Fragments Upon the Balance of Power in EuropeM. Peltier, 1806 - 335 sayfa |
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absolute advantages arbitrary Austria authority balance of power Buonaparte called character circumstances Cisalpine republic common conduct consequence considered Corfu court danger declared dominion emperor empire England Europe evil execution existence fate favour federal foreign forms French cabinet French empire French government French troops future Genoa Genoese Germany ground Helvetic hope immediate indemnity independence influence interest Italian Italy king laws liberty maxims means measures ment military minister monarchy Moniteur motives Naples national right negotiation neighbouring never object oppression Parma partition of Poland party peace of Luneville Piedmont Poland political possession present pretensions princes principality of Piombino principles provinces Reding relations remain republic resistance respecting revolution ruin ruler of France Russia scarcely silence sion situation sovereign Spain spirit subjection Swiss Switzerland tained Talleyrand territory thing tion treaty of Luneville treaty of peace true Tuscany Valais vernment violence whole wish
Popüler pasajlar
Sayfa 55 - Law of Nations, b. 3, c. 3, § 47. " What is usually termed a balance of power," says Gentz, " is that constitution subsisting among neighbouring states, more or less connected with one another, by virtue of which no one among them can injure the independence or essential rights of another without meeting with effectual resistance on some side, and, consequently, exposing itself to danger.
Sayfa 58 - The proper character of a union of States, such as has existed in modern Europe and the triumph of its constitution, is that a certain number of States, possessing various degrees of power and wealth, shall remain untroubled within their own confines, under the protection of a common league.
Sayfa 62 - That if that system is not merely to exist, but to be maintained without constant perils and violent concussions; each member which infringes it must be in a condition to be coerced, not only by the collective strength of the other members, but by any majority of them, if not by one individual...
Sayfa 63 - perhaps would have been with more propriety called a system of counterpoise, for perhaps the highest of its results is not so much a perfect equipoise as a constant alternate vacillation...
Sayfa 61 - and be maintained by common exertions no one of its members must ever become so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest together.' So it is by reducing the incidence of conflict and mitigating its destructive impact through a balance of power, checking and restraining the overweening ambitions of the powerful, that the realist has traditionally hoped to reconcile the centrality of the sovereignty of its members with...
Sayfa 62 - European state attempted by unlawful enter[38 prises to attain to a degree of power, (or had in fact attained it,) which enabled it to defy the danger of a union of several of its neighbours, or even an alliance of the whole, such a state should be treated as a common enemy; and...
Sayfa 58 - True equality, and the other equality attainable by legitimate means, consists, in both cases, in this, that the smallest as well as the greatest is secured in the possession of his right, and that it can neither be forced from him nor encroached upon by lawless...
Sayfa xix - I have put down the inhabitants like a valiant man: and my hand hath found as a nest the riches of the people; and as one gathereth eggs that are left, have I gathered all the earth; and there was none that moved the wing, or opened the mouth, or peeped.
Sayfa 111 - The state which is not prevented by any external consideration from oppressing a weaker, is always, however weak it may be, too strong for the interest of the whole...
Sayfa 63 - ... if, on the other hand, it had acquired that degree of force by an accidental concurrence of circumstances, and without any acts of violence, whenever it appeared upon the public theatre, no means which political wisdom could devise for the purpose of diminishing its power, should be neglected or untried.