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other thing, as in a living creature, or in earth, or in heaven, or in any other thing; but he shall see It as That which Is in Itself, with Itself, of one Form, Eternal; and all the other beautiful things he shall see as partaking of It after such manner that, while they come into being and perish, It becometh not a whit greater or less, nor suffereth any change at all. 'Tis when a man ascendeth from these beautiful things by the Right Way of Love, and beginneth to have sight of that Eternal Beauty,-'tis then, methinks, that he toucheth the goal. For this is the right Way to go into the Mysteries of Eros, or to be led by another-beginning from the beautiful things here, to mount up alway unto that Eternal Beauty, using these things as the steps of a ladder-ascending from one to two, and from two to all, Beautiful Bodies, and from Beautiful Bodies to Beautiful Customs, and from Beautiful Customs to Beautiful Doctrines, and from these till at last, being come unto that which is the Doctrine of the Eternal Beauty and of naught else beside, he apprehendeth what Beauty Itself is. Tis then, dear Socrates, said the Woman of Mantinea, that life is worth living, and then only, when a man cometh to behold Beauty Itself; the which if thou hast once seen, thou wilt hold wealth, and fine raiment, and fair companions, as naught in comparison with it -yea, those fair companions whom thou now lookest upon with amazement, and art ready—thou and many others of thy like to pass your lives with them, gazing upon them, and, if it were possible, neither eating nor drinking, but only beholding them and being with them alway. What thinkest thou, then, she said, if a man could see Beauty Itself, clear, pure, separate, not gross with human flesh, and tainted with colours, and decked out with perishing gauds-what thinkest thou, if he could behold Beauty Itself, divine, uniform? Thinkest thou, she said, that it would be a paltry life for a man to live, looking unto that, beholding it with the faculty meet therefor, and being with it alway? Understandest thou not that thus only shall he be able, seeing with that whereby Beauty is seen, to bring forth, not Images of Virtue-for 'tis no Image that he layeth hold of,-but Things True-for he layeth hold of That which is True; and when he hath brought forth True Virtue and nurtured her, understandest thou not that then he hath become above all men beloved of God, and himself immortal!

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OBSERVATIONS ON THE DISCOURSE OF DIOTIMA

I

The Myth in which Diotima sets forth the parentage and nature of Eros differs in style from the Myth of the Round People told by Aristophanes, as widely as it is possible for one composition to differ from another. If the Myth of the Round People is so barbarously grotesque that one has difficulty in recognising it as a Platonic Myth, Diotima's Myth is equally hard to bring under that designation, on account of the prevalence of philosophical allegory in its style. It is, indeed, in its first part simply a philosophical allegory1 setting forth pictorially an analysis of Love into elements which are seen to be identical with those given by an analysis of Philosophy. Ἔρως is neither Πόρος nor Πενία, but the child of these two; φιλοσοφία is neither ἀμαθία nor σοφία, but the outcome of both. This point, however, once reached by the way of allegory thinly disguising the results of previous analysis, Diotima's Discourse henceforward assumes the character of true Myth, if not in its matter-for no further narrative is added-yet certainly in its essential form: it becomes an imaginative development of the notion of φιλοσοφία: φιλοσοφία is set forth as the Desire of Immortality. Philosophy is not merely a System of Knowledge, but a Life, nay, the Life Eternal-the true Life of the immortal Soul.2 Diotima's Discourse thus ends in the character of a true Myth, setting forth in impassioned imaginative language the Transcendental Idea of the Soul. It is out of the mood which expresses itself in, and is encouraged by, such impassioned imaginative language that prophetic visions arise, and great Myths about the Soul's creation, wanderings, and goal. Diotima's Discourse in its latter, non-allegorical,

1 Plotinus, Enn. iii. 5, may be read for an elaborate interpretation of Diotima's Allegory:-Zeus is vous, Aphrodite is yuxń, Poros is Xoyos, Penia is An; and much more to the same effect. Cf. Cudworth, Intellectual System, vol. ii. p. 379 (ed. Mosheim and Harrison).

2 See Zeller's Plato, pp. 191-196 (Eng. Tr.), for the connection made, in the Phaedrus and Symposium, between Eros and Philosophy; and, especially p. 194, n. 66, for the meaning of Diotima's Discourse, and a protest against the NeoPlatonic interpretation of its meaning adopted by Jahn in his Diss. Plat. 64 ff. and 249 ff.

part we must regard as a true Myth-although it has no story, no pictures, because we feel that it might at any moment break out into the language of prophetic vision.

Its identification of Love and Philosophy is intended to bring home to the Imagination the great Platonic doctrine that Philosophy is Life. The outline, or ideal, presented here, without articulation, to the Imagination, is articulated, still for the Imagination, in the astronomical Eschatology of the Phaedrus Myth; and for the Understanding, in the account given in the Republic of the Philosophic Nature and of the Education which it needs. A vast non-articulated ideal, like that held up by Diotima in the latter part of her Discourse, lends itself easily to either kind of articulation-it may be articulated in an abstract way as a great system of laws, or pictorially, as a group of symbols making an Allegory which, because it is so vast, easily assumes the character of Myth. And Myth may be painted as well as spoken. As a scheme of education, articulating for the Imagination the Ideal of "Philosophy is Life," the Spanish Chapel fresco, which has already been instanced as a painted Myth, may well be placed beside the scheme set forth for the Understanding in the Republic. The details in the fresco are the result of minute analysis of the elements which constitute true education; but they are so presented to the eye as to reveal to its intuition the spiritual bond which unites them together in one meaning-in one λóyos Ts μiews which transcends the parts. Faith, Hope, and Charity are hovering in the sky, and beneath them, also in the sky, are Courage, Temperance, Justice, Prudence. Beneath these are seated in a row ten Prophets and Apostles, with S. Thomas Aquinas on a throne in the middle. Beneath these again sit the Sciences Divine and Natural, fourteen of them; and beneath each Science sits her greatest earthly Teacher.

2

The separate figures are symbols, and form groups which

1 485 B ff. That the scheme of education in the Republic articulates for the Understanding an outline, or ideal, presented to the Imagination is plainly admitted. The scheme is called a Mythas 376 Ε, ἴθι οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντές τε καὶ σχολὴν ἄγοντες λόγῳ παιδεύομεν τοὺς ἄνδρας: and 501 Ε, ʼn πоλTela v μvloλovoûμev λóyw: and see Couturat, de Plat. Mythis, p. 50Respublica tota ex ipsius auctoris sententia mythica est: cf. Tim. 26 c, Remp. 420 c, 536 в, c, 376 D, 501 E, 443 B, C.”

"

2 Supra, pp. 114 and 257.

may be interpreted as Allegories, but the whole picture which contains them is a Myth.

It is difficult, as I have pointed out before, to distinguish, in the work of a great creative artist, between Allegory and Myth. Allegory, consciously employed as such by a man of genius, always tends to pass into Myth. In dealing with this point I have said that Plato's Cave, carefully constructed as it is in all its detail, like the Spanish Chapel fresco, to give a picture of results already in the possession of its author, is, beyond all that, a wonder for the eye of Imagination to be grasped in one impression. Beneath the interpretation of the Allegory we are aware of the enigma of the Myth. Plato, we feel, had seen the whole before he began to articulate the parts. Perhaps, as I ventured to suppose, some weird scene in a Syracusan quarry gave the first suggestion.

I said that, although the former part of Diotima's Discourse is an Allegory, the latter part has the true characteristic of the Myth, setting forth, without narrative or pictures indeed, but in impassioned imaginative language, the Transcendental Idea of the Soul. It is only by accident, we feel, that the Discourse does not break out into the language of prophetic vision.

The Diotima of this Discourse may be taken as a study of the Prophetic Temperament.

Let me try to bring out the essential nature of this temperament by making some passages in Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus do service as a commentary on Plato's study. To appreciate the nature of the prophetic temperament and the use of prophecy as determined by the great Jewish critic-he was one of the founders of biblical criticism -is, I think, to go far towards appreciating the function of Myth in Plato's Philosophy.

The passages to which I refer are in the first and second chapters of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Spinoza begins by distinguishing teachers of natural science from prophets. Although natural science is divine, its teachers cannot be called prophets; for what the teachers of natural science impart as certain, other men receive as certain, and that not merely on authority but of their own knowledge. It is by the faculty of Imagination that prophets are dis

tinguished from teachers of natural science. By Imagination prophets perceive the revelations of God and transcend the limits of the Scientific Understanding. This is why they impart what they perceive almost always in parables, expressing spiritual truths by means of sensible images; for this is the method which their faculty naturally prescribes. Prophets are not endowed with a more perfect Intelligence, but with a more vivid Imagination than other men. Prophecy, as it depends on Imagination, does not per se involve certainty prophets are not made certain of the revelation of God by the revelation itself, but by a sign. Thus Abraham (Genesis xv. 8), on hearing the promise of God, asked for a sign. He, indeed, believed God, and did not ask for a sign in order that he might believe God, but in order that he might know that the thing was actually promised to him by God.1 Herein prophecy is inferior to natural knowledge, which needs no sign, but has its certainty in itself. The prophet's certainty is not metaphysical but moral. The prophet may be recognised by three marks: (1) he imagines the things revealed as vividly as if they were objects of waking sense, (2) he needs a sign, and (3)—and chiefly-he has a mind inclined to that which is just and good. Though this may seem to show that prophecy and revelation are uncertain, yet they have much that is certain; for God never deceives pious men, "His Elect." He uses them as instruments of His goodness, as he uses the wicked as instruments of His wrath. Now, since the signs are merely to persuade the prophet in a matter where the certainty is not metaphysical but moral, it follows that the signs are suited to the opinions and capacity of the prophet; and the revelation (i.e. the thing imagined) varies with the temperament (gay or sad), and the beliefs, of the prophet. The conclusion of all is that prophecy never adds to the knowledge of the prophet or of others, but leaves them in their preconceived opinions; so that, in merely speculative matters, we are not at all bound to believe prophets; but in matters which concern righteousness and moral character we are.2

1 Similarly, miracles do not make us believe in the existence of God. We must believe in the existence of God before we can believe in the occurrence of miracles.

2 Prophecy, says Professor P. Gardner (Jowett Lectures, 1901, p. 117), "is

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