BLACKWOOD'S EDINBURGH MAGAZINE. No. LXXV. APRIL, 1823. Vol. XIII. REMARKS ON MR ALISON'S THEORY OF BEAUTY, AS EXPLAINED BY MR JEFFREY That the researches of Mr Alison, in justification of the qualified asserand his reviewer Mr Jeffrey, have con- tion, that much of the pleasure which tributed to throw considerable light we are in use to experience on conon the interesting topics of Sublimity templating objects which are beautiand Beauty, it would be absurd to de- ful or sublime, is referable to the imany. One very fertile source of agree- gination, operating in the manner able emotion has at all events been which he has described. For that opi. explored by them; and their specula- nion has been long ago illustrated by tions possess, upon the whole, a veri- the ablest philosophers, and has never, similitude, which shews, that to a in so far as we know, been disputed by certain extent at least, they must be any one. well-founded. “A system of natural Without farther preface, we shall philosophy,” says Dr Adam Smith, proceed in our attempt to separate, by "may appear very plausible, and be means of a few brief explanations, the for a long time very generally received, errors of his system from the truth.and yet have uo foundation in nature; But, first of all, in order to shew clearbut the author, who should assign as ly what his peculiar opinions are, rethe cause of any natural sentiment, specting the nature of beauty and sus some principle which neither had any blimity, and of our emotions on conconnection with it, nor resembled any templating them, we quote the followother principle which had some con- ing succinct statement of these opininection, would appear absurd and ris ons by Mr Jeffrey.-"It is," says he, diculous to the most injudicious and " the opinion of this excellent writer, inexperienced reader." (Mr Alison,) to express it in one senMr Alison, throughout his volumi- tence, that the emotions which we exnous work, has appealed so often and perience from the contemplation of so successfully to the common sense sublimity or beauty, are not produced and the daily experience of mankind, by any physical or intrinsic quality in as to leave upon the minds of his read- the objects which we contemplate ; but ers not a shadow of doubt, that his by the recollection or conception of theory must have some foundation in other objects which are associated in nature. And if his principles have been our imaginations with those before us, carried rather too far, and have been and consequently suggested by their made the basis of conclusions which appearance; and which are interestthey do not quite justify, the error is ing or affecting, on the common and one which lies open to all who have familiar principle of being the natural understandings to make use of the ma- objeets of love, or of pity, or of fear or terials which he has so amply furnish- veneration, or some other common and ed. It may, indeed, be considered as lively sensation of the mind. This is somewhat superfluous to say any thing the first and most important proposi. Vol. XIII. 3 B tion in his theory; of which, accord- word. We may therefore be allowed ingly, it may be stated as the funda- to say, in conformity with the commental principle, that all objects are mon use of language, that colours and beautiful or sublime which signify or forms, considered abstractedly from suggest to us some simple emotion of the other qualities of the objects in love, pity, terror, or any other social which they are perceived, may be more or selfish affection of our nature; and or less beautiful; in other words, that that the beauty or sublimity which we the feeling of the beautiful is coeval ascribe to them consists entirely in the with sensation. As the mind, howpower which they have acquired, by ever, advances to maturity, each exassociation or otherwise, of reminding panding faculty adds to that primary us of the proper objects of these fami- feeling the peculiar emotions to which liar affections. Mr Alison adds, that its operation gives birth. At first the the sensation of sublimity or beauty is infant is only sensible to what may be not fully developed by the mere sug- called the beauty of sensation ; he pergestion of some natural object of in- ceives in all around him nothing but terest or affection ; but is distinctly forms and colours more or less agreefelt, only when the imagination is sti- able to his eye. The child learns by mulated to conceive a connected train degrees to add to his sensations the or series of such objects, in unison perception of that particular state or with that which was first suggested by condition of objects of which they are the particular form, which is cailed the natural signs. And lastly, the beautiful, only for having been the poet and the man of sensibility, not parent of such a train.” content with the united pleasures of In opposition to the above state- sensation and perception, sets his mement, we shall endeavour to shew, mory and his imagination at work, that the recollection or conception of and fashions for the objects before him other objects, associated with the one a beauty which is not their own, but which we contemplate, is not by any which takes its character from the parmeans necessary in order to our esteem- ticular frame and texture of his mind. ing it beautiful ; much less does the Now, unfortunately, Mr Jeffrey, combeauty of that object consist in its mencing at the very end of this propower of producing any.recollection or cess, has either entirely overlooked conception in our minds. the previous steps of it, or has forgotParticular colours and forms are cer- ten the necessity of their intervention : tainly in themselves distinguished by and thus we distinctly see the origin a species of beauty. The vulgar call of his erroneous opinion, that it is only a colour beautiful, just as they call a “ by the recollection or conception of taste sweet, in cases where the plea- other objects, which are associated in sure is purely and immediately refer- our imaginations with those before us," able to the nature of the impression that we receive the impression of sumade upon the eye; and we hold it to blimity or beauty. The truth is, howbe a good rule,“ to think with philo- ever, that agreeable sensations, or the sophers, but speak with the vulgar." view of agreeable forms and colours, It would seem, indeed, that the pri- such, perhaps, as those which have mary use of the term Beauty, in all been pointed out by Mr Burke, are languages, has been simply to distin- essential, in the first place, to the perguish between the pleasures of sight ception of beauty in objects, and the and those of the other senses; als production of the simple feeling conthough at present its signification is so sequent upon it. In unison with that exceedingly extensive, and its figura- feeling and perception, Fancy may tive application so very frequent, that perform her nobler pert, and may pour it has become impossible to give it a upon the soul a flood of delightful definition. Meanwhile, we must needs emotion. But that emotion is entirely confine our attention to the subject of adventitious, and is of no definite chavisible beauty ; leaving it to those who racter. It may therefore render the are best able, to account for the “con object which is perceived ten times spicuous and distinct” existence of the more agreeable than it otherwise same or any similar quality, in argu- would have been ; but, in strict proments, tunes, demonstrations, and priety of speech, it cannot be said to such other anomalous shapes. render that object one iota more beauIt is needless to dispute about a tiful. It is true, as Mr Jeffrey contends, but also that there is no " physical or that there is perhaps no modification intrinsic” quality of beauty in objects. of colour or of form, which can be Let us now bestow upon this dogma, pointed out in all objects that are beau- and the theory from which it has sprung tiful. But surely we cannot be called up, a little farther attention. upon to say so, in order to be allowed In our present state of existence, the to think, with Mr Burke, that the sim- qualities of external objects are made ple elements of beauty are ultimately known to us solely by means of certain to be sought after among those modes arbitrary signs, which, according to the of sensation, which are naturally most laws of our constitution, are uniformpleasing to the mind, and which are ly associated with them. One class of found to occur most frequently in our impressions upon my senses, when conperceptions of beautiful objects. It is veyed to my mind by sensation, denote not in consequence of the possession of whiteness, another sweetness, another any one common quality, which can hardness. It is, however, evident, that be laid hold of by the understanding, no conceivable sensation can possibly that some smells and tastes are more resemble the whiteness that is in snow, ågreeable than others. But who ever the sweetness that is in honey, or the thought of calling in question the ori- hardness that is in stone. But, never. ginal source of the pleasure which we theless, by the laws of my constituderive from these senses ? tion, I am led irresistibly to believe in We do not intend to create any dis- the real existence of those qualities of pute about the degree of pleasure which objects which affect my senses. I know we are capable of receiving from the that God has not constituted my mind sight, considered merely as one of the so as to deceive and mislead me. But external senses, or to cavil concerning independently altogether of this assuthe measure of delightful sensation rance, I am led, as it were, instinctivewhich the kaleidoscope can furnish to ly, and without reflection, to think and the man, or the child. For we freely act conformably to the language which admit that colours and forms, however nature speaks to me by the senses, so + lovely in themselves, do not in general soon as I am able to interpret it. constitute the entire beauty of any ob- Des Cartes, it is well known, flattered jects, and for the most part contribute himself he had made a very important only in a subordinate degree, to the discovery, when he thought he had production of emotion in the minds of found out that there is no heat in the grown up people. Experience teaches fire, nor smell in a rose, nor taste in an us that they serve to indicate a certain apple. And Mr Locke and every sucstate of relative perfection in objects; ceeding philosopher, till the time of and in this as in other cases, we very Reid, was in use to astonish the uninisoon learn to abstract our regard more tiated by a statement of the same apor less from the sign, and to fix it upon parently strange dogma, with his own the thing signified. Accordingly, we additions and improvements. Themysobserve that the term Beauty has two tery is now, however, fully cleared up. distinct significations. We find it Mr Locke used the word heat to denote sometimes applied to denote the agree the sensation in our minds, which no able quality of our sensations; but in one of common sense ever could becommon discourse, it is much more fre- lieve to exist without us; while the quently used to signify that inherent vulgar more commonly applied it to quality, or that state of relative perfec- the unknown cause of that sensation tion, in the objects around us, within the fire. And thus it happened, which the appearances that cause those that while Mr Locke and the vulgar sensations are found united, in our ac- thought in exactly the same way, his tual perceptions. From an inattention opinion, which, when properly stated, to this important distinction, has arisen amounts in fact to a complete truism, much of that uncertainty which has so came to assume the form of a most long prevailed in the philosophical astonishing paradox, which deceived world, with regard to the nature of himself in the first place, and afterbeauty. Mr Jeffrey, for example, ab- wards the world, for half a censtracting his regard from all but our tury. complex emotions, tells us, not merely Now, let us remark how very nearthat these emotions are not referable to ly allied this paradox of Mr Locke is our original sensations and perceptions, to that of Mr Jeffrey, with regard to the non-existence of Beauty, as a perma- called by philosophers --whether pernent quality of objects. Colour, says fection, order, or fitness of things, -is the one, is not in the rose, but merely called beauty by mankind in general, in the mind of him who perceives it. there cannot be a rational doubt enBeauty, says the other, is not in the tertained. rose, but only in the mind of him who, Now, if it bé once admitted that by a certain effort of imagination, is beauty is indeed a permanent qualienabled to discern it. For both, the ty, the theory of association, like Mr same answer will suffice. Every one, Locke's doctrine of secondary quali: whose organs of vision are in a healthy ties, becomes stripped entirely of its pastate, receives certain sensationson look- radoxical form, and in part results in a ing upon a rose; and these sensations statement of truisms. That the nature are the signs of its inherent qualities. and the real existence-not of beauty Now, when they are of a certain charac- itself—but of our perception of it, deter, we are led to consider them as be- pends entirely upon the laws of our ing also the signs of a particular state present constitution, is certainly abunof perfection, or whatever it may be dantly manifest; for upon these lawsdes called, in which the parts of the rose pends our perception of colour, of form, exist, and to which we give the name of hardness, and indeed of every other of beauty; and we then say, that we be- property of bodies. That form of mathold a beautiful rose. The colour and ter which now gives us the perception the beauty in this case are alike inhes of colour, may possibly give no such rent in the rose—the signs of them alone perception to angels; and it is at least exist in the mind. conceivable, that objects which are Now, it is plain that we cannot, prior beautiful to us, are not so to them. to experience, tell why any simple sen- The latter supposition is, however, sations should be significant of beauty, highly improbable. Higher orders of and not of deformity ; since we cannot beings than ourselves, who see things even tell why they should be significant as they really are, and not as repre of a beautiful red colour, and not of a sented by signs, must, where we are dirty brown. In either case, the effect simply pleased by the perception of upon the mind must necessarily be to- beauty, be ravished by the sight of tally dissimilar in itself to any form of inherent perfection. matter. It can therefore only be by an It is also quite self-evident, that the original principle of our nature, that same beautiful objects must affect dif: we are led to believe in the real existe ferent people differently, according to ence of beauty in the rose. And it is the diversities of constitution and of as unlikely that nature has deceived us, education which subsist among them; in instilling into us that principle of for nature speaks to some in a plainer belief, as that she has deceived us in language than to others. A man who regard to the real existence of redness has a perfect vision, may derive more in the rose, or rather of some unknown pleasure from beholding beautiful coquality which has the power to pro- lours, than another man whose vision duce the idea of that colour in our is less perfect ;-and so also in the minds. mind of a person who has a lively imaThat beauty, instead of being, as is gination, the perception of a coloured commonly supposed, a permanent qua. object, or a group of coloured objects, lity of objects, has only an accidental may, by accidentally producing agreeexistence, depending on the occasion- able trains of thought, excite agree al creation of pleasant visions in the able emotions, which, by another per mind of man, is a doctrine abhorrent to son, or at another time, are untelt. common sense. Would Paradise not Now, if that object, or that group, is have been more beautiful than a de said to appear on these accounts more sart, unless Adam had been created to beautiful, we quarrel not with the exadorn it with human associations ? tended use of the term, provided phi. And, by the way, it is rather a curious losophers will keep always in mind the question, which Milton has quite over distinction which really subsists belooked, with what associations he could tween the original permanent quality possibly at the first adorn it. How of beauty, and the occasional flecting ever, concerning the real and perma- emotions which sometimes heighten nent existence of some quality or other its priinary effect. For the simple perin objects, which, whatever it may be ception of beauty in an object, is of course accompanied with a simple emotion of pleasure, which is sui generis, and which must be quite familiar to every one. When caused by a simple perception alone, this emotion exists pure and unmixed; but it more frequently exists in combination with other emotions. In the former case, we are at once conscious of its presence: in the latter, we must analyse and reflect upon the objects of our consciousness, in order to discover it. Nevertheless we have the common sense of mankind in favour of its existence, even in cases of very complex emotion. When told that the face or the form of a lovely woman derives its beauty solely from this association, or that, or the other, or from all united; our reason, although perhaps constrained to give its assent, gives it reluctantly, and remains, after all, doubtful and unsatisfied; and, on the other hand, we naturally believe, without reasoning at all about the matter, that there is something in beauty beyond all these associations. Now, this is exactly what we call the common sense of mankind. Nor is this common sense incapable of being justified by solid argument. A woman is often said to be not beautiful but agreeable, or beautiful but not agreeable. In both of these cases, it appears, that Imagination and Reason have done their utmost to destroy our perception of beauty, but in both have failed. For how, indeed, is it possible for either of these faculties to alter or annihilate an original perception? Experience teaches us that habit may render the countenance of an ordinary woman pleasing, by associating the features of it with those amiable dispositions, of which they happen to be the sign; but Experience also teaches us, that it can do no more. Imagination and Reason may together create ten thousand of these associations, and may thus serve to render a woman highly agreeable, in a general sense; but they can never create or destroy that simple perception and feeling, which give a well-known specific character to our complex emotion, when we think and feel that she is beautiful. Mr Jeffrey bestows upon us one or two arguments, in order to remove "the seeming anomaly," as he is plea sed to call it, "of admitted beauty, where there is no expression of any amiable or attractive emotion." He says, for example, that beauty is always associated (in the imagination it is to be supposed he means) with the ideas of youth and health, and that the female form is to men, the object of a passion, which is satisfied with these attributes. And he also says, that "our impression of the beauty of the human countenance is derived from a habitual recollection of the interesting or amiable qualities of which it is generally found to be the sign." When we have brought ourselves to believe that a sinooth surface may be made rough and uneven-that white may be made black-and that red may be made yellow, by Mr Jeffrey's arguments, we may perhaps be induced to take some pains in considering them. But, in the meantime, we may remark, that the view of an ugly countenance calls up the ideas of youth and health, no less frequently than that of a beautiful one; and that we have sometimes heard of females admiring each other -or admiring and hating, if you will, with a corresponding intensity and ardour. With respect to the last mentioned argument, it is, in the first place, a mere gratuitous assertion ;but, secondly, there is a well-known principle, that whatever tendency is the result of a habit, may be removed by an opposite habit. But we cannot bring ourselves to cease admiring a woman as beautiful, by habitually reflecting that she is unamiable. Therefore it appears, that the feeling caused by contemplating the beauty of the human form cannot be owing to any "habitual recollection" in the mind of the beholder. Let it not be here objected, that the same forms and countenances do not appear equally beautiful to all men; for, in so far as this phenomenon is owing to varieties in the original perception, we know that it is still more strikingly displayed in the case of the other senses. We have already remarked, that Nature does not speak exactly the same language to all men; an approximation to uniformity in the information, which, at different times, and in different circumstances, she conveys to us by means of the senses, is all that can either be expected or desired. We freely admit the influence of circumstances, such as diversities in the bodily organs, and among the objects which act upon them, in mo |