what middle? Not in the Pythagorean middle of the Universe, which is not the Earth, but the Central Fire. The throne of 'Aváyn is certainly placed by Plato either on or within the Earth, which is in the middle of his Universe. Mr. Adam, with, I venture to think, too much regard for ȧxpißoλoyía, maintains that it is within, not on the surface of, the Earth. "If the light is 'straight like a pillar," he writes (note on 616 B, 13), "and stretches through all the Heaven and the Earth,' it follows that as the Earth is in the middle of the Universe, the 'middle of the light' will be at the centre of the Earth. No other interpretation of κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς is either natural or easy. It would seem, therefore, that at the end of the fourth day after leaving the Meadow the Souls are at the central point both of the Universe and of the Earth, as is maintained by, among others, Schneider and Donaldson; and this view is also in harmony with some of the most important features of the remaining part of the narrative."

My view is that the throne of Necessity is on the surface of the Earth, at that spot where the pillar of light-the axis on which the Cosmos revolves-was seen, by the Pilgrim Souls as they approached, to touch the ground,-seen, with the accompanying knowledge (so characteristic of dream-experience) that it goes through the Earth and comes out at the antipodal spot. I do not think that we ought to press the phrase kaтà μéσov тò pŵs, as Mr. Adam does. Apart from the fact that the Pythagorean or Parmenidean central 'Aváyŋ was not in the centre of the Earth, the whole scenery of the Myth and its general fidelity to mythological tradition seem to me to be against putting Plato's throne of Necessity, as Mr. Adam does, in the centre of the Earth. The Myth begins by telling us that the Souls came, some of them out of the Earth, some of them down from "Heaven," to the Meadow. The Meadow is certainly on the surface of the Earth. Their journey thence to the throne of Necessity is evidently on the surface of the Earth, they have the sky above them; they see the pillar of light in the sky before them for a whole day, the fourth day of their march, as they approach it. There is no suggestion of their going down on that day into Tartarus in order to reach the "middle of the light" at the centre of the Earth. Those of them who came out of Tartarus are still out of it, and are

not going back into it. And those who came out of the region described as oupavós, "Heaven," are still out of that region. Hence, if I am right in identifying the oupavós of the Rep. with the "True Surface of the Earth" of the Phaedo Myth, Mr. Adam cannot be right when he says, 616 B, 11 (cf. 614 c, n.), that "Plato in all probability thinks of the Xeμov as somewhere on the True Surface of the Earth described by him in the Myth in the Phaedo, and it is apparently along this surface that the Souls progress until they come in view of the light." The True Surface of the Earth and Tartarus, according to my view, were both equally left when the Xeμóv was reached. The Souls are now journeying along the "Third Way," which leads, under the open sky, by the throne of Necessity, and then by the River of Lethe, eis yéveow. The River of Lethe does not appear in the list of the subterranean or infernal rivers given in the Phaedo;1 the mythological tradition (observed even by Dante, as we have seen) places it under the open sky-probably the sky of the under-worldthe antipodal hemisphere of the Earth. And the φέρεσθαι ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ἄττοντας ὥσπερ ἀστέρας (621 B), from which Mr. Adam (citing Aen. vi. 748 ff.) infers "that the Souls, just before their re-incarnation, are underground," seems to me, on the contrary, entirely in accordance with the view that, encamped near the River of Lethe, they are on the surface of the Earth, under the open sky, up into which they shoot in various directions like meteors, surely an inappropriate picture if they were down in a cavern somewhere at the centre of the Earth.

The whole movement, in short, of the Myth of Er, from the meeting of the two companies of Souls at the Meadow onwards, is above ground, under the open sky. From afar they see a pillar of light reaching down through the sky to

1 Olympiodorus, Schol. in Phaedonem, connects the list of infernal rivers with Orphic tradition—οί παραδιδόμενοι τέσσαρες ποταμοὶ κατὰ τὴν ̓Ορφέως παράδοσιν τοῖς ὑπογείοις ἀναλογοῦσι δ' στοιχείοις τε καὶ κέντροις κατὰ δύο ἀντιθέσεις. μὲν γὰρ Πυριφλεγέθων τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀνατολῇ, ὁ δὲ Κωκυτὸς τῇ γῇ καὶ τῇ δύσει, ὁ δὲ ̓Αχέρων ἀέρι τε καὶ μεσημβρία. τούτους μὲν Ορφεὺς οὕτω διέταξεν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν Ὠκεανὸν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τῇ ἄρκτῳ προσοικειοῖ. Here the River of Lethe does not appear.

Roscher (art. "Lethe") gives the following mentions of Lethe: Simonides, Epig. 184 (Bergk)-this is the first mention, but the authorship is doubtful; Aristoph. Ranae, 186; Plato, Rep. 621; Plutarch, Cons. ad Apoll. ch. 15, in quotation from a dramatic writer; Virg. Aen. vi. 705, 715; Lucian, de luctu, §§ 2-9; Mort. Dial. 13. 6, 23. 2; Ovid, Ep. ex Pont. 2, 4, 23.

the Earth; and, because Plato, the Dreamer of the Myth, recognises this pillar as the axis of the Cosmos-the cause of its necessary revolutions-lo! when the Souls are come to the foot of the pillar, it is no longer a pillar reaching down through the sky that they see, but Necessity herself sitting on Earth, on her throne, with a model of the Cosmos revolving in

her lap.

There is another point on which I feel obliged to differ from Mr. Adam. "It is clear," he says (note on Rep. 616 c), "that the light not only passes through the centre of the Universe, but also, since it holds the heavens together like the undergirders of men-of-war, round the outer surface of the heavenly sphere"-i.e. the ends of the light which passes round the outer surface are brought inside the sphere, and, being joined in the middle, form the pillar. This seems to me to make too much of the man-of-war, or trireme. It is enough to take Plato to say that the pillar (which alone is mentioned) holds the Universe together in its particular way, as the vжоóμaтa, in their particular way, hold the trireme together. And if there is a light passed round the outer surface of the Heaven, as well as one forming its axis, why do the Pilgrim Souls see only the latter? The Heavens are diaphanous. The Pilgrims ought, if Mr. Adam's view is correct, to see not only the pillar of light rising vertically from the horizon at a certain fixed point towards which they journey, but also another band of light that which surrounds the outside of the Universetravelling round with the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars from East to West.

IV

I shall now conclude what I have to say about the Myth of Er with a few words on the great philosophical question raised in it. I mean the question of How to reconcile Free Will with the Reign of Law. Both are affirmed in the Myth. The Pilgrim Souls are conducted to a spot at which they see, with their own eyes, the working of the Universal Law-they stand beside the axis on which the Cosmos revolves, and see clearly that the revolutions "cannot be otherwise." They see that the axis of the Cosmos is the spindle of 'Aváyên :—and,

behold! there sits 'Aváyin herself on her throne, and there are the three Fates, with solemn ritual, ordering the succession of events in time according to the law of 'Aváyη. Yet, within the very precincts of the court of 'Aváyn in which they stand, the Pilgrim Souls hear the Prophet telling them in the words of Lachesis, that "they are free to choose, and will be held responsible for their choice." Plato here presents the Idea of Freedom mythically under the form of a prenatal act of choice the choice, it is to be carefully noted, not of particular things, but of a Whole Life-the prenatal "choice" of that whole complex of circumstances in which particular things are chosen in this earthly life. Each Soul, according to its nature, clothes itself in certain circumstances comes into, and goes through, this earthly life in circumstances which it has itself chosen-that is, in circumstances which are to be regarded not as forcing it, or dominating it mechanically from without, but as being the environment in which it exhibits its freedom or natural character as a living creature.1 Among the circumstances of a Life "chosen," a fixed character of the Soul itself, we are told, is not included-yuxôs dè Táşiv ovк éveîvai (Rep. 618 B),-because the Soul is modified by the Life which it chooses. This means that the Soul, choosing the circumstances, or Life, chooses, or makes itself responsible for, its own character, as afterwards modified, and necessarily modified, by the circumstances, or Life. In other words, a man is responsible here on Earth for actions proceeding from a connate character which is modified here in accordance with the circumstances of a general scheme of life made unalterable by Necessity and the Fates before he was born-αἱρείσθω βίον ᾧ σύνεσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης (Rep. 617 E).

In presenting Moral Freedom under the Reign of Natural Law mythically, as Prenatal Choice made irrevocable by 'Aváykn, Plato lays stress, as he does elsewhere, on the unbroken continuity of the responsible Self evolving its character in a series of life-changes. It is the choice made before the throne of 'Aváykn which dominates the behaviour

1 It was chiefly in order to express this relation between living creature and environment that Leibniz formulated his theory of Pre-established Harmony. We may say of Leibniz's theory what he says himself of Plato's doctrine of áváμvnois-that it is "myth"-"toute fabuleuse" (Nouveaux Essais, Avantpropos, p. 196 b, ed. Erdmann).

of the Soul in the bodily life on which it is about to enter; but the choice made before the throne of 'Aváykn depended itself on a disposition formed in a previous life; the man who chooses the life of a tyrant, and rues his choice as soon as he has made it, but too late, had been virtuous in a previous life, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας — his virtue had been merely "customary," without foundation upon consciously realised principle (Rep. 619 c). Plato thus makes Freedom reside in esse, not in operari. To be free is to be a continuously existing, self-affirming, environment-choosing personality, manifesting itself in actions which proceed, according to necessary law, from itself as placed once for all in the environment which it has chosen-its own natural environment the environment which is the counterpart of its own character. It is vain to look for freedom of the will in some power of the personality whereby it may interfere with the necessary law according to which character, as modified up to date, manifests itself in certain actions. Such a power, such

"

a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, would be inconsistent with the continuity, and therefore with the freedom and responsibility, of the Self. It is, in other words, the freedom of the 'noumenal,” as distinguished from the "phenomenal" Self, which Plato presents as the "prenatal choice of a Life"mythically; which is, indeed, the only way in which such a transcendental idea can be legitimately presented. aipeio0w βίον ᾧ σύνεσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἡ δ ̓ ἀρετὴ ἀδέσποτον. A certain Life, with all its fortunes and all its influences on character, when once chosen, is chosen irrevocably. But, none the less, it is a life of freedom, for " Virtue is her own mistress." In being conscious of Virtue-that is, of Self as

1 For the distinction, see Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena, ii. § 117; Die Welt als Wille u. Vorstellung, vol. ii. pp. 364, 365; and Die Grundlage der Moral, § 10. In the last of these passages Schopenhauer (explaining the distinction between the "intelligible" and the "empirical" character, the latter of which is related to the former as operari is to esse-operari sequitur esse) quotes Porphyry (in Stobaeus, Ecl. 8. §§ 37-40): τὸ γὰρ ὅλον βούλημα τοιοῦτ ̓ ἔοικεν εἶναι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔχειν μὲν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τὰς ψυχὰς πρὶν εἰς σώματα καὶ βίους διαφόρους ἐμπεσεῖν, εἰς τὸ ἢ τοῦτον τὸν βίον ἑλέσθαι ἢ ἄλλον.

* Hobbes' "Sovereign, once chosen, ever afterwards irremovable," is a "foundation-myth"; the social order which constrains individuals to conformity is accounted for "mythically" by a prehistoric act of choice exercised by individuals. They willed themselves into the social order, and may not will themselves out of it. A "categorical imperative" is laid upon them to act as social beings.