maxim.

The noble viscount was also in error in assuming that the objections felt against the naval conduct of the war applied only to America, and to the capture of the frigate alluded to; those objections extend

Brazils, and even to the South Seas. Jamaica was notoriously left so unprotected as to be in a state of blockade by American privateers. Indeed he was assured that a ship and cargo worth 60,000l. had been captured by an American vessel off that island, and had lain there two days, during which time no British ship of war appeared to rescue her. In the Windward and Leeward islands we had only 1,500 men for their protection, while the seas around swarmed with American privateers, defying and deriding the naval force of England. And with respect to Guiana, an application was made in vain for a convoy to escort our trade to Eng. land, without which convoy it was actually obliged to sail. But in Demarara, our commercial vessels, with one of our frigates, was really for some time blockaded by the Americans; nay, a British ship was actually cut out of the harbour by an American privateer. Then as to the Brazils, we had upon indisputable record, that an English vessel of war was positively challenged to contend with an American frigate; and in the South Seas we had lost several whalers. With these facts before the House, he would ask, whether there did not exist sufficient grounds for complaint and ample reasons for enquiry.

unavailing. Was there not then, under | pacem in bello para,' being an indisputable all the circumstances in the cases alluded to, sufficient grounds to excite in every rational mind a suspicion of neglect, and improvidence, on the part of our naval administration? and did not such suspicion justify a demand for inquiry? But the noble viscount at the head of the Ad-ing to the West Indies, to Guiana, to the miralty had observed, that if ever so many British vessels had been placed on the American station, still American ships might escape from port, and through disparity of force overcome detached English frigates. Which escape, however, of American ships, would not have been so practicable, had adequate measures been taken in due time to blockade the American_harbours., That the Chesapeake and Delaware, New York and Rhode Island, might have been blockaded, no one acquainted with those places would attempt to deny, and it was notorious that during the blockade of Toulon, for several months, only two ships had escaped. Why then, was not similar vigilance exhibited with respect to America, in order to protect our trade and our frigates; and why was not that vigilance put forth in the earliest season by those ministers, who ought to have been prepared for war with America, from their peculiar knowledge of the state of the negociation with the American government, and of the disposition of that government, but particularly in consistency with their declaration, that the American government was not to be conciliated? For so they repeatedly declared when proposing and supporting the Orders in Council, which they would not repeal until such evidence appeared of the mischievous operation of these Orders upon our own trade and people as was calculated to impress the Americans with a belief that the repeal was more owing to our own distress than to any spirit of conciliation towards them. But the noble viscount had expressed an opinion, that if ministers had taken such a vigorous measure of preparation as his noble friend who made the motion wished for, they would have been censured and disapproved of by his side of the House. For himself, however, and his noble friends, he could most confidently declare that the opinion was unfounded. Nothing could, indeed, be farther from their sentiments than to condemn on any occasion an adequate preparation for war, for such a state of preparation was the best policy of any government bellum in pace,

But to return to America; it appeared that notwithstanding the signal valour and conduct of our army, opposed to the force which attempted to invade Canada, there was still too much ground to accuse ministers of misconduct in that direction, for the Americans had been permitted to construct a naval force both upon Lake Superior and Lake Erie. Indeed, on one of those lakes the Americans had a frigate of 36 guns. The noble viscount had, however, stated, that from the amount and distribution of our naval force, it was impracticable to send a larger force to the stations alluded to than had been actually sent. But could the House be influenced by such a statement, considering that we had actually 1000 vessels of war in commission, of which 100 were ships of the line, while we had no naval power to con

tend against but those of France and Ame- | rica, which, combined, were comparatively insignificant. The noble viscount had, however, followed this statement-after asserting that our trade was not conceived to be in danger, as the rates of insurance had not advanced above one per cent. since the commencement of the American war (which assertion he was assured, upon good authority, was quite unfounded)-by alleging, in rather a tone of boast, that if the whole American navy had dared to proceed to Halifax or Newfoundland, where a British squadron was to be met, that navy would have been completely destroyed. But, unfortunately for the noble viscount, the Americans did not think proper to make war according to his desire. They were too wise to follow the noble viscount's advice. But, in seriousness, what could be thought of the mind or conduct of a first lord of the Admiralty or of any director of the English navy, who, if a fleet had come out from Brest, and committed considerable depredations, should say in his defence-" Ay, to be sure, the fact is indisputable, but if the Brest fleet had presumed to come to Torbay, where I had stationed a fine British squadron, it would have been utterly extinguished." (A laugh, and hear!) What then was to be thought of the nature of the noble viscount's defence in this debate? After further urging this and the other points of his speech with considerable ingenuity and force, particularly dwelling upon the neglect of ministers to avail themselves of the proper opportunity by early exertion to bring the American government to sentiments of moderation, by convincing it of the perils of war, the noble earl concluded with an animated exbortation to the House, as it valued the essential interests and future security of the country, to institute the proposed enquiry. The Earl of Galloway, in explanation, stated, that if the proposed enquiry did not imply a censure upon ministers, he would support it; but as that proposition appeared to him to convey a direct censure, he must oppose it.

Earl Bathurst observed, that the chief ground taken by the noble lords who supported the motion, was derived from the capture of three British frigates by three American frigates; and it was maintained that it ought to have been the duty of ministers to have foreseen the war to have provided for every exigency. With respect to the commencement of the war,

ministers did not think it wise and prudent to withdraw the ships of the line from the blockade of ports in one quarter, to employ them in the blockade of ports in another and with regard to the capture of the three frigates, he would put it to the candour of the House, whether any certain arrangements could have been made to prevent these losses happening, as they had done, in very distant parts? One was taken off the Western Isles; another in the Brazils; and the third had been separated from a line of battle ship, when they were both on a cruize. There was in reality no foresight, no precaution, which could prevent such losses. It was objected to them that a war with America having been foreseen by his Majesty's ministers, they ought to have been provided for it: but though they foresaw that a war would at some time or other inevitably follow, they saw no reason why it should take place at that particular time. From the arrangements that had been just made, there was every reason to suppose the contrary; but the Americans, in fact, went to war on the unprincipled motive, that that was the most advantageous time in which they could go to war, and because they thought they should capture our fleets which were then setting sail from the West Indies. In this object, however, which was their primary motive for commencing the war, owing to the vigilance of government in sending vessels to the protection of our West India merchantmen, they had completely failed. With respect to what had been said of the raising the insurance on vessels, it was not generally true. Only two instances had been given of vessels which had been insured at a high rate, and this had arisen from other accidental circumstances, as in the case of the Bonne Citoyenne, which had been for a long time given over as lost. It would require ten ships of the line and an immense number of frigates to blockade the ports of America, and protect our trade along the whole line of coast in the manner proposed by the noble earl. This was not the principle on which government had acted, nor did they think it right to act on the principle of withdrawing their naval force from the blockade of an enemy with whom they were at war, for the blockade of one with whom they might some time or other be at war. The paper of the American government called for by the noble mover, he had not alluded to in the course of the debate, nor did he won

der at it, as he must have found that that I had told us that they would, if certain paper contained a complete contradiction terms were not complied with; and, se. to a great part of his motion. Our naval condly, for the reason assigned by the losses were supposed to be entirely owing noble lord himself, that this was the best to negligence; our successes by land were possible time for them to go to war in; attributed to good fortune. Thus the re- when we had no disposable force on their sults of the campaign in Canada, which coast, and our fleets were exposed unwas a tissue of brilliant actions, were protected to their depredations. But, it merely good fortune. The noble earl seemed, it was not from mere accident or trusted that we should have the same negligence that our fleets were left thus good fortune this year that we had the defenceless at this critical juncture: no, last, and that the conquest of Canada, it was because, according to the declarawhich the Americans had boasted they tion of the noble viscount, it was the sysshould accomplish in six weeks, would tem and policy of the government to cripnever take place. ple the naval exertions and resources of the country, for the sake of schemes and projects which they were prosecuting, he knew not with what success, on the continent. This declaration called for inquiry more loudly than any thing else; it imputed a crime of a blacker dye than any charge which had been alleged against ministers. If our failures had arisen from inability, and all our resources had been exerted, but exerted in vain, this might have formed some excuse: but he did not expect to be told that our weakness, our imbecility, was the result of system and design, and a determined resolution on the part of government to cramp and cripple our navy, in a war like the present, in which the existence of the country was at stake. To be told this in the face of parliament must call aloud for inquiry, if noble lords had one drop of English blood remaining in their veins. Some adroitness had been shewn by ministers in the war in that House-the only war in which they shone-in, ringing the changes on frigates taken or not taken. To be sure, if only one or two frigates had been taken by the enemy, it would have formed a narrow ground for inquiry; but when the capture of these frigates was the whole of what had been done-when all the advantages which had been gained were against us, this, undoubtedly, was a strong primâ facie evidence, was a sufficient ground for suspicion and inquiry. When we knew that the Americans were increasing their naval force, we ought to have increased ours. When we knew that our frigates were not able to meet theirs, we ought to have built a class of vessels equal to their frigates, and not have waited to be told this night, by the noble viscount, that he is now cutting down ships for this purpose, and preparing to go to war with America, after a year's hostilities. If we ought to build these vessels now we are

Lord Grenville said, that the doctrine laid down by the noble earl (Galloway), that inquiry implied censure, would lead to the abdication of all the functions of parliament; for no inquiry could, in this case, be instituted, without incurring the guilt of condemning the parties unheard. The true principle had been stated by his noble friend, that they ought not to vote for inquiry on slight grounds, or without strong facts to support it. There were few men who regarded the war with America with feelings of deeper regret than he had always done, because there were few men who had the same opportunity of knowing the difficulty which we had to encounter in the contest, which his Majesty's ministers were just beginning to feel. He had, therefore, all along besought, intreated, conjured them to do justice to America in those points, in which we had done her injustice; not, indeed, to give up our own rights, but to place ourselves in a situation to vindicate those rights more effectually. He had, therefore, urged the rescinding the Orders in Council, that it might be seen what the true ground of the quarrel was. This was not the injustice of those Orders, but a determined hostility in the American government against this country. But though he thought that conciliatory measures ought to have been adopted, he did not think this a reason that we should not, at the same time, have put ourselves in a formidable posture of defence. This, how ever, the noble viscount (he thought very strangely, and contrary to all known maxims of policy) treated as a contradiction and an absurdity. The noble earl, who spoke last, had said that we knew the Americans would go to war, but how were we to know that they would go to war when they did. By two of the most obvious methods in the world. First, they