Kant and Spencer: A Critical ExpositionHoughton, Mifflin, 1912 - 439 sayfa |
Diğer baskılar - Tümünü görüntüle
Sık kullanılan terimler ve kelime öbekleri
absolute admit affirm agnosticism antinomy apodictic appears argument atheism become causality cause changes coexistence conceive conception connection consciousness deduce doctrine elements empirical empiricism empiricists ence evolution existence experience extensive quantities external fact feelings fundamental reality give given Hence ideas impossible impressions infinite insight intelligence intuition judgment Kant Kant's kind knowledge lative laws of thought ledge logic matter and motion means mental metaphysical mind modes molecules nature nervous never nihilism nomena noumenon object organic perception persistence of force phenomena philosophy physical possible principle Principles of Psychology priori produced pure rational rational psychology reason regard relation relative realities representations sciousness seems sensations sense simply Sir William Hamilton space spatial Spencer substance suppose syllogisms symbols synthesis synthetic table of judgments temporal things thought tion transcendental truth unconditioned understanding unity Unknowable vesicles vivid
Popüler pasajlar
Sayfa 438 - If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.
Sayfa 320 - Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity ; and during •which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.
Sayfa 268 - that his ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts...
Sayfa 438 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the —'perception.
Sayfa 3 - If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.
Sayfa 246 - The very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known, as that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not.
Sayfa 316 - Matter, Motion, and Force are ,but symbols of the Unknown Reality. A Power of which the nature remains for ever inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or Space can be' imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects have certain likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together under the names of Matter, Motion, and Force...
Sayfa 270 - He, like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause ; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and act out that belief.
Sayfa 40 - Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible?
Sayfa 32 - Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. Therefore it is equally necessary to make our concepts sensuous, ie to add to them their object in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, ie to bring them under concepts. These two powers or faculties cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their union only can knowledge be produced.