory of pre-existence; for if that state releases men from responsibility for their sins, it releases them as effectually, if it was produced by a fall in a previous life, as it could if it were the work of a fall in this.

From some of the most important positions, however, which Dr. B. advances, respecting the nature of man, "the limitation of divine power," and the gradual steps by which the most wise, benevolent, and energetic administration God can exercise, must rise to efficiency over him, his views of man, both in his fallen and unfallen state, differ, we take it, very

essentially from those of the orthodox generally; and render it quite mistaken to regard his profession of the latter as corroborating their truth, or yielding them any authority. Instead of regarding a tendency to sin as having had its origin, as the orthodox doctrine affirms, in the fall, he holds that it is an original and necessary element of the mind anterior to its fall; and of such strength, and lying in such a measure beyond the sphere of the divine influence, as to make it impossible to God, with all the resources of his power and wisdom, to counteract it, and preserve the mind from apostasy. Thus he maintains

"That there is a temporary limitation of divine power, originating from the limitation of finite capacities to comprehend God and his ways, and a consequent liability in the first generations of creatures, to unbelief, distrust, and sin, involving a season of suffering in God, and requiring a full unfolding of truth in act, until God and his system shall be fully disclosed, and the occasion of unbelief cease,” p. 475. "A temporary limitation of divine power in the earlier stages of creation, in consequence of the liability of finite minds to unbelief and distrust of God, when exposed to the trials which inevitably pertain to an infinite system, and which are necessary to their own development and perfection," p. 509.

"The position that God's power of disclosing himself, and his system, and plans, to his creatures in their earliest generations is limited, does not diminish, but increases our ideas of the greatness of God; for his greatness is the cause of the limitation in question. It is merely the inability of an infinite mind to bring itself and its plans. down to the level of a finite mind. Does it exalt our ideas of God, and show the infinite difference between him and a creature, to assert that he can put himself and all his plans fully into the mind of that creature? Or does it, on the other hand, most exalt God to say that he is so vast that no created mind can fully comprehend him or his plans, and that it is beyond even his power to destroy the infinite chasm that separates creator and creature? But simple and obvious as is this idea of the vastness of God and his system, and this consequent limitation of finite minds, and obvious and satisfactory as is the solution of the origin of evil which it furnishes, still it has been much overlooked. The causes which have blinded so many to it are, the inconsiderate ascription to God of the unproved ability to do all things in a moral system by naked power, without moral and intellectual motives; want of proper reflection on the disproportion between him and created minds, and on what is essential in order to

act with him in a universal system, and on the discipline needed to fit created minds for it, and on the trial involved in such discipline; on the ease with which a being so vast, in the execution of his plans which are infinite and for eternity, may be misunderstood, and on the immediate and fatal effects of a loss of confidence in God. It has not been sufficiently considered, that if the very greatness of God, and the necessary limitation of all, even the highest created minds, render it impossible for him to disclose fully either himself or his plans to them, then that he must try them by acting in view of what he sees, not of what they see; that is, he must act in view of considerations unseen and unknown to created minds. He dwells in light to which no created mind can approach, and no eye has seen, or ever will see, but in an infinitely small degree, all that is involved in the full knowledge of God. But when once these things are well considered, they disclose a satisfactory reason for the origin of evil, and one not dishonorable to God; for to annihilate the infinite distance between himself and a creature is not in his power. He must act according to his own greatness, and yet under the limitations created by an utter impossibility of transmitting into a finite mind a full knowledge of all that exists in an infinite one. Hence, if he will act with finite minds, on an infinite plan, he must act, at least in the earlier generations, with a necessary liability of being misunderstood; and if his ways are trying, of losing the confidence of those with whom he acts."-Pp. 476, 477. .

It is apparent thus, if this representation is true, that the tendency to sin, so far from having had its origin in the fall, results of necessity from the very nature of new created agents, and has a predominating power in the earliest stages of a moral system. That this tendency is supposed to spring from an incapacity to comprehend all the thoughts and purposes of God, does not alter its character or intercept it from accomplishing the ruin of those in whom it exists. It is as insuperable by the power of God, and as certainly works the destruction of its subjects, as though it were the consequence of an eager appetence, or of a violent temptation from without. His notion, thus, is, that new created beings fell for precisely the same reason as he holds that they now sin after they have fallen; namely, because of a liability and tendency to unbelief, distrust, and aversion, excited by the nature of the trials to which they are necessarily subjected in order to secure the ends of the divine government. This

idea of man's independence of God, or intractableness under the most powerful influence he is able to exert, and invinci ble tendency to sin by the force of his constitution while unfallen, is thus altogether at war with the doctrine of the orthodox which Dr. B. professes to entertain, and with the teachings of the Scriptures.

Another element of the theory on which he proceeds of equal importance, is the doctrine that God is bound in justice and goodness to exempt his creatures, both fallen and unfallen, as far as possible, from every instance and measure of temptation; and employ all the means in his power to preserve them from sin. He says:

"Not only do the demands of honor and right forbid the Creator thus to injure his creature in his original constitution, but they equally forbid him to place him in circumstances needlessly unfavorable to right conduct, and a proper development of his powers.

"What benevolent being, dealing with new created minds committed to his care, would not feel bound to place them under a system of influences most favorably arranged for their highest good, and where all needless trials and temptations to sin and ruin would be avoided? Could any man defend himself on any principles of benevolence, honor, or right, if he did not act on this principle? And when the great Creator is deciding on the circumstances of the new created immortal minds called into being by his power, is it benevolent, honorable, or right for him to act on any other principle?

"If now, in opposition to these views, any allege that God, for his own happiness or glory, or that of his creatures, may act on other principles, it is enough to say, as before, that it is not supposable that a perfect being could be made happy or glorious by acting on any other principles. The only grounds on which God or any of his holy creatures can be happy or glorious, as honorable and benevolent minds, in view of the ruin of any others, are those already stated. It must appear that God did not wrong them in their original constitution, but gave them a constitution honorably manifesting his sincere good will towards them as individuals, and tending towards eternal life. It must also appear that he did not wrong them in their situation and circumstances, but so placed them that all things were, on the whole, as favorably arranged for all as possible."-Pp. 37, 38.

He thus holds that God is bound by honor and benevo