The Confession of Belgium (A. D. 1566) declares, that "There is one only simple and spiritual essence, which we call God, eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite, etc."

The Articles of the English episcopal church declare, that "there is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions, etc."

The Confession of the Reformed churches in the Netherlands, revised at the Synod of Dort (A. D. 1618-1619), declares: "We believe that there is one only and simple, spiritual Being, which we call God; and that he is eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite, etc." (Vide Harmony of Confessions.)

With these agrees the Westminter Confession, approved by the general Assembly of Divines in A. D. 1647, adopted by all the Presbyterian churches in Great Britain and America, and assented to by a great part of the Congregational churches in New England. Its words are: "There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, etc." (West. Con. p. 32.)*

Now is this the denial of the divine unity, with which we are implicitly charged? Can Unitarians present a more complete description of the divine unity, than is presented by these Symbols of different denominations of Christians, who admit the doctrine of the Trinity?

But, admitting our statement of the divine unity to be correct, you will probably aver, that my second proposition is subversive of my first. Whether this be so, or not, is what I now propose to investigate.

The common language of the Trinitarian Symbols is, that "there are three PERSONS in the Godhead." In your comments upon this, you have all along explained the word person, just as though it were an established point, that Trinita

* So too the Westminster Catechism: "The same in substance, equal in power and glory."

rians use this word in such a connection, in its ordinary acBut can you satisfy yourself What fact is plainer from

ceptation as applied to men. that this is doing us justice? church history, than that the word person was introduced into the creeds of ancient times, merely as a term which would somewhat strongly express the disagreement of Christians in general with the reputed errors of the Sabellians, and others of similar sentiments, who denied the existence of any real distinction in the Godhead, and asserted that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were merely attributes of God, or the names of different ways in which he revealed himself to mankind, or of different relations which he bore to them, and in which he acted? The Nicene fathers meant to deny the correctness of such views, when they used the word person. They designed to imply by it, that there was some real, not merely nominal, distinction in the Godhead; and that something more than a mere diversity of relation or action of the Godhead in respect to us, was intended. They used the word person, because they supposed it approximated nearer to expressing the existence of a real distinction, than any other which they could choose. Most certainly, neither they, nor any intelligent Trinitarian, could use this term in such a latitude as you represent us as employing it, and as you attach to it. We profess to use it merely because of the poverty of language; merely to designate our belief of a real distinction in the Godhead; but not to describe independent, conscious beings, possessing separate and equal essences and perfections. Why should we be obliged so often to explain ourselves on this point? Is there any more difficulty here, or anything more obnoxious, than when you say: "God is angry with the wicked every day?" You defend yourself in the use of such an expression, by saying, that it is only the language of rhetoric and figure; that it is merely intended to describe that in the mind of the Deity, or in his actions, which corresponds in some measure, or in some respect, to anger and its consequences in men; not that God is really affected with the passion of anger. Why will you

not permit me then to say that we speak of persons in the Godhead, in order to express that which in some respect or other corresponds to persons as applied to men, i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a separate consciousness, will, omnipotence, omniscience, etc.? Where then, considering the poverty of language in respect to expressing what belongs to the Deity, is our inconsistency in this, or how is there any absurdity in our language, providing there is a real foundation in the Scriptures on which we may rest the fact of a distinction, which we believe to exist?

I could wish indeed, on some accounts, that the word person had never come into the symbols of the churches, because it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary dispute and difficulty. But since it has been in common use so long, it is difficult now, perhaps impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily concede that the use of it ought to be so guarded, as not to lead Christians generally into erroneous ideas of God. Nor can I suppose that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that which you attribute to us as believing. Then surely it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and then charge them with the absurdities consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used aside from their ordinary import. And what can teach us in a plainer manner, that Trinitarians do use the word person in this way, than that they do universally agree that God is one, both in essence and in attributes?

It might have been justly expected, likewise, that before they were charged with subverting the divine unity, the meaning of the word person, in the ancient records which describe its first introduction into the symbols of the church, should have been carefully investigated. One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, de

mands that "every word. . . . should be modified and explained according to the subject which is discussed, according to the PURPOSES, feelings, circumstances, and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dispute between us about the meaning of person is forever at an end.

What then, you doubtless will ask, is the specific nature of that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the specific definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt to make out. By what shall I, or can I, define it? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being, who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eternal? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here, in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact, that there are three persons in the Godhead, (in the sense explained); that there is a distinction, which affords grounds for the respective appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which lays the foundation for the application of the personal pronouns, I, Thou, He; which renders it proper to speak of sending and being sent; to speak of Christ as being with God, being in his bosom, and of other things of the like nature in the like way, and yet to hold that the divine nature equally belongs to each; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation.

Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact that there is a distinction in the Godhead, than there is in understanding the fact that God possesses an underived existence? With what shall we compare such existence? All other beings are derived; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with which it can be compared. To define it, then, is beyond our reach. We approximate towards a conception

of it, merely by negatives. We deny, for example, that the divine existence has any author or cause; and when we have done this, we have not defined it, but simply said that a certain thing does not belong to it. And here we must rest; for archangels, it is probable, cannot proceed beyond this.

The distinction in the Godhead, I ought to say here, we do not, and cannot, consider as a mere subject of speculation, which has little or no concern with ardent piety, or the best hopes of the Christian. We believe that some of the most interesting and endearing exhibitions of the divine character are founded upon it; and that corresponding duties are urged upon us, and peculiar hopes excited, and peculiar consolations administered, by it.

In regard to this distinction, we say: It is not a mere distinction of attributes, of relation to us, of modes of action, or of relation between attributes and substance or essence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures justify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject. We undertake, (at least the Trinitarians of our country with whom I am acquainted undertake), not at all to describe affirmatively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative description of underived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of the divine self-existence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, because we cannot affirmatively define it.

I may ask moreover: What is the eternity of God? You answer by telling me, that there never was a time when he did not exist, and never can be one when he will not exist. True; but then, what was time, before the planetary system which measures it had an existence? And what will time be, when these heavens and this earth shall be blotted out? Besides, passing over this difficulty about time, you have only given a negative description of God's eternity; you deny certian things of him, and then aver that he is eternal. Yet because you cannot affirmatively describe eternity, you would